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ABSTRACT 
Sectarian Homes: The Making of Shiʿi Families and Citizens  
under the French Mandate, 1918–1943 
Linda Sayed 
My dissertation focuses on the legal recognition of the Shiʿi sect by the Mandate state as 
a pivotal point in generating increased sectarian awareness, particularly as it related to the 
domain of the family. I analyze the impact this had on the space of the family during the French 
Mandate and the creation of the new Lebanese nation-state from 1918–1943 as growing concerns 
to reform Shiʿi families emerged. I explore how the family became intertwined in the system of 
sectarianism and became vital to the understanding of Shiʿas as a Lebanese sect. This study 
examines three sites, the Shiʿi press, Jaʿfari shariʿa courts, and Shiʿi educational institutions, in 
order to reveal how familial and gendered relationships were defined, performed, and 
constructed during this period. All three sites represent different forms of producing Shiʿi 
families and gender relationships. By exposing the differences in these spaces, I disclose how 
multiple notions of masculinity and femininity were deployed in the formation of the Shiʿas as a 
collective entity and citizens of the nation-state. 
By concentrating on the locus of the family, my dissertation highlights how marital and 
gender roles became intertwined in sectarian and national categories of practices for the Shiʿi 
Muslims of Lebanon. This study seeks to place the family space and everyday experiences of 
Shiʿi Muslims in the understandings and articulations of sectarian and nationalist concepts of 
identity. The multiple productions of Shiʿi families in the press, Jaʿfari shariʿa court records, and 
Shiʿi educational institutions reveal how fluid and mutable gendered, sectarian, and national 
modes of identification were during this period. 
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This dissertation is a historical examination of how Shiʿi Muslims in Lebanon came to 
practice citizenship and sectarianism, and the impact these practices had on the family-system 
during the French Mandate and in the creation of the Lebanese nation-state from 1918–1943. By 
focusing on the domain of the family, this historical study highlights how familial and gender 
roles became intertwined in sectarian and national categories of practices for Shiʿi Muslims of 
Lebanon. It looks at various institutions that became interwoven with the institutions of the 
modern nation-state, including the Shiʿi press, Jaʿfari shariʿa courts, and Shiʿi educational 
institutions. In doing so, this historical study reveals how Shiʿi families were integrated (and 
integrated themselves) in the Lebanese national formation, and multiple, and at times competing, 
sectarian identifications.1 It was within the space of the family that political, social, and cultural 
constructions of sectarianism and Lebanese nationality were provoked, negotiated, and 
normalized through these various institutions and everyday practices of Shiʿi Muslims. In 
conducting this study, I was guided by the following research questions: How did the recognition 
of Shiʿas as an official Lebanese sect affect their integration as citizens into the newly formed 
nation-state? How did sectarian categories of identification inform Shiʿi familial practices and 
gender roles? And finally how did the space of the family become intertwined in the formation of 
Lebanon as a nation-state and the production of competing practices of sectarianism?  
The study, entitled Sectarian Homes, highlights how the space of the family was 
important to the integration of Shiʿas as both a modern sect and as citizens into the newly 
emerging Lebanese nation-state during the French Mandate. Specifically, this dissertation 
                                                           
1 I use the term identification rather than identity throughout this dissertation as argued by Rogers Brubaker and 
Fredrick Cooper in “Beyond ‘Identity,’” in Theory and Society 29 [1] (2000): 1–47. 
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examines the changes during the Mandate period that generated a Shiʿi sense of collective 
awareness, and fostered a need to address and reform societal and gender norms as they related 
to the family. These changes took place as the Shiʿi population became bounded and defined by 
the borders of a newly constructed Lebanese nation-state. The space of the family, and in 
particular marital relationships, became vital in the understanding of the Shiʿi population as a 
modern Lebanese sect. This project explores that space, along with how the Shiʿi population 
debated constructions of gender, notions of masculinity and femininity, childbearing, and 
education in its efforts to integrate into the Lebanese nation-state.  
In order to conduct this project, my research utilized the archives of the Jaʿfari shariʿa 
courts in conjunction with records from Shiʿi press and educational institutions to examine how 
sectarian and gender identities were shaped, debated, and reconstructed during this period of 
Lebanese national formation. These records revealed how sectarian and national categories were 
practiced in the space of the family and within gender relations, and how the population came to 
negotiate and normalize what it meant to be a modern citizen of the Lebanese nation-state. 
Sectarian Homes shows how Shiʿi sectarian identifications were continuously reproduced, 
challenged, and negotiated in national and gender practices of citizenship during this period of 
national formation.  
Sectarian Homes makes two major contributions to the historiographical literature on 
Lebanon. First, this dissertation adds to the growing but still diminutive social history of the 
Shiʿi community in Lebanon by exploring Shiʿi practices of sectarian formation and gender 
studies during the French Mandate period. It is the first study of its kind based upon early 
primary sources from Lebanese Shiʿi institutions that focuses on the domain of the family, and 
the ways the “family” was implicated in the processes of Shiʿi identification and sectarian 
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production. By looking at these various institutions, Sectarian Homes reveals how Shiʿi 
individuals of various socioeconomic classes negotiated, constructed, and normalized competing 
notions of Shiʿi sectarian identity and gender roles as they pertained to their newly acquired 
Lebanese citizenship. The family became a site of contestation as multiple notions of national 
and sectarian formation were articulated through the institution. In doing this, Sectarian Homes 
reveals how sectarianism not only impacted the politics of the Lebanese landscape but also the 
domestic affairs and practices of everyday life for Shiʿi individuals.  
Second, this dissertation reveals how sectarian and national categories of identification 
were flexible and not fixed categories of affiliation during this formative period of the nation-
state. In other words, sectarianism was not a trans-historical category. By examining the Shiʿi 
press, Jaʿfari shariʿa courts, and educational centers, Sectarian Homes demonstrates how 
multiple, and at times contradictory, sectarian modes of identification were constructed and 
contested as they related to Shiʿi families and gender formation. For example, the Shiʿi press 
through the journal al-ʿIrfān constructed middle class perceptions of sectarian gender roles that it 
deemed necessary for national inclusion. As this dissertation reveals, these often conflicted with 
the everyday realities and practices of Shiʿi Muslims as articulated in the records of the Jaʿfari 
shariʿa courts. By examining Shiʿi press and court records, along with records from the first 
Shiʿi educational institutions, my dissertation reveals how Shiʿas of various socioeconomic 
statuses utilized sectarian, as well as gender identity, to suit their personal interests, and redefine 
societal norms, and create their own understanding of “citizenship” in the Lebanese nation-state.  
 
Setting the Stage 
4 
 
As the Shiʿas were the most historically marginalized and underrepresented group in 
Lebanon, the French Mandate brought about many changes in the way they came to 
conceptualize and integrate their place in the modern nation-state as a sect. With the breakdown 
of the Ottoman Empire, Shiʿi Muslims found themselves under the mandatory authority of the 
French and within the boundaries of a newly established Lebanese nation-state. The end of 
World War I led to the division of the Middle East according to the Sykes-Picot Agreement that 
brought with it the imposition of the French Mandate, and the beginnings of the Lebanese nation-
state. It is for this reason that this dissertation uses 1918 as its starting point. The establishment 
of the French Mandate demarcated borders and constructed the contours of a new Lebanese 
national entity that had not existed prior to this moment. These borders determined the 
perimeters of new national entities and established new social and political communities based 
on a system of sectarianism ordained by the modern nation-state.  
 Influenced by the work of Michel Foucault, Sectarian Homes analyzes how the modern 
nation-state, through its institutions that included schools, courts, and the press, became sites 
whereby everyday practices of family and sectarian identifications were normalized and 
produced in society.2 Rogers Brubaker expands on this notion of nationalism by examining the 
nation as a practical category, or as Lisa Wedeen terms it a “performative category.”3 Citizens 
become attached to the nation-state through various categories of practice. Accordingly, 
nationalism was not a universal category or modular as Benedict Anderson conceived, but rather 
                                                           
2 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 
1977); Idem, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Random House, 1978). 
3 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 16. This idea was later expanded on by Lisa Wedeen as performative practices 
of the nation. See Lisa Wedeen, Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power and Performance in Yemen (Chicago: 




a construed classification in the everyday practices of society within any given historical period.4 
In the case of Lebanon, sectarian identification based on kinship became the only form of 
nationalized citizenship with the establishment of the modern nation-state. As Ussama Makdisi 
elaborates, sectarianism in Mount Lebanon emerged in the context of nineteenth-century 
Ottoman reforms and within competing “Ottoman, European, and Lebanese narratives of 
modernization.”5 Hence, sectarianism developed as a discourse and practice that was produced 
and not as something “native” and “indigenous” to the history of Lebanon. However, with the 
fall of the Ottoman Empire and the occupation of the French mandatory authority, sectarianism 
became the official legal system of the Lebanese nation-state and the only form of national 
participation adhered to by law. With the legal recognition of four sects by the Lebanese nation-
state during the French Mandate, and the institution of personal status law as separate and 
distinct from civil law, sectarian categories of citizenship in both the public civil order and 
personal private order were delineated. From this point onward, newly constructed sectarian 
citizens were continuously reproduced in the Lebanese nation-state as the only form of 
recognition and practice. In many ways, these sectarian categories of citizenship in the public 
civil order and those of the personal private realm mutually reinforced one another due to the 
very structure of the Lebanese nation-state. 
Prior to the imposition of the French Mandate, Shiʿas living in the region known as 
Greater Syria had no distinct political ties linking the various Shiʿi communities. At the end of 
World War I, Shiʿas residing in the territories of the newly formed Lebanese nation-state found 
                                                           
4 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 
1991). 
 
5 Ussama Makdisi, The Culture of Sectarianism:Community, History and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman 
Lebanon (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000), 6. 
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themselves under the authority of the French Mandate, and citizens of a new national entity. 
Shiʿi Muslims of Lebanon have geographically resided in Jabal ʿAmil in the south, areas of the 
Bekaa Valley in eastern Lebanon running from Mount Lebanon to Anti-Lebanon, such as 
Baalbek, Tripoli, Kisrawin, and the capital of Beirut. For Shiʿi Muslims of Lebanon, the 
establishment of the Lebanese nation-state brought with it the first political and legal recognition 
of the group as a sectarian entity within the boundaries of the newly defined nation-state.  
 
From Ottoman Empire to Mandate 
For the most part, Shiʿas residing in Lebanon are Twelver Shiʿas. Twelver Shiʿas believe 
in the succession of the 12 imams of ahl al-bayt, or the family of the Prophet.6 According to 
Twelver belief, the succession of the caliphate, after the Prophet’s death, should have been 
rightfully passed on to ʿAli bin Abi Talib, the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, and his family. 
Followers of Twelver Shiʿism believe that the Prophet had bestowed ʿAli, one of the Prophet’s 
most faithful and gallant men, with the spiritual leadership of the faithful in 632 at Ghadir 
Khumm.7 With the death of the Prophet in 632, a community of faithful selected Abū Bakr as the 
Prophet’s successor and first caliph against the will of ʿAli and some of the Prophet’s 
companions who supported his claim. ʿAli was passed over for the caliphate twice more. With 
the assassination of the third caliph, ʿUthman bin ʿAffan in 656 C.E., ʿAli became the fourth 
caliphate of the Muslim umma. In 661 C.E., ʿAli was killed and the caliphate was not passed on 
                                                           
6 Throughout my reading, the term Shiʿa as a noun and Shiʿi as an adjective will be used to denote Twelver Shiʿas 
while the other Shiʿi sects will be referred to by their specific name. 
 
7 Mahmud Shahabi, “The Roots of Shiʿism in Early Islamic History,” in Shiʿism: Doctrines, Thought, and 
Spirituality, ed. and annotated by Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid Dabashi, and Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr (Albany, NY: 




through ʿAli’s lineage, but rather through the Umayyad branch of the Prophet’s clan. ʿAli’s 
followers believed that the caliphate should have been bequeathed to ahl al-bayt. Although there 
are various divisions within Shiʿi Islam on the Imamate of ʿAli’s lineage, Twelver Shiʿas believe 
that the last imam, al-Madhi, went into occultation in 874 C.E., and will return at the end of time 
to restore peace and justice.8 For Twelver Shiʿism, Jabal ʿAmil has long been a historical and 
cultural stronghold of the group where a sizable community has long resided. However, under 
the Ottoman Empire this community was largely silenced and marginalized.  
Under the Ottoman Empire, Shiʿi Muslims were not given any particular legal status or 
millet recognition, and were thus forced to adhere to the principles of Hanafi law as practiced by 
the state. This drastically changed under the French Mandate whereby on January 27, 1926, 
Shiʿas were recognized as an independent ṭāʾifa, or sect, with the right to establish separate 
Jaʿfari shariʿa courts to administer the sect’s personal status matters.9 It was precisely at this 
moment that the recognition of the Jaʿfari maddhab (religious denomination) transformed the 
Shiʿas of Lebanon into a sect within the boundaries of the new nation-state.10 The first Jaʿfari 
shariʿa courts to administer Shiʿi personal status or family law were also established at this time. 
Consequently, the standardization of the legal system of family law by the state solidified Shiʿi 
sectarian affiliation and kinship in the public sphere. In many ways, it defined a place for 
“religion” to make its public appearance within the state.11 More importantly, the application of 
                                                           
8 Majed Halawi, A Lebanon Defied: Musa al-Sadr and the Shiʿa Community (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 22–
23. 
 
9 This is elaborated on in Chapter two. 
 
10 The difference between maddhab and ṭāʾifa is explored further in Chapter two. 
 
11 The impact and emergence of sectarianism in Lebanese society has been examined in depth by Ussama Mikdasi. 
Ussama Mikdasi, The Culture of Sectarianism, 2000; and idem, “Revisiting Sectarianism” in Religion Between 
Violence and Reconciliation, ed. Thomas Scheffler (Beirut: Orient-Institut, 2002), 179–91.  
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personal status law came to have no meaning independent of the judicial institutions belonging to 
the Lebanese nation-state.12 
 The official recognition of Shiʿas as a sect by the mandatory state, and the creation of 
Jaʿfari shariʿa courts to govern matters of Shiʿi personal status or family law, integrated Shiʿas 
as a sect in the national framework and deepened sectarian belonging.13 It was precisely during 
this period, as this study shows, that great emphasis was placed on bettering Shiʿi families, 
societal norms, and educating Shiʿi children. Sectarian Homes investigates the legal domain of 
the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts and its first records to explore how familial matters were negotiated, 
and the impact that sectarian recognition had on marital practices and gender norms. During the 
Mandate period, the familial home served as a space where Lebanese Shiʿas negotiated, 
practiced, and normalized being modern sectarian citizens of the nation-state. This dissertation 
exposes this change during the Mandate period that moved toward the reassessment of Shiʿi 
families, and the deployment of notions of femininity and masculinity as efforts were made to 
construct Lebanese Shiʿi citizens. Through the modern nation-state, the family became a 
“localized pedagogical apparatus” whereby gender formations and practices of sectarian 
citizenship were performed.14 
                                                           
12 Article 95 of the 1926 Lebanese Constitutions created a nation rooted in sectarian difference. Meir Zamer, 
Lebanon’s Quest: The Road to Independence (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997). Arrete 3503 decreed by the French gave 
each sect the sovereign rights to rule on communal personal matters. 
 
13 Max Weiss elaborates on this process of institutionalization of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts. See Max Weiss, In the 
Shadow of Sectarianism: Law, Shiʿism, and the Making of Modern Lebanon (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 
2010). For a more detailed analysis of this process see Max Weiss, “Institutionalizing Sectarianism: Law, Religious 
Culture and the Remaking of Shiʿi Lebanon, 1920–1947” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 2007). 
 
14 Michel Foucault, “The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century,” in Power/knowledge: Selected Interviews 
1972–1977, trans. C. Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 166–82. 
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Due to the specific focus of this dissertation on the space of the family and its 
relationship to Lebanese sectarianism and nationalism, this study does not emphasize the 
political unrest between Arab nationalism and Lebanese nationalism, although it highlights its 
impact when relevant. Rather, Sectarian Homes displays how various spaces and institutions in 
Shiʿi society negotiated and produced conflicting notions of gender roles and family practices in 
the hopes of producing modern Shiʿi citizens of the Lebanese nation-state. 
 
Modern Lebanese Historiography and Shiʿas 
 For the most part, Shiʿi Muslims have been neglected in the grand narratives of Lebanese 
historiography, particularly during the French Mandate period. This has been largely due to their 
political and economic marginality during this time. Lebanese historiography has usually pointed 
to the rise of Imam Musa al-Sadr, the Shiʿi political and religious leader of the 1960s, as the 
pivotal moment which triggered Shiʿi mobilization and solidified sectarian unity. Although this 
period saw great strides in improving the social and political conditions of Lebanese Shiʿas by 
bringing the community’s concerns to the national forefront, the history and involvement of the 
Shiʿas in Lebanon prior to this moment has been underrepresented and marginalized in the 
nation’s contemporary historiography.  
Considered a leading scholar in Lebanese historiography, Kamal Salibi’s A House of 
Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered takes a critical approach at analyzing the 
uniqueness and peculiarity of Lebanese history composed of different communities and histories. 
Although Salibi emphasizes the different views and histories that make Lebanon exceptional, he 
places very little importance on Shiʿas in this history. Salibi claims that they “had no impact on 
10 
 
the Lebanese scene outside strictly Shiʿite circles. No effort of imagination could convincingly 
depict them as part of a general Lebanese heritage.”15 Salibi posits Shiʿas as insignificant and 
extraneous to the Lebanese landscape and history whilst underscoring the need to examine the 
diversity of peoples that came to characterize Lebanese history and its national distinctiveness. 
For Salibi, Shiʿas did not play a role in this heritage or historical makeup of the nation-state, and 
thus neither did the formation of the nation-state impact Shiʿas or their national affiliations. 
More recently, Fawwaz Traboulsi’s text A History of Modern Lebanon offers an 
insightful revisionist history of the “often neglected and obscured internal factors” by 
highlighting the underlying social and economic factors that have shaped Lebanon politically and 
historically.16 More importantly, Traboulsi moves away from the reductionist historiography 
based on sectarian identity and affiliation by viewing “politicised religious sects” as historical 
products constituting “multifunctional forms of identification.”17 However, Traboulsi does not 
delve into the Shiʿas of Lebanon and how politicized identifications were historically informed, 
particularly during the French Mandate. Traboulsi dedicates only a few pages to the Shiʿas.18 
Still, Sectarian Homes utilizes Traboulsi’s theoretical objective to examine the Shiʿas’ 
multifunctional forms of identification as it relates to citizenship, family, and gender under the 
French Mandate.  
                                                           
15 Kamal Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: The History of Lebanon Reconsidered (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1988), 206. 
 




18 Traboulsi dedicates only a few pages on Shiʿas amounting to seven references and only two pages under the 




Other works such as Masʿūd Ḍāhir’s Tarīkh Lubnān al-Ijtimāʿi 1914–1926, provided a 
more critical analysis that moves away from a state centered approach of history to class analysis 
and socioeconomic factors to better understand the political history of Lebanon.19 Despite taking 
this approach, Ḍāhir makes little mention of Shiʿas in this regard or the impact that the 
peripheral Shiʿi region of Jabal ʿAmil had on the history of Lebanon. Meir Zamir’s works on 
Lebanon, The Formation of Modern Lebanon 1920–1926 and Lebanon’s Quest: The Road to 
Statehood 1926–1939, like many, focus on a Mount Lebanon-Beirut centric approach to the 
nation-state’s history, neglecting marginalized communities, such as the Shiʿas or the peripheries 
where most Shiʿas reside, and the impact they had on the national landscape.20 Sectarian Homes 
does not attempt to insert Shiʿas in the national narrative, but rather reveals the colonial impact 
that nation-state formation had on Shiʿas as a sect and practices of citizenship, particularly as it 
related to the “private” domain of the family and gender.  
In this regard, Sectarian Homes is influenced by Elizabeth Thompson’s text Colonial 
Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege and Gender in French Syria and Lebanon. 
Thompson makes a significant contribution regarding the impact that colonialism had on the 
construction of citizenship in mandate Syria and Lebanon, particularly as it related to “subaltern” 
citizens in negotiating a colonial civic order.21 Thompson examines how gender was used “as a 
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primary analytical tool to integrate the many levels of political experience that shaped the 
colonial civic order” by focusing on the capital cities of Beirut and Damascus. Sectarian Homes 
builds upon Thompson’s work as it investigates the impact of colonialism on gender and 
sectarian identification relating to the Shiʿas of Lebanon. Nevertheless, unlike Colonial Citizens, 
that concentrates on urban centers and notable social movements, this study focuses on the 
everyday practices and lives of average citizens through the press, shariʿa court records, and 
educational establishments. Sectarian Homes adds a dimension of social history as the voices 
and concerns of Shiʿi men and women were heard through court records, and therefore within 
the larger historical context of the period. 
 
Growing Field of Lebanese Shiʿi Historiography 
In recent years, there have been major advances to situate Shiʿas within the narratives of 
modern Lebanese history. Various works have focused on the centrality of Shiʿas by 
emphasizing the history of the community and its importance in the Lebanese narrative.22 
Mounzer Jaber’s dissertation, “Pouvoir et Société au Jabal ʿAmil 1749–1920 dans la conscience 
des chroniqueurs chiites et dans un essai d’interprétation,” centers on the interactions between 
Jabal ʿAmil and Druze and Maronite populations in the eighteenth century, and claims that a 
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Aʿla, 1993); idem, al-Takāmul al-iqtiṣādi bayna Jabal ʿAmil wa muḥīṭihi al-ʿarabī, 1850–1950 (Beirut: Dār al-
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sense of Shiʿi communal awareness emerged from these interactions with “the other.”23 Jaber’s 
work places centrality on Jabal ʿAmil as a source of Shiʿi identity. This work, however, does not 
elaborate on the impact of colonialism and nation-state formation on Shiʿi collectivity. Akin to 
these concerns are Waddāḥ Sharārah’s texts al-Umma al-Qāliqa and Dawlat Ḥizb Allāh, which 
provide a detailed history from a Shiʿi perspective regarding the community’s concerns by 
placing this history in the larger narrative of the region and the Lebanese nation-state.24 
Tamara Chalabi’s The Shiʿis of Jabal ʿAmil and the New Lebanon: Community and 
Nation-State, 1918–1943 examines how the Shiʿas of Jabal ʿAmil went from a marginal to an 
active community during the Mandate period as she analyzes how Shiʿas situated themselves as 
a community in the regional politics of Arab nationalism and Lebanese nationalism. She focuses 
on their political usage of maṭlabiyya, a politics of demand that helped integrate and negotiate 
the needs of the ʿAmili Shiʿas, contributing to their growing sense of communitarian identity.25 
Although Chalabi’s work makes a major contribution to the political history of the Jabal ʿAmil 
community, her work concentrates only on the political elites and ʿulamaʾ of Jabal ʿAmil, and 
largely neglects Shiʿas living outside this area and average Shiʿi individuals. Sabrina Mervin’s 
work, Un Réformisme Chiite: Ulémes et letters du Gabal ʿAmil de la fin de l’Empire ottoman 
àl’indépendence du Liban, provides a rich history of prominent Shiʿi religious ʿulamaʾ during 
                                                           
23 Mounzer Jaber, “Pouvoir et Société au Jabal ʿAmil 1749–1920 dans la conscience des chroniqueurs chiites et dan 
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Dār al-Nahār, 1996). 
 
25 Tamara Chalabi, The Shiʿis of Jabal ʿAmil and the New Lebanon: Community and Nation-State 1918–1943 
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). Chalabi expands on the idea of maṭlabiyya from the works of Ali ʿAbd al-
Munʿim Shuʿayb, Maṭālib Jabal ʿAmil: al-waḥdah, al-musāwā fī Lubnān al-kabīr, 1900–1936 (Beirut: al-
Muʾassasa al-jamʿiyya, 1987); and Nawāl Fayyāḍ, Ṣafaḥāt min tarīkh Jabal ʿAmil fī al-ʿahdayn al-ʿuthmānī wa-l-




the French Mandate, focusing predominantly on the figures of Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amīn and 
Sayyid ʿAbd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Dīn.26 She highlights the religious debates among Shiʿi leading 
figures who brought about social and political transformations within the community. Despite 
the scholarly significance Mervin’s work contributes, her study is based on the elite religious 
segment of Shiʿi society, and thus offers little insight outside this social circle.  
Max Weiss’s work, In the Shadow of Sectarianism: Law, Shiʿism and the Making of 
Modern Lebanon, analyzes how the colonial institutions of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts contributed 
to the “sectarianization” of Shiʿas under the French Mandate. As the first work of its kind that 
looks at the Jaʿfari courts, Weiss examines the institutional power of this institution as 
administered by the French authorities and sanctioned by the Shiʿi community. According to 
Weiss, “the production of sectarianism in Lebanon has been contingent upon institutional and 
ideological factors that impinge upon the self-understanding and public culture of Lebanese 
citizens and collectivities.”27 For Shiʿas, as Weiss shows, this contingency was built on the 
institutional effect and establishment of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts under the French Mandate. The 
establishment of the courts along with the recognition of Shiʿas as a sect, as shown by Weiss, 
propelled religious and political reform within the sect. While Weiss’s work provides a new and 
groundbreaking perspective on the history of Shiʿas in Lebanon and their sectarianization into 
the Lebanese nation-state, gaps remain.  
First, Weiss claims to provide a social history of Shiʿas by examining Jaʿfari court 
records, yet he dedicates only half a chapter to the actual archives and cases to show how the 
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courts interfered in the daily lives of Lebanese Shiʿas. His analysis of a few court cases centered 
more on the institutional power of the court on the lives of Shiʿas rather than offering a critical 
analysis of the negotiation process, knowledge formation, and interpretative framework present 
in the courts by the individuals involved. Weiss does not delve into the court cases and their 
practical usage or the impact they had on the daily lives and practices of Shiʿas. Sectarian 
Homes offers such insight on the lives of Shiʿi individuals as it related to gender formation, 
marital relationships, and practices of citizenship.  
As one of the only two individuals (the other being Weiss) who have gained unique 
access to the records of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts, my work utilizes the records of the courts to 
document and examine how sectarian and national identifications were performative categories, 
and how familial matters and gender roles influenced such categories of practices. This study 
illustrates the role that average Shiʿi individuals had in debating, normalizing, and constructing 
societal norms and perceptions. Sectarian Homes takes an intimate look at Shiʿi families and 
practices in the newly established Jaʿfari personal status courts, and reveals notions of agency 
and how they complicated and contributed to national and sectarian identification. Through the 
examination of Jaʿfari shariʿa court records, I show how multiple and conflicting notions of 
nation and sect were debated during this advent period of the nation-state.  
Secondly, Weiss notes that “beyond the differential distribution of power and influence in 
political institutions along sectarian lines (political sectarianism), the field of law proved 
instrumental in delineating sectarian norms, boundaries and modes of identification.”28 Although 
Weiss makes this argument and advances how this institution bolstered sectarianization, I show 
how these boundaries were not as fixed as they initially seemed. Sectarian Homes reveals, 
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through the examination of a wide array of court cases in conversation with the Shiʿi press and 
school records, how these boundaries of identification were negotiated as they related to gender 
formation and sectarian identification. Sectarian Homes therefore reveals multiple forms and 
spaces of sectarian citizenship through the lens of gender analysis. 
 
Sources and Research Background 
Based on archival research I conducted between June 2007 and August 2008, Sectarian 
Homes examines Shiʿi journalistic coverage in conjunction with the records of the Jaʿfari shariʿa 
courts cases and the first Shiʿi educational institutions to explore how these mediums became a 
site to negotiate Shiʿi social and cultural norms as a way of integration into the new Lebanese 
nation-state. This dissertation utilizes the archives of the Jaʿfari shariʿa tribunal courts in Beirut, 
Tyre, Sidon, Baalbek, Bint Jbeil, and Marjayoun. I had unique access to the hand-written records 
at these courts dating back to 1926. Court records in each city varied in scope and organization 
depending on how well they were maintained and preserved. Sectarian Homes also uses the 
popular Shiʿi journal al-ʿIrfān, housed at the American University of Beirut library, as a source 
of historical analysis to demonstrate the intricate role the press played in the making of Shiʿi 
families, gender roles, and societal norms at a time when Lebanese Shiʿas were integrated into 
the modern nation-state as a sectarian entity. Finally, this study examines the first successful 
Shiʿi educational institutions, Al-Jamʿiyya al-Khayriyya al-Islāmiyya al-ʿAmiliyya (The 
Charitable Islamic ʿAmili College) and al-Jamʿiyya al-Khayriyya al-Jaʿfariyya (The Charitable 
Jaʿfari Society) to gain a better understanding of how educating Shiʿi children of the nation-state 
contributed to practices of sectarian citizenship and familial formations. This analysis was based 
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on archival research and examination of the schools’ yearly records, publications, school 
attendance, and curricula.  
All three primary sources contribute to a better understanding of how the family was a 
site of contested sectarian and national modes of identification at a time of national uncertainty 
for Shiʿas.   
 
Organization of Dissertation 
The following historical study consists of five chapters. Chapter one, “Asserting Roots: 
Re-claiming Origins in the Narrative (s) of Lebanese Nationalist History,” examines the changes 
which came about during the French Mandate and that propelled the writing of Shiʿi history and 
its inclusion in the Lebanese historical narrative. Although the Shiʿi community has largely been 
underrepresented and ignored in the standard narratives of Lebanese history, which is rooted in a 
centric Mount Lebanon-Beirut-Maronite-centric perspective, this chapter uncovers how 
European travelers, philologists, and writers became fascinated with locating the origins of the 
Shiʿas of Greater Syria, particularly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. This 
chapter inspects the writings of a number of Orientalists who questioned the “authenticity” of the 
Shiʿi Muslims of Greater Syria and constructed a racialized image of Shiʿas that delegitimized 
their claims to the region.  
Chapter one also examines how this interpretative framework focused on constructing 
origins and affected the very nature of Shiʿi historiography in the early twentieth century. As this 
chapter reveals, Shiʿi historians and ʿulamaʾ adhered to the same narrative of origins and race in 
order to establish the legitimacy and history of Shiʿas in the region, as well as within the newly 
founded Lebanese nation-state. It concludes by providing a brief historical understanding of the 
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political and social conditions of Shiʿi Muslims at the end of the Ottoman Empire and advent of 
the French Mandate to better situate the changes that came about with the formation of the 
Lebanese nation-state. 
Chapter two, “Constructing Boundaries and Negotiating Citizenship: The Nationalization 
of Shiʿi Families and the Jaʿfari Shariʿa Courts in Lebanon, 1926–1943,” looks at one of the key 
institutions established by the mandatory authorities and how it contributed to Shiʿi sectarian 
identification through the space of the family. This chapter examines how the creation of Jaʿfari 
shariʿa courts and their usage by individuals both complicated and reinforced the legal and 
political categories of citizenship that were instituted by the Lebanese nation-state. By profiling a 
number of cases pertaining to matters of marriage and divorce, the chapter demonstrates that 
these courts and their participants went beyond the regulatory process of the state by molding 
and contesting legal categories of Shiʿi sectarian and national belonging. Through these records, 
the chapter locates how notions of identifications—sectarian, national, and gender—were 
practiced, manipulated, and reinforced before the court to suit the personal needs of litigants. 
This chapter commences the dissertation’s focus on the space of the family, and how familial and 
gender roles became intertwined in multiple and competing notions of sectarian and national 
identification. 
Chapter three, “Molding Shiʿi Families: Fashioning Fathers and Husbands, and Mothers 
and Wives through the Shiʿi Press, al-ʿIrfān,” explores how marital and gender roles became a 
contested site of modernity and sectarian awareness for the Shiʿas of Lebanon under the French 
Mandate. By examining the pages of al-ʿIrfān from the 1920s to the 1940s, the chapter tracks the 
changes in the concept of motherhood and wifehood as women were envisioned as the vessel of 
the nation-state and Shiʿi sect, and thus in need of reconstructing. As an embodiment of middle-
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class perceptions, the Shiʿi press contributed to a normative discourse of morality and gender 
roles as Shiʿas negotiated their sectarian citizenship within the Lebanese national framework. 
Chapter four, “Realities on the Ground: Negotiating Family through the Jaʿfari Shariʿa 
Courts,” in contrast, explores the intimate records of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts to see how gender 
roles were contested in the everyday lives of Shiʿi individuals. This chapter explores how the 
Jaʿfari shariʿa courts produced multiple, and at times, conflicting notions of masculinity and 
femininity, especially when compared to the depictions presented in al-ʿIrfān as examined in the 
preceding chapter. By placing these chapters alongside each other, the discrepancy between what 
was constructed as ideal gender roles and marriage in al-ʿIrfān and what actually took place in 
the shariʿa courtrooms is revealed.  
Chapter five, “The Future of the Sect: Educating Shiʿi Children into the Lebanese 
Nation-State,” tracks the call for educational reform during the Mandate period that linked the 
upbringing of the home to that of formal schooling. This chapter traces the establishment of the 
first Shiʿi educational centers by looking at curricula and records of both the Al-Jamʿiyya al-
Khayriyya al-Islāmiyya al-ʿAmiliyya in Beirut and al-Jamʿiyya al-Khayriyya al-Jaʿfariyya in 
Tyre. It explores how the first Shiʿi schools contributed to and fostered both sectarian and 
nationalist sentiment—and at times contrasting notions—among the Shiʿi Muslims of Lebanon.   
These chapters together reveal how the family space was a site of contested sectarian 
practices and citizenship at a time of national uncertainty indicative in this study’s reading of the 
Shiʿi press, educational centers, and personal status court records. Sectarian Homes contributes 
to the social history of Shiʿas by offering a revisionist historiography of Lebanon that takes an 
interdisciplinary approach to better understanding the practices of citizenship, sectarianism, and 
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gender in national formation and colonialism. This study also questions the notion of sectarian 
formations as long established entities and demands that they are viewed as historical categories 
of practices. Whereas the extant historiography assumes that sectarian and national categories are 
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. . . that fields of learning, as much as the works of even the most eccentric artist, are 
constrained and acted upon by society, by cultural traditions, by worldly circumstances, 
and by stabilizing influences like schools, libraries, and governments; moreover that both 
learned and imaginative writing are never free, but are limited in their imagery, 
assumptions, and intentions.29 
 
Introduction 
For the most part, history has always been written by the politically powerful, thus 
leaving the voices of the disenfranchised and politically weak silenced in the annals of history.30 
Consequently, little has been written about the Shiʿi Muslims of Greater Syria under the 
Ottoman Empire, largely due both to the lack of surviving Shiʿi primary sources and their 
marginality in an Empire that adhered to the orthodox form of Hanafi Islam as the rule of 
governance.31 As heterodoxy, Twelver Shiʿas were not given a distinct legal status by the 
Ottoman administration as a community or millet, and thus for the most part remained 
unrecognized. Hence, Shiʿi Muslim communities living in Jabal ʿAmil, the Bekaa Valley (the 
Baalbek al-Hirmil region), and some pockets in Beirut and Mount Lebanon have been largely 
neglected in Lebanese historiography. Some of the first records referring to the Shiʿi Muslims of 
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Greater Syria, however, were written by Western intellectuals and travelers, as well as Arab 
Sunni historians. This chapter begins by looking at the early writings that started to appear in the 
late 1800s and early 1900s, focusing on the origins and “authenticity” of the Shiʿas of Greater 
Syria. In these writings, Shiʿi Muslims were seen as alien to both the Arab and Lebanese context 
as their ethnicity, race, and national origins were put into question. These writings, which 
spanned for a century-and-a-half, constructed an image of Shiʿas as foreigners and/or colonists 
who were portrayed as racially inferior and backward in comparison to the other people of 
Lebanon. This chapter argues that this interpretative discourse affected the very nature of the 
first modern Lebanese Shiʿi historiographies that sought a need to reassert their origins and 
geographic nativeness to Lebanon and the Arab world. With the fall of the Ottomans and the 
advent of the French Mandate, there was a push among Shiʿi historians, intellectuals, and 
religious scholars to write the history of the Shiʿas of Lebanon. This chapter looks at how the 
writing of history for the Shiʿi Muslims of Lebanon became important just as the community 
was amalgamated into the nation-state as a ṭāʾifa (sect), and how this Lebanese Shiʿi history was 
relational to the history of the “other” sects as they tried to assert their roots within a greater 
Maronite-Lebanese historical narrative.32 This chapter concludes by discussing the historical and 
economic relationship between the Shiʿas of Jabal ʿAmil, where the majority of the Shiʿi 
population resided, and Mount Lebanon under the French Mandate, and the political state of 
Shiʿi inclusion into the newly defined nation-state. 
 
Part One: Who Are the Matawilas? 
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Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century, a number of foreign travelers, 
philologists, and historians traveled to Greater Syria recording their observations of the land and 
its people. In their expeditions to the East, foreigner travelers, usually hailing from France or 
Britain, sought to unravel the history of the Arab world and the “origins” of its people. In doing 
so, they created a body of knowledge politically charged, racialized, and rooted in biological 
determinism as notably argued by Edward Said.33 Post-enlightenment Europe sought to make 
distinctions between the East (Muslim) and West (Christian) by creating Western knowledge 
about the Orient institutionalized by scientific fields of disciplinary studies, such as human 
sciences, anthropology, philology, etc., that categorized people according to “race, color, origin, 
temperament, character, and types.”34 Orientalists, as argued by Said, created “a set of structures 
inherited from the past, secularized, redisposed, and re-formed by such disciplines as philology, 
which in turn were naturalized, modernized, and laicized substitutes for (or versions of) Christian 
supernaturalism.”35 Basing their analysis on “scientific” and anthropological findings, and 
consequently masking their Western Christian motivations (this distinction between secular and 
religious rooted in the West will be discussed in Chapter two), Orientalists created general ideas 
and perceptions about the Arab world that validated the differences between East and West on 
the grounds of “race.” Creating a binary typology of advanced and backward societies, 
Orientalists created a discourse that solidified the division of races and created a quasi hierarchy 
of civilizations. Among Orientalists, many interests in the East were the Matawilas residing in 
Lebanon/Greater Syria. The term Matawila, Metawileh, or Mutawila was largely used when 
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referring to the Shiʿas of Lebanon prior to the French Mandate. Although the roots of the term 
have been greatly debated, it is believed to have derived from the phrase “Māta waliyyan li-ʿAli” 
(He died as the friend of (Imam) ʿAli) or “Māta waliyyan li-ahl al-bayt” (He who died as a friend 
to the Prophet’s family) in the seventeenth century.36 By the twentieth century, the term acquired 
a derogatory connotation largely due to the negative meaning ascribed to the term by non-
Matawilas. The term is rarely used anymore to refer to the Shiʿas of Lebanon. According to 
European sources of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Matawilas of Lebanon 
resided predominantly in Akkar, Kisrawan, Tripoli, Baalbek, the Bekaa Valley in the Mount 
Lebanon region, and Jabal ʿAmil or Bilad Bishara, beginning just north of Saida and extending 
south to the Qarn River in Palestine.37 A reference to Lebanon became more readily employed 
during this time period as the seeds for a loosely imagined European-Christian national project 
began envisioning the beginnings for a Maronite homeland that would only later become a 
Lebanese nation-state entity with defined boundaries in the modern sense. 
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century, a number of foreign writers sought to 
unravel the “origins” of the Matawilas and their racial makeup. In trying to decipher and 
categorize the people of Lebanon, Orientalists created an “idea” of the Matawilas as a distinct 
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been traced back to a ruler during the Middle Ages by the name of Beshara ibn Muʾkabil who ruled the region. 
Others have noted that the name was established under the Ayyubis when Houssam al-Dīn Beshara came to the 




group or race that existed as a historical entity.38 Orientalists converged in establishing the 
foreignness of the Matawilas and their racial inferiority vis-à-vis other Lebanese groups. The 
striking similarities in the vast accounts during the turn of the century produced a normative 
discourse that had lasting effects on Lebanese Shiʿi historiography and communitarian identity. 
In October 1860, French Orientalist philologist Ernest Renan was sent on an 
archaeological mission to Lebanon by Emperor Napoleon III to “explore ancient Phoenica” and 
discover the ancient Phoenician inscriptions of the land.39 His findings were later published in 
Mission de Phénicie, which explored the ancient Phoenician ruins found throughout Lebanon.  
Although not directly stated, Renan’s Mission (as commissioned by the Emperor) sought to 
dovetail the history of antiquity and the idea of Maronite national consciousness as a means of 
ultimately establishing a French protectate over a Maronite Phoenician population.40 Renan 
ruminated on the different “races” and breeds that divided the country while underlining the 
inferiority of the Matawila race vis-a-vis other religious communities in Lebanon. In his 
explorative account, Renan noted the generosity and kindness of the Maronite population, who 
relished in the riches of the Phoenician civilization while “. . . the Matawilas do not have the 
same capacity of observation and memory; their brains seem struck with debility.”41 Unlike the 
Maronites, the Matawilas lacked the mental capacity to recognize and appreciate the Phoenician 
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riches of the ancient land they resided on. What was most interesting in Renan’s depiction was 
his categorization of the Matawilas as a distinct group of people who can be physically and 
psychologically differentiated and distinguished from the other “races” present in Lebanon. 
Renan, like other Orientalists, sketched out an image of a distinct group, a community that 
stretched across Lebanon with recognizable characteristics, whether racial, sociological, or 
physical, that could be attributed to the Matawila people. According to Renan, the Matawilas’ 
palpable racial inferiority hindered the country, creating a “partition wall” that divided the 
people.42 Through his depictions, Renan created a societal hierarchy placing the Matawilas at the 
bottom end of the spectrum. 
Like most Orientalists of the time, Renan questioned the origins of Shiʿas. Renan, like 
other writers, traced the origins of the Matawilas to the Persian race, thus putting into question 
the legitimacy of the Shiʿas in the region. The Matawilas’s perceived mental incapacity to 
appreciate the geographical land was subsequently linked to their “ethnic” foreignness. As a 
textual footnote to his previous psychological description of the Matawilas, Renan reflected on 
his personal experience with a handful of them: 
 
On the other hand, nothing is as beautiful as the Matawilas in prayer. During terrible 
storms and torrential rains, I saw him kneeling on the road. He did not turn away to see us 
pass. The resignation of Matawilas to support their little feudal tyrants, only because they 
are of their race, is also something admirable. Lastly, I knew one or two Matawila 
                                                           




families, of excellent quality or standards, whereby the good Iranian race (Kurd) 
transported there by Saladin could still be felt.43 
 
Even though Renan admired the beauty of the Matawilas’s strict adherence to prayer and racial 
loyalty to their own kind, he traced these qualities back to the time of Saladin in the thirteenth 
century. The Matawilas’s foreignness continued to resonate in their mannerism and social 
conduct. Renan’s encounter with just a few Matawilas confirmed the Kurdish-Iranian racial 
ancestry of the Shiʿi Muslims of Lebanon. The pleasant sociological nature of the Matawilas was 
rationalized by tracing it to Persia, consequently reinforcing the Matawilas’s alienness to the 
land. Like Renan, Louis Lortet, a French doctor of the late nineteenth century, echoed the same 
ethological assumptions about the Matawilas as descendants of the Kurds of Upper 
Mesopotamia, who purportedly arrived in Syria in the thirteenth century. Lortet based this 
postulation on anthropological and physiognomic proof derived from the visible differences 
between the Matawila race and that of the Druzes and Maronites. Lortet described “the shape of 
the Matawilas’ eyes” and “their short necks” which reflected their Persian ancestry, while “the 
shape of their heads and faces” evoked the Kurdish race. Lortet alleged anthropological evidence 
allowed him to construe the Matawilas’s racial difference from their Syrian neighbors.44 The 
Matawilas were deemed at once distinct and inferior to their regional neighbors of different 
religious denomination. Most of the descriptions of Europeans who traveled to Lebanon in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century disputed the origins of the Matawilas, while 
constructing an image of a distinct group or people scattered throughout the Syrian lands that 
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could be uniformly classified and categorized. Although most Orientalists utilized 
anthropological or ethnological justifications to dismiss the nativeness of the Matawilas, others , 
such as the French philosopher Constantin Volney, relied on historical findings, or lack thereof, 
to question their presence in the region.  
 Although the French philosopher Constantin Volney, who traveled to Syria in the 
eighteenth century, did not trace the Matawilas to the Persian race, he refused, however, to 
believe that the Shiʿas were indigenous to the land. Volney asserted: 
 
It is claimed that they have existed as a nation in this land for a long time, meanwhile 
their name has never appeared in books before this century; it’s not even on the maps of 
Anville. La Roqu who only spoke of their country within the last 100 years has always 
designated them as the Amédiens. Nonetheless, they have managed to occupy (the 
attention of) Syria in recent times with their wars, thievery, progress and backwardness. 
Before the mid-century, they only held Baakbek and a few cantons in the valley of anti-
Lebanon, from where they seem to originate.45  
 
Volney argued that the Matawilas’s name did not appear in textbooks before this century as no 
records of their existence appeared in the charts of Anville.46 Even though Volney claimed that 
the Matawilas were quite recent to Lebanon on the grounds of their absence in historical sources, 
Volney did not take into consideration the lack of historical recognition and marginalization of 
the Matawilas by the Ottoman government. Consequently, it would not be surprising to have an 
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absence of records on the Matawilas. Records kept by Ottoman officials and European travelers, 
who documented their findings and reported them back to the French cartographer Anville, show 
no trace of the Matawilas. This is not particularly surprising since the group was persecuted 
under various empires throughout history.47 Throughout various moments in history, Shiʿi 
Muslims had resorted to the practice of taqiyya (concealment of religious beliefs) in order to 
avoid religious persecution. Taqiyya was crafted by the sixth infallible Shiʿi Imam, Jaʿfari al-
Ṣadiq in the eighth century. This practice was frequently adhered to by Shiʿi Muslims during the 
Umayyad and ʿAbbasid Empires and well into the Ottoman Empire.48 According to Belgian 
Orientalist Henri Lammens, the reason why the name Matawila did not appear before the 
seventeenth century in the charts of Anville was due to the fact that Matawilas were referred to 
as “Hamadyya” instead.49 Nevertheless, Volney relied on European artifacts and sources to 
structure the historiography of the Matawilas rather than utilizing local sources to support his 
claim. 
Despite the Matawilas’s recent involvement in the affairs of Syria as noted by Volney, he 
claimed that before the middle of the century they were predominately in Baalbek without 
holding much historical significance in the region or country as a whole. Volney accounted for 
only 500 families in Baalbek, whom he argued where forced by the Druze chiefs to migrate to 
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the Anti-Lebanon regions of Jabal ʿAmil.50 The conclusions made by Volney put into question 
the historical importance and longevity made by Matawilas to the acclaimed sacred territory of 
Jabal ʿAmil, discussed in further detail below. 
Volney and other European travelers crafted an idea of the Matawilas or Shiʿas as a 
group united across the vast lands of Greater Syria without acknowledging the historical, 
political, and cultural differences that existed. Prior to the French Mandate, Shiʿi political 
affiliation and identification was regional and clan-based, not religious or sectarian. The political 
conditions and circumstances between Shiʿas in the Bekaa Valley and Jabal ʿAmil differed as 
different families and political players factored into their local interactions with other clans of 
various religiosities. Leading Shiʿi families were politically aligned to ruling Maronite and 
Druze notables who had a greater impact on the livelihood of a given region than any form of 
religious belonging. This is not to say that there were no interactions or correspondence between 
ʿulamaʾ (Muslim cleric or scholar) scholars of the various regions where Matawilas lived, but 
rather that the historical situation of each area was regionally determined with no sense of a 
collective Shiʿi agenda at this time. However, the portrayal of Matawilas by European 
Orientalists constructed essentializing images of the group that disseminated a collective body of 
texts constituting a discursive tradition about the Matawilas. This body of hegemonic knowledge 
came about through missionary projects, travel expeditions, and politicians and scholars who 
were usually funded and commissioned by governments or institutions, and who came to classify 
the Matawilas of the East as inferior and distinct from the West. Western Christendom had an 
invested interest in the Muslims or “others” of the East and, in this case, the Matawilas of 
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Greater Syria as they sought to classify the group as mutually distinct and different from the 
West.  
In 1860, commissioned by the United Presbyterian Church of Scotland, gospel minister 
and physician Reverend John Wortabet, who lived for several years in Hasbeiya, a town in 
Mount Hermon, composed his findings in Researches into the Religions of Syria. The objective 
of his research was to “expose the false doctrines of the religions and sects of the country” in the 
hope of enlisting sympathies and prayers of British Christians toward the Christian population of 
Syria who suffered under the aggressions and cruelties of the Druzes and Mohammedans.51 With 
a clear motive of propagating a Christian agenda, Wortabet dedicated a section to the Matawilas 
of Syria delving into their religious beliefs and historical origins. Like most depictions of the 
Matawilas drawn by Europeans, Wortabet echoed the same disdain and condescension toward 
this inferior race of people. Wortabet described the Matawilas as “the most filthy race in the 
country” whose backwardness and paltry intelligence can be visibly noted in comparison to the 
other races of Syria.52 In his description, Wortabet ruminated on the sociological traits of the 
Matawilas of Syria: 
 
But few, however among the higher classes, have any intelligence or general 
information; and even their learning is superficial, and their acquaintance with the state of 
the civilized world very limited. In their morals, they are not any better, if not indeed 
much worse, than the Moslems. The lower classes among them are addicted to petty 
theft, and all of them shameless lying. Nor does it appear that they consider either theft or 
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lying to be great crimes, especially when the victims of their fraud are persons who do 
not belong to their sect.53 
 
The stereotypical representations of the Matawilas painted them as intellectually inferior and 
morally corrupt, thus producing degrading images in the writings of foreign travelers. These 
sociological differences were increasingly racialized as Orientalists portrayed the Matawilas as 
foreigners and/or even colonists. According to Wortabet, the stronghold of the Shiʿi religion and 
the Matawilas since its earliest existence had been Persia, where Shiʿism served as the religion of 
the state and of its people.54 Although Wortabet did not delve into producing an argument tracing 
the historical origins of the Matawilas, he, like others of this time, relied on the physiognomic 
features of the Matawilas as a mark of their visible alienness to the Syrian land. Their physical 
appearance was “strongly marked and distinctive, making the theory not improbably which 
regards them as colonists from some foreign country, perhaps Assyria or Persia.”55 It was quite 
clear from Wortabet’s remarks, which appeared without any references to support it, that the 
belief of the Matawilas’s inauthenticity was widely accepted and presumed. The Matawilas were 
assumed to be colonists to the land, proving their extraneous origins to the region on the grounds 
of their physiognomy. Biological and scientific conclusions on the grounds of physiognomy and 
race were made by foreign travelers and scholars who categorized the people of the region into a 
civilizational hierarchy that authorized future national claims. As the makings of nationalist 
projects were underway, bodies of knowledge were constructed to justify Christian imperialist 
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agendas that later supported Maronite (Christian) political aspirations in the region. Like 
Wortabet, the American archaeologist Frederick Jones Bliss presumed that Shiʿas may be of 
foreign origin due to their distinct physiognomy. Accordingly, this was evidence enough to 
accept the common belief that Shiʿas arrived from Syria with Saladin and his Kurdish forces in 
the twelfth century.56 A hierarchal apparatus based on race and, indiscreetly, religion was 
institutionalized via knowledge and power to deny Matawila claims to the land as non-Arabs.57   
The British evangelical David Urquhart, who traveled through Greater Syria in the 
nineteenth century, argued that the Matawilas were indeed of the Arab race. However, he was 
certain “that they do not belong to the original people of the Lebanon, and that their introduction 
dates but from a recent period; certainly not before the fourteenth century, and more probably, or 
at all events principally, in the middle of the seventeenth.” 58 Urquhart dated the Matawilas’s 
arrival to Lebanon as late as the seventeenth century, making them fairly recent immigrants to 
the land. Although the Matawilas are Arab by race they were not natives to the Lebanon lands 
and did not have claims to its rich Phoenician history. According to Urquhart, the Matawilas 
were descendants of the Alides from the borders of Persia who were “hated by the Persians as 
Arabs, and by the Turks and Arabs as Shiites,” and it was for this reason they sought shelter in 
Lebanon as their haven.59 Although Urquhart described the Matawilas as a people with great 
pride and unity, he still referred to them as “ferocious” and “fanatic.”60 Nevertheless, Urquhart 
recognized the predicament of the Matawilas who belong to neither the Sunni Arab world nor the 
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Persian Shiʿi race. This struggle to belong persisted among the Matawilas with the rise of 
conflicting Arabism and Lebanism national projects at the turn of the century that left the 
Matawilas trying to justify their various political claims as Shiʿas within a Sunni majority. The 
dynamics of the regional makeup left the Matawilas of Greater Syria torn at the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire and the advent of the French Mandate due in part to these racialized lines that 
remained an area of political contestation (discussed later on in this chapter). Nevertheless 
Urquhart, like his fellow Orientalists, contributed to the stereotypical representation of the 
Matawilas as a socially backward and inferior group of people distinct from all other races. 
 In April 1926, a conference was held in Damascus centered solely on the origins of the 
Matawilas. The papers at the conference deduce three theories about the racial origins—Persian, 
Kurdish, or Arab—of the Matawilas of Lebanon.61 Among the participants was renowned 
Belgian Orientalist Henri Lammens who served as a pioneer in developing the Department of 
Oriental Studies at the Jesuit Université Saint-Joseph in Beirut. Lammens had a preoccupation 
with deciphering the origins of the people of Lebanon and the historical specifics of the land that 
he described to be a nation of minorities. In his conference paper titled “Les ‘Perses’ du Liban et 
L’Origine des Métoualis,” Lammens chronicled the various theories on the racial origins of the 
Matawilas by European and Arab writers throughout the years. Although Lammens had once 
claimed in his text “Sur la Frontière nord de la Terre Promise” that the Matawilas who arrived 
during the time of Saladin were of Persian origin, he retracted this claim for “forgetting that this 
big Kurdish captain, the destroyer of the Fatimid Caliphate, showed himself, throughout his 
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career, as the adversary of the Shiʿas and the restorer of Sunni.”62 According to Lammens, the 
Persians noted by Yaʿqūbī and other writers as recognizable by their physiological complexion 
were Iranian soldiers whom settled in the region after being uprooted during the time of 
Moʿawiya from the Iran/Iraq region.63 That said, Lammens argued that the Matawilas of 
Lebanon were probably Arab by race and appeared distinct from the other people of the land due 
to the fact that they isolated themselves from others as a result of their differing religious beliefs. 
Although Lammens questioned his previous assumptions about the Matawilas’s race, prominent 
Sunni historian Muhammad Kurd ʿAli, who participated in the conference, reiterated the 
Matawilas’s connection to the Iranians and to the Persian movement of the al-Shuʾubiyya.64 
Evident by the nature of this conference, the interest in the origins of the Matawilas remained a 
point of contestation that produced a lasting discursive body of literature. This hegemonic body 
of knowledge that was politically charged and authorized by the Western world was 
disseminated and accepted in the Arab world that internally sought to classify Matawila Shiʿas as 
inferior and different from the Sunni majority. 
Consequently, Western travelers were not alone in attempting to delineate the origins of 
Shiʿas. Various Arab historians theorized about the presence of the esoteric Shiʿas in Greater 
Syria. Sunni Arab heresiography viewed Shiʿism, including the Matawilas of Greater Syria, as a 
non-Islamic, non-Arab manifestation, delegitimizing any claims to power in an Arab-Islamic 
world. The Arab historian Ṣalāh ibn Yaḥyā examined the history of Beirut under Buhtur b. ʿAli, 
the Amir of Beirut in the fifteenth century. In his account, Ibn Yaḥyā accounted for a Matawila 
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population in Beirut and questioned their presence in the area. He rationalized their presence by 
explaining that the Matawilas had come from Persia through Syria during Muawiya’s time, and 
resided in the region since.65 Although Ibn Yaḥyā traced the arrival of the Matawilas to the early 
years of Islam before the foundational tenets of Shiʿi Islam were instituted, Ibn Yaḥyā’s 
explanation assumed that a Persian essence continued to mark the Matawila community for 
centuries. This belief was also accepted by the Iranian traveler Nassiri Khosraui in his travel 
logs. He described the Kurdish history and ruins found in the Shiʿi areas of the Bekaa Valley, 
Tyre, and Tripoli supporting the idea that the Kurds entered these areas during the Crusades.66 
On the other hand, the renowned Arab historian Yaʿqūbī has been frequently cited as an 
authoritative source by Europeans and Arabs alike for claiming that residents of Jbeil, Beirut, 
Sidon, and Jabal ʿAmil were Persians and came to the region during the Muawiya’s Caliphate.67 
Nineteenth-century Arab historian Tannūs al-Shidyāq reiterated the same claims about the 
Matawilas’s racial origins and inferior character in his text Akhbār al-Aʿyān fī Jabal Lubnān.68 
According to al-Shidyaq, the commonality in religious beliefs between the Matawilas and 
Persians was proof enough to establish the racial lineage between the two groups. 
The Ottomans also participated in fashioning a condescending representation of the 
Matawilas. Two Ottoman officials, Muhammed Bahjat and Muhammed Rafiq al-Tamimi, were 
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commissioned by the Ottoman government to conduct a survey of the Wilaya of Beirut (Beirut 
province) which included the region of Jabal ʿAmil since 1864. Their findings were recorded in 
Wilāyat Bayrūt in which they documented their experience in the cities of Tyre, Sidon, and 
Nabatiyya where they came across the Matawila people. The overall description and tone of the 
authors concerning Matawila society reconfirmed the social backwardness and inferiority of this 
group of people. In the sections dedicated to the Matawilas, Bahjat and al-Tamimi and remarked 
on the community’s lack of cultural development and intellectual prowess. The two authors 
claimed that “the Matawilas’ cultural life is debase because of their loyalties to their leaders . . . 
who prefer to keep it as such even though they are aware of the means to social conditions but 
prefer to keep their community in despair.”69 Bahjat and al-Tamimi reminisced on the glorious 
days of Tyre under the Romans and compared it to the city of day that had “no intellectual or 
industrial life” due to the Matawilas who sought no social advancement.70 Although the authors 
acknowledge a body of Matawila literature, the two men debunk all intellectual contributions of 
the group as insignificant and “religious” in nature rather than “cultural” or “artistic.”71 
According to the Ottoman officials the Matawilas were a “filthy” society of “religious fanatics” 
with “odd traditions” who contributed little to society and the Ottoman nation.72 Like the 
Orientalists and Arab historians of their time, Bahjat and al-Tamimi constructed an essentializing 
“idea” of the Matawilas as an intellectually and racially primitive group of people in comparison 
to the “other” (in this case, the Sunni Muslim other and Western Christian) based on 
anthropological evidence from an authoritative position of power.  
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The dissemination of colonial knowledge in the form of European missionaries, travelers, 
and scholars enforced and fashioned an image of the Matawilas as inferior, backward, non-Arab, 
foreign, and distinct from their internal other (Sunni, Maronite, and Druzes in the case of 
Lebanon/Greater Syria) in the Arab world, as well as the Western/Christian “superior” other. In 
the annals of history written by Orientalists and Arab Sunni intellectuals alike, the Matawilas or 
Shiʿas residing in Lebanon were viewed with little historical significance and importance. Their 
lack of historical attention was coupled by their presumed foreignness to the land as Persian or 
Kurdish colonists. The similarities between the various accounts, spanning from the nineteenth to 
the twentieth century, reflected the obsession with establishment roots as a way to place 
legitimate political claims on the nation. Coinciding representations dovetailing Lebanese Shiʿas 
at the turn-of-the-century during a time of national formation continue to have some relevance 
today. The hegemonic power of this body of knowledge was institutionalized (via disciplines, 
texts, universities, nations, etc.) and reinforced by Matawila writers and intellectuals who 
attempted to stake a claim in the political dynamics of the region. In their efforts to write their 
history and legitimize their place in the new nation, Shiʿi intellectuals came to redeploy and 
expand on the colonial knowledge by utilizing the same discursive tradition-based race and 
origins.  
The writings of Shiʿi intellectuals of the early twentieth century employed the same line 
of rationalization in constructing their people as an “indigenous” and distinct Arab race with a 
long local history in Lebanon and the region. This racialized tradition was internalized by Shiʿi 
intellectuals and historiographers who were obsessed with documenting the origins and 
“authenticity” of Shiʿas to the region in their earliest texts. Consequently, a body of Shiʿi 
historiography began to surface in the early twentieth century, at just about the same time as the 
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fall of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the colonial French mandatory authorities, that 
reasserted the political claims of the Shiʿas in a newly created nation-state, forcing them to see 
themselves as a collective entity. For the most part, Shiʿi historical texts of the early twentieth 
century were written by men hailing from Jabal ʿAmil, thus much significance was given to this 
proclaimed “sacred” land. The mountain of Jabal ʿAmil, which was also referred to as Bilad 
ʿAmila or Bilad Beshara, was the home of the majority of Shiʿas residing in Greater Syria.73 The 
Shiʿas of Jabal ʿAmil have been referred to as ʿAmilis, which at times has become applicable to 
all the Twelver Shiʿas residing in Lebanon while the term Matawila became insignificant and 
rarely used by Shiʿi writers. Hence, Jabal ʿAmil became the symbol of Shiʿi efforts in levying 
their claims to the nation and erecting the ʿAmilis as a distinct group of people with a rich 
history. The following section examines the first forms of Shiʿi historiography that focused on 
documenting the history of Jabal ʿAmil and the people of the region. The striking similarities 
between the historical texts that relied on the same discursive tradition constructed by Western 
Orientalists indicated the obsession of these authors to reassert their place within this discourse 
while also re-legitimizing the authoritative power of this tradition.74 These men provided some of 
the first efforts within the ʿAmili community in writing down the history of Jabal ʿAmil and 
placing it in the national narrative. 
 
Part Two: The Writing of Modern Lebanese Shiʿi History: From Matawilas to Amili Shiʿas 
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The early years of post-Ottoman Lebanon saw great political turbulence as contending 
forces sought the allegiance of the land’s diverse population. The power struggle between the 
French colonial forces that promoted a Lebanist perspective and Amir Faysal’s Arab nationalist 
movement left the Shiʿas of Lebanon, along with other communities of the Ottoman provinces, 
struggling to redefine their political allegiance. Various voices were heard from within the Shiʿi 
community that swayed between a pro-Ottomanist, pro-Arabist, and pro-French stance during 
the political anxiety after the Ottoman Constitutional Revolution and the disintegration of the 
Ottoman Empire. Although Arab societies in support of Faysal emerged as early as 1908, a 
vibrant Shiʿi movement in support of the Arab cause did not appear until the start of World War 
I. Even though the involvement of Shiʿi intellectuals in the Arab nationalist movement is outside 
the scope of this dissertation, the turbulent political climate created an impetus among Shiʿi 
intellectuals to record a history for its community and people.75 Although the Shiʿas of Lebanon 
could not be spoken of as a unified communitarian entity at the time, the first expressions of a 
Shiʿi collective identity were articulated and negotiated in the earliest historical writings of Shiʿi 
intellectuals. An examination of the writings of Shiʿi historians in the early twentieth century 
illustrates their preoccupation with constructing a specific Shiʿi identity and a particular history 
that allotted the community a place of political significance. This section looks at the writings of 
four eminent Shiʿi intellectuals during this period: Sheikh Ahmad Riḍā, Muhammad Jābir al-
Ṣafā, Sheikh Sulaymān Ẓāhir, and Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amīn, as well as the popular Shiʿi journal 
al-ʿIrfān.  
                                                           
75 For an extensive examination of the diverse political position and involvement of Shiʿas in the Arab nationalist 
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Hailing from similar educational backgrounds and upbringings forming the intellectual 
milieu of ʿAmili society, these men represented the first efforts to record the history of the Shiʿas 
of Lebanon.76 They created a specific historical narrative for the Shiʿas of Lebanon that largely 
focused on the history of Jabal ʿAmil. Geographically, Jabal ʿAmil constituted an area of about 
1,200 square miles and a population of 130,361 whose physical contours were defined by the 
Awali River just north of Sidon and extending southward to the Qarn River in Palestine with the 
Mediterranean sea to the west and Wadi al-Taym and the Bekaa Valley to the east.77 Efforts to 
record the history of Jabal ʿAmil became a way for Shiʿi intellectuals to document and reclaim 
their historical roots in the region and the new nation. 
These first forms of modern Shiʿi history at the advent of the French Mandate 
demonstrated a collective effort in constructing a particular version of historical narrative that 
sought to reassert racial and genealogical roots in the region. Consequently, these intellectuals 
utilized the same language and hegemonic modes of knowledge to craft their arguments against 
the same discourse. Said’s Orientalism argues that the scholar “could be regarded as the special 
agent of Western power as it attempted policy vis-à-vis the Orient.”78 In these instances, scholars 
                                                           
76 Ahmad Riḍā, Sulaymān Ẓāhir, and Muhammad Jābir al-Ṣafā began their education in Jamʿīyya al-Maqadis al-
Khayriyya in Nabatiyya and later in al-Madrasa al-Hamidiyya (the Hamidian School), named after the Ottoman 
Sultan, ʿAbd al-Hamid II and subsidized by the Ottoman government. Many other Shiʿi intellectuals were graduates 
of this school, including the founder of the first Shiʿi journal al-ʿIrfān, Ahmad ʿĀrif al-Zayn. This school was 
dissolved by 1906. For a more detailed analysis of these writers see Tamara Chalabi, The Shiʿis of Jabal ʿAmil and 
the New Lebanon, chapter seven and 33–41.  
77 According to al-ʿIrfān, out of the total population 62,796 were Shiʿas. Al-ʿIrfān 7, no. 7 (April 1922): 437. 
However, the total population of Shiʿas according to the 1932 census was documented at 155,035. Rania Maktabi, 
“The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited. Who are the Lebanese?” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 26, no. 
2 (1999): 222. 
 




have agency as both agents and double agents.79 Even as a group of intellectuals within a largely 
“silenced” minority, these men ascribed to the same discursive body of Western knowledge and 
power while supposedly refuting the claims made by it. Hence, this discursive tradition shaped 
the first modern forms of Shiʿi historiography in the early twentieth century. 
This is not to claim that historical texts from within the Shiʿi community did not exist 
prior to the twentieth century, but rather the nature and content of Shiʿi historiography was 
reshaped and redefined as the group was recognized as a sect and amalgamated into a new 
nation. The few Shiʿi historical texts written prior to the twentieth century appeared in the form 
of annals, chronicles, or biographical dictionaries. Most of the published texts that survived were 
religious and local in nature, focusing on the leading zuʿamāʾs or muqātiʿjīs of Jabal ʿAmil. 
They were generally written by religious ʿulamaʾ and remained unpublished and little known 
outside Shiʿa circles.80 Among the first published manuscripts from within the ʿAmili 
community were Muhammad al-Ḥurr al-ʿĀmilī’s Amal al-Āmil fī Tarīkh Jabal ʿAmil (Hope of 
the Hopeful in the History of Jabal ʿAmil), written in the seventeenth century, and Haydar Riḍa 
al-Rukaynī’s Jabal ʿAmil fī Qarn (Jabal ʿAmil in a Century), published in the eighteenth 
century.81 Both texts focused on local events and daily life occurrences in Jabal ʿAmil without 
any regional or political awareness. While Shaykh Muhammad Mughniyya’s Jawāhir al-Ḥikam 
wa-Nafāʾis al-Kalām (The Essence of Knowledge) was written in the mid-nineteenth century, he 
focused on writing the biographical history of the powerful muqātiʾjī families of Jabal ʿAmil. 
                                                           
79 Gil Anidjar, “Secularism” in Critical Inquiry, 69. 
 
80 Many Shiʿi manuscripts were held in private libraries. Many of these libraries perished during Ahmad Jazzar’s 
assault on Jabal ʿAmil in 1760, which Shiʿi historians have written about extensively. See Jaber, “Pouvoir,” 43. 
 
81 Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan al-Ḥurr al-ʿĀmilī, Amal al-Āmil (Muʿassasat al-Wafāʾ, 1693) and Haydar Riḍa al-
Rukaynī, Jabal ʿAmil fī Qarn (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr al-Lubnāni, n.d.). Several other texts of this nature were 
published, such as Shaykh ʿAbd al-Muḥsin Ḍāhir, Al-Dalala al-ʿAmiliya lil-Usra al Waʿiliya. 
43 
 
The forms of historiography written prior to the French Mandate focused on the localized history 
of Jabal ʿAmil emphasizing the idiosyncrasy of their political or religious figures. Writings that 
emerged during the Mandate period sought to move Shiʿas from the periphery to the center of 
Arab historiography. 
Early historical writings emphasized the Arabness of the community and glorified its 
historical past. The emphasis on the Arabness of Shiʿas was accentuated on two fronts. On the 
one hand, Shiʿi intellectuals were preoccupied with reasserting their Arab identity in order to 
legitimize themselves in Faysal’s Arab cause. As a minority, the ʿAmili community had to prove 
their loyalty to the Arab cause that was an ideological manifestation of an urban Sunni majority. 
On the other hand, the nature of the historical writings sought to reassert Shiʿi roots and 
“authenticity” to the region to debunk the representations proliferated by European and Arab 
historians. From these texts, it was clear that Shiʿi intellectuals were aware of the discursive 
narrative constructed by Orientalists and Arab Sunni historians. Consequently, Shiʿi historians 
and intellectuals utilized the same hegemonic discourse rooted in “scientific” origins and race to 
institute their roots to the region and later their national claims. Shiʿi historiography that 
emerged during this time employed a similar line of argument, focusing on the establishment of 
the Matawilas racial, geographical, and historical origins to Lebanon via their stronghold in Jabal 
ʿAmil where the majority of its population resided. This interpretative framework has had a 
lasting effect on the structure of modern Lebanese Shiʿi historiography and communitarian 
identity of today. 
Some of the first modern Shiʿi texts appeared in the Shiʿi journal al-ʿIrfān. Most of these 
men used the popular Shiʿi journal Majallat al-ʿIrfān as a cultural medium to transmit and shape 
Shiʿi historiography. In many ways, the journal itself became a historical text that symbolized 
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the Shiʿi community. This chapter first turns to the critical role played by al-ʿIrfān in the 
foundation of Shiʿi historiography 
 
Inscribing Shiʿi/ ʿAmili History: al-ʿIrfān 
Majallat al-ʿIrfān, the monthly Shiʿi journal founded in Saida in 1909 in the wake of the 
Ottoman Constitutional Revolution by Ahmad ʿĀrif al-Zayn, was the first journal of Jabal ʿAmil 
and the main journal of the Shiʿi world until the 1950s.82 As a pioneer of its kind, al-ʿIrfān 
became a platform for literary, political, and intellectual exchange among the Shiʿi Muslims of 
Lebanon while simultaneously addressing the broader regional concerns that beleaguered the 
area. The journal sought to draw a connection between the Shiʿas of Lebanon and the outside 
world. Hence, the richness of the journal allowed it to reach a much greater audience as it 
focused on a number of topics ranging from Karl Marx to Faysal’s Arab nationalist movement to 
the Iranian constitutional revolution. The various debates and voices heard in al-ʿIrfān, which 
frequently included women writers, reflected the extensive role played by the journal in creating 
a Shiʿi public space. These articles marked the beginning of a public discussion of a local 
identity and laid the foundations for ʿAmili history that was Arab Shiʿi in nature. It also sought 
to draw a connection between the Shiʿas of Lebanon and the external world. Although al-ʿIrfān 
attempted to situate the Shiʿas of Lebanon within the local and regional dynamics of the region, 
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its main objective was to propagate Shiʿi self-awareness and interests. Thus, its content was 
meant for the Shiʿi audience of Greater Syria. It provided Shiʿi intellectuals and ʿulamaʾ a means 
to express their ideas while calling for societal reform.83 As a mouthpiece of Shiʿas, it became 
one of the few primary sources of information about the community during the French Mandate. 
Most importantly, al-ʿIrfān provided the first written form of modern Shiʿi historiography during 
a time of national and regional uncertainty. Lebanese Shiʿi history was being inscribed and 
chronicled in the pages of al-ʿIrfān, fashioning Shiʿi communitarian consciousness, and 
ultimately became a means of integrating the sect into the nation-state. The impact and wide 
usage of the printing industry made it possible for a journal, such as al-ʿIrfān to envision and 
shape a Shiʿi sub-national entity within a larger national identity.84 As a result, modern Lebanese 
Shiʿi historiography first appeared in the pages of al-ʿIrfān. The journal’s contributors and its 
debates came to shape the nature of Lebanese Shiʿi historiography. As Tarif Khalidi rightfully 
noted, al-ʿIrfān was “. . . both a history and a historian, unearthing old and valuable 
historiographic material and then processing that material in a manner that contributed to 
historical change.”85 One of those changes was processing a Shiʿi historiography that spoke both 
to the local Lebanese context and greater regional dynamics. 
An examination of the articles published by al-ʿIrfān during the French Mandate reflect 
the journal’s position that sought to write down the community’s history in Lebanon. Evident in 
its first issue, al-ʿIrfān became a platform for Shiʿi historians and intellectuals to reclaim their 
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ancestral existence in the area by highlighting their roots in Jabal ʿAmil as a way to legitimize 
their origins and inclusion into the new nation-state. Thus, al-ʿIrfān became a forum to 
publically inscribe Shiʿi history and propagate a Shiʿi sense of identity in the early twentieth 
century. Numerous articles appeared throughout the 1920s and 1930s documenting the long 
history of Shiʿas in Jabal ʿAmil.86 The articles accorded the ʿAmili community a distinguished 
historical position that accentuated their longevity and significance in the region.87  
 
Shaykh Ahmad Riḍā 
In some of the first published articles to appear in al-ʿIrfān, Shaykh Ahmad Riḍā (1872–
1953) became a regular voice to the journal, contributing a number of profound articles on the 
historical roots of Shiʿas in Jabal ʿAmil. Ahmad Riḍā was among the Shiʿi notables from the 
town of Nabatiyya who made up the intellectual milieu of the community in the early years of 
post-Ottoman Lebanon.88 Educated and trained by a number of notable Sayyids in Najaf, Riḍā 
studied Arabic literature, philosophy, and logic. As a supporter of the Arab cause and member of 
the Arab Academy of Damascus, Riḍā composed a book on Arabic lexicon titled Muʿjam Matn 
al-Lugha and frequently published in al-ʿIrfān. The importance of Riḍā’s writings cannot be 
emphasized enough as he was the first to tackle the issue of Shiʿi history via the pages of al-
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87 The term ʿAmilis or ʿAmili community was coined to refer to the Shiʿas of Jabal ʿAmil, and later became 
applicable to all Twelver Shiʿas residing in Lebanon. See Rula Abisaab, “Shiʿite Beginnings and Scholastic 
Tradition in Jabal ʿAmil,” Muslim World 89, no. 1 (1999): 1–21; and “The Ulama of Jabal ʿAmil in Safavid Iran, 
1501–1736: Marginality, Migration and Social Change,” Iranian Studies 27, no. 1–4 (1994): 103–22.  
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Janūb (Beirut: al-Majlis al-Thaqāfī li-Lubnān al-Janūbī, 1983); and Fayiz Tarḥīnī, Al-Shaykh Ahmad Riḍā wa-l-Fikr 




ʿIrfān. Beginning in 1910, Riḍā published several articles in al-ʿIrfān, such as “Mā ḥiya al-
Umma?” (What is the Nation?) and “Ṣafaḥāt Min Tarīkh Jabal ʿAmil” (Pages from the History 
of Jabal ʿAmil) that focused on formulating a history for the Shiʿas of Jabal ʿAmil and 
positioning this community vis-à-vis other communities in the early twentieth century. In his 
serialized article “Al-Matawilah aw al-Shiʿa fī Jabal ʿAmil” (The Matawila or the Shiʿa in Jabal 
ʿAmil), published first in 1903 in al-Muqtataf, the Egyptian-based scientific journal, and later 
republished in al-ʿIrfān in 1910, Riḍā highlighted his preoccupation with locating Shiʿi origins 
and identity. The fact that Riḍā republished the same article in two journals of differing genres 
and locality indicated his desire to reach a broader audience concerning the issue of 
Matawila/Shiʿi identity. Riḍā sought to reclaim the asāla of Shiʿas or Matawilas in Jabal ʿAmil 
by discrediting the presumed belief of their Persian origins.89 The term asāla can be translated as 
“authenticity” of the Matawilas. In either case, the term, as I understand, was itself part of a 
discursive tradition that sought to locate the Matawilas by engaging in a given historical 
narrative that evoked it with authority. In his writings, Riḍā investigated the asāla of Shiʿas that 
asserted their local and regional history and place in the nation.  
In his article, Riḍā acknowledged the promulgated assumption of the arrival of the Shiʿas 
to Greater Syria in the eleventh century, but contended that further historical investigation and 
facts invalidated this theory. Riḍā argued that it was inconceivable that the Matawilas were of the 
Persian race, as presumed by many, given that Shiʿism appeared in Jabal ʿAmil way before its 
presence in Iran.90 Following this line of argument, Riḍā proclaimed that “Shiʿas in Greater Syria 
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90 “Al-Matawila aw al-Shiʿa fī Jabal ʿAmil” [The Matawilas or the Shiʿa in Jabal ʿAmil], al-ʿIrfān 2, no. 5 (1910): 
239. Riḍā published the same article in the journal al-Muqtataf from May through October 1903. Al-Muqtataf was 
originally published in Beirut, but moved to Egypt in 1876. It is quite interesting that it would be published in the 
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were older than all other Shiʿas found in any other country with the exception of al-Hijazi.”91 
This claim, he argued, was supported by the Shiʿi belief that Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī, one of the 
Prophet’s companions and one of the first four partisans of Imam ʿAli, arrived to Syria during 
the reign of ʿUthman ibn ʿAffan, the third caliph, and preached the early teachings of Imam ʿAli 
and Shiʿi Islam.92 According to Riḍā, al-Ghifārī had a residence in the town of al-Sararfand near 
Saida where his first conversions to Shiʿi Islam took place in the seventh century. Riḍā subdued 
the claim that the Matawilas emigrated to the region in the eleventh century by inscribing Jabal 
ʿAmil’s long historical stronghold and foundational role in establishing the Shiʿi faith. 
According to Riḍā, the Matawilas were to be revered as pioneers of Shiʿi Islam. By proclaiming 
the Matawilas’s longevity in the region as “indigenous” inhabitants rather than Persian or 
Kurdish colonists, Riḍā asserted their geographic legitimacy in Greater Syria. To further 
discredit the presumed Persian ancestry of the Matawilas, Riḍā reiterated the belief that the 
ʿAmilis were descendents from the Banū ʿAmila bin Sabaʿ tribe of Yemen.93 Citing Ibn 
Khaldun, thus relying on a renowned Sunni source to validate his argument, Riḍā contended that 
the Shiʿas of Jabal ʿAmil hailed from the Banū ʿAmila tribe which originally settled on the 
mountain that later came to be known by the tribe’s name. They were believed to have arrived in 
Jabal ʿAmil in the third century BC and settled in the region. By tracing the Matawilas’s lineage 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
same journal that discussed Darwinism and scientific reviews. The fact that origin and race theories were 
categorized as scientific and anthropological in nature may explain its presence in this journal. Riḍā wrote other 




92 Abū Dharr opposed Uthman and later Muʿawiya for the distribution of alms to governors and relatives, rather than 
adhering to the principles of Islam and utilizing and redistributing it to the Muslim masses.   
 
93 Ahmad Riḍā, “Al-Matawila aw al-Shiʿa fī Jabal ʿAmil” [The Matawila or the Shiʿa in Jabal ʿAmil], al-ʿIrfān 2, 
no. 9 (1910): 444–50. Ahmad Riḍā, “Banū ʿAmila,” al-ʿIrfān 31, no. 5–6 (1942–1943): 218–24. “Mā ḥiya al-




to the Yemenites, it further rebutted their Persian roots, which was one of Riḍā’s principal 
objectives in the article. As descendants of the Banū ʿAmilas, the Matawilas were 
unquestionably authenticated as Arabs by race through genealogical deduction. By making such 
claims, Riḍā also established that the racial composition of the Matawilas was marked as Arab 
before Shiʿa. The Matawilas were defined as Arabs and later became among the first Shiʿi 
converts in the Middle East. While the origins of this claim are not known and cannot be 
confirmed (Riḍā set the historical standard which modern Shiʿi historians referred to), the idea 
that the ʿAmilis were descendents of the Banū ʿAmilas became widely circulated in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century and a staple of Shiʿi historiography, discussed later in this 
chapter.94 This assertion of origins presumed that Shiʿas in the Bekaa Valley, Mount Lebanon, 
and Jabal ʿAmil were all descendents of the Banū ʿAmila tribe as it envisioned a cohesive 
homogenous Shiʿi entity in Lebanon that was most likely fallacious. Nevertheless, this historic 
lineage was erected as a cornerstone of Shiʿi historiography with Jabal ʿAmil as the birthplace of 
Arab Shiʿism in Greater Syria. 
Jabal ʿAmil was constructed as a religious, cultural, and geographic stronghold of Arab 
Shiʿism, highlighting the centrality and significance of the Matawilas in history. Riḍā noted the 
religious and literary contributions of the Matawilas to the world and chronicled the works of 
several Shiʿi intellectuals. Asserting the educational centrality of Jabal ʿAmil, Riḍā claimed that 
Shiʿas from India, Russia, and Iran have come to Jabal ʿAmil to learn and thrive from their 
religious scholars and centers.95 Riḍā glorified the writings of ʿAmili Shiʿas filling the pages of 
                                                           
94 The connection to Abū Dharr was also made by al-Hurr al-ʿAmili’s work, Amal al-Āmil fī Tarīkh Jabal ʿAmil the 
first and most well-known Amiliʾ historical text before the emergence of modern Lebanese Shiʿa historiography. 
 
95 “Al-Matawila aw al-Shiʿa fī Jabal ʿAmil” [The Matawila or the Shiʿa in Jabal ʿAmil], al-ʿIrfān 2, no. 8 (1910): 
381–92. This was a common theme in al-ʿIrfān, whereby the contributions of Shiʿi religious figures and 
intellectuals were repeatedly noted while poetry written by Shiʿas were regularly published in the journal.  
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al-ʿIrfān with their poetic prose and religious edicts. Riḍā’s writing, like that of other Shiʿi 
intellectuals of the time, hoped to obscure the peripherality and marginality long prescribed to 
the Shiʿas of Lebanon by bringing their history to the forefront. The multifaceted writings of al-
ʿIrfān sought to accentuate the contributions of Shiʿas by means of subverting the image of Jabal 
ʿAmil as an abyss of primitiveness and backwardness. Historical texts that appeared at the turn 
of the century coalesced to form a standard narrative of ʿAmili history. The writings converged 
on establishing the racial legitimacy of Shiʿas as Arabs by tracing their ancestry to the Banū 
ʿAmila tribe while simultaneously highlighting the primacy of their Shiʿism to the days of Abū 
Ghifārī. This methodology prescribed early on by Riḍā became the canonical formula of Shiʿi 
historical texts at the advent of the Mandate. Shiʿi historians were obsessed with proving their 
origins and historical significance in the region, and began their historical texts with the assertion 
of origins and regional authenticity before they purported the relevance of the Shiʿi community 
in Jabal ʿAmil throughout time. During the Mandate, this application became a prerequisite for 
any historical texts as a means of diffusing Orientalist and Arab literature produced on the 
community while also asserting their place in the political dynamics of the nation.  
 
Muhammad Jābir al-Ṣafā 
Muhammad Jābir al-Ṣafā (1875–1945) was born in Nabatiyya and educated under several 
thinkers before ending up in the Hamidiyya school in Nabatiyya.96 Al-Ṣafā was a prominent 
Shiʿi thinker who spent the second part of his life writing about Jabal ʿAmil and the Shiʿas of 
Lebanon from the city of Damascus. Al-Ṣafā wrote the most widely circulated historical text on 
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Jabal ʿAmil.97 Considered the first modern Shiʿi historian, al-Ṣafā’s Tarīkh Jabal ʿAmil (The 
History of Jabal ʿAmil) was written in the 1930s and published in 1952.98 The text was the first 
attempt to erect a comprehensive history of the ʿAmili community that engaged with the post-
Ottoman reality of Jabal ʿAmil and Lebanon as a whole. From the opening of his text, the 
objective of al-Ṣafā was to write down the obscured and little-known history of Jabal ʿAmil with 
communitarian overtones toward a unified Shiʿi ṭāʾifa (sect). Al-Ṣafā was writing from a clear 
communitarian perspective to promote the history and identity of the sect within its regional 
context. Al-Ṣafā demanded the need to know one’s history to construct national sentiment and 
unity.99 Although al-Ṣafā was not speaking specifically of a Lebanese national entity, he was 
aware of the political reality of Jabal ʿAmil and its connection to Mount Lebanon, both 
geographically and politically. Consequently, al-Ṣafā developed a methodological approach 
toward history dividing it in two parts: public and private. Public history, according to al-Ṣafā, 
was divided into four sections: 1) The Muslim Caliphate to the end of the Roman empire, 2) the 
Early Middle Ages to the end of the Byzantine empire, 3) the Late Middle Ages to 1789, and 4) 
the Modern Age of the French Revolution until 1914. Al-Ṣafā argued the need to be familiar 
with the history of major worldly events before diagnosing the private history of Jabal ʿAmil and 
the Shiʿi community within these major epochs.100 As a result, al-Ṣafā attempted to examine the 
specific history of the ʿAmili community within this larger narrative, focusing primarily on the 
modern era and the current political climate in the region.  
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98 The published text was a shortened version of Al-Ṣafāʿs unpublished manuscript titled “Mudhakkarat 
Tarīkhiyya,” which contains five volumes. References will be made to the published text that was widespread and 
widely read. Muhammad Jābir al-Ṣafā, Tarīkh Jabal ʿAmil (Beirut: Dār al-Nahār, 1996). 
 
99 Muhammad Jābir al-Ṣafā, Tarīkh Jabal ʿAmil (Beirut: Dār al-Nahār, 1996), 21. 
 
100 Al-Ṣafā, Tarīkh Jabal ʿAmil, 14. 
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Al-Ṣafā was a supporter of the Arab nationalist movement and a member of the CUP 
(Committee of Union and Progress) division in Nabatiyya, where he later joined the secret pro-
Arab parties in Istanbul that resulted in his arrest in the ʿAley trials of 1915. Evident by his 
political affiliations, al-Ṣafā was an advocate of the Arab cause, which can be seen throughout 
his writing that emphasized Jabal ʿAmil’s support for this movement. Al-Ṣafā’s project focused 
predominantly on the political history of the ʿAmili community, particularly the leadership of the 
leading muqatiʿji (families) in Jabal ʿAmil. Hence, al-Ṣafā concentrated on the glory days of 
Jabal ʿAmil under the tutelage of ʿAli Saghir (ca. 1649), who claimed direct lineage to the Banu 
ʿAmila tribe. By highlighting the unity of the ʿAmil community and their political leaders ,and 
the position they played with other religious communities in Lebanon, al-Ṣafā helped construct a 
semblance of Shiʿi communitarian unity. Al-Ṣafā integrated the political events of Jabal ʿAmil 
with the affairs of Mount Lebanon and the Greater Syria area. Shiʿas were portrayed as 
defenders of the Christian community in the 1860 civil war between Christians and Druzes, 
asserting the importance of Jabal ʿAmil in relation to the political affairs of Mount Lebanon 
under the Ottomans.101 According to al-Ṣafā, it was the Ottomans who created tensions between 
the sects during particular moments in history. Al-Ṣafā examined the severity of the Ottoman 
Empire on the Jabal ʿAmil community, which brought unity among Shiʿas but intensified 
tensions between Shiʿas and the other sects.102 Although al-Ṣafā diffused any civil strife among 
the various sects of Lebanon in order to establish a multi-communitarian balance, al-Ṣafā 
stressed the difficulties and inequalities faced by Jabal ʿAmil, which was mistreated in terms of 
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taxation and land treatment, under the Ottomans.103 Al-Ṣafā represented the making and asserting 
of a “Lebanese” Shiʿi identity. Like other Shiʿi intellectuals, al-Ṣafā highlighted the literary and 
educational contributions of the ʿAmili community chronicling the authors’ biographical history 
and their published texts.  
Although al-Ṣafā did not delve into the extensive discourse of the origins of Shiʿas, al-
Ṣafā opened his text by asking, “Why was this region named Jabal ʿAmil and Bilad Beshara?” 
Al-Ṣafā asserted the Arab legacy of this area since the time of Banū ʿAmila, and ruminated that 
“only Arabs lived in this region evident in their language and traditions who migrated from 
Yemen from the ʿAmila bin Sabaʾ tribe 300 years before Christ.”104 He dismissed any cultural 
exchange or colonial interference in Jabal ʿAmil and depicted a picture of the mountain as an 
isolated entity that had shielded this Arab tradition for centuries, distinguishing it from any other 
community. This proclaimed eternal connection to Jabal ʿAmil, which maintained its unchanging 
Arab characteristic, created an unchallenged narrative of the region as an everlasting stronghold 
of Arab civilization. According to al-Ṣafā, this long tradition allowed Shiʿas to have the closest 
pronunciation to classical Arabic of all other Arabs, indirectly refuting Orientalists’s claims that 
the Arabic dialect of the Matawilas was indicative of Persian blood. The primacy given to the 
Arabness of the region spoke of its political situation whereby Shiʿi historians felt the need to 
assert their indigenous claims to the land. The proclivity of early twentieth-century Shiʿi writings 
was intent on asserting legitimacy and primacy of Shiʿas on the grounds of racial, geographical, 
religious, and even linguistic claims. Shiʿi historians wanted to prove their authenticity on two 
fronts: racial as Arabs and religious as Shiʿas through the geographical entity of Jabal ʿAmil. 
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Adhering to the standard narrative of the community, al-Ṣafā also linked the emergence of 
Shiʿism in the area since the time of Abū Dharr. Although al-Ṣafā did not delve into this history 
and assume the validity of this narrative, he cited the work of Iranian traveler Nasser Khosrau 
who noted that most of the population in Tyre and Tripoli were of the Shiʿi faith.105 Al-Ṣafā 
helped construct and reaffirm the standard Shiʿi historical narrative that sought to establish the 
nativeness of Shiʿas to the land as Arabs who contributed to the region’s history and continue to 
affect the political makeup of the area.  
 
Shaykh Sulaymān Ẓāhir 
Sulaymān Ẓāhir (1873–1960), another distinguished Shiʿi intellectual and renowned 
shaykh from Nabatiyya, published various articles in al-ʿIrfān, as well as historical texts 
proliferating the history of Jabal ʿAmil and its importance in the region.106 In a series of articles 
titled “Muʿjam Qura Jabal ʿAmil” (Dictionary of the Villages of Jabal ʿAmil) Ẓāhir recorded the 
epistemological origin of every village name in Jabal ʿAmil and its history during the eighteenth 
century.107 Ẓāhir accounted for 305 villages while citing the land-owning notables of each town. 
Documenting the geographical parameters of each town, Ẓāhir chronicled the impact of major 
political events in the town. The myriad of articles contributed by Ẓāhir indicated the effort made 
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by the editors of al-ʿIrfān to produce a history for Jabal ʿAmil that signified both its local and 
regional significance. Among Ẓāhir’s other publications are two articles, “Jabal ʿAmil wa Qalʿat 
al-Shaqif” (Jabal ʿAmil and the Beaufort Castle) and “Ṣilat al ʿilm bayna Jabal ʿAmil wa-l-
Shām” (The Chain of Knowledge between Jabal ʿAmil and Syria ), which reflected his concern 
to highlight the importance of Jabal ʿAmil and its contribution to the outside world, particularly 
the larger and more dominant Sunni milieu. Ẓāhir repeatedly illustrated the geographical and 
historical importance of the region by examining the archeological remains found in Jabal ʿAmil, 
such as the Beaufort Castle near the southern town of ʿArnun. Although Beaufort Castle was 
believed to have been built during the Crusades, Ẓāhir provided supporting evidence to trace the 
castle back to the time of the Romans, linking Jabal ʿAmil to the historical contributions of 
civilizations past while also asserting the  connection of the Shiʿas to the acclaimed Phoenician 
past hailed by the Christian Maronites as their own.108 Geography became a key component for 
making history and political claims for the Shiʿi community. Ẓāhir made various efforts to write 
down and magnify the history of the area as a means to make the presence of Shiʿas visible and 
living. Ẓāhir sought recognition and appreciation for the ʿAmili community which had been 
disinherited for so long and ignored in both Sunni and European accounts. Shiʿi contributors of 
al-ʿIrfān endeavored to engrave the historical presence and significance of Jabal ʿAmil within 
the larger regional and Syrian context.   
Ẓāhir’s Jabal ‘Amil fī al-Ḥarb al-Kawniyya (Jabal ʿAmil during the World War) was his 
first major historical contribution. The text began with the standard articulation of the geographic 
parameters of Jabal ʿAmil and the reiteration of the ʿAmilis lineage from Banū ʿAmila bin Sabaʾ 
while reasserting the ʿAmili claim as the beholders of Shiʿi Islam since the time of Abū Ghifārī. 
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Unlike Riḍā’s historical analysis, Ẓāhir provided no proof to support this opening proclamation 
but rather asserted it as a given. This affirmation of origins became the normative introduction 
found in early Shiʿi historical texts regardless of scope or period under examination. The overall 
composition of Ẓāhir’s text focused on the political impact of World War I on Jabal ʿAmil and 
the subsequent French occupation. Ẓāhir’s text was entrenched with sympathy for the Arab cause 
and Faysal’s nationalist movement while glossed with a profound anti-French occupation stance. 
Ẓāhir described the involvement of the ʿAmilis in the events of post-Ottoman Lebanon and 
argued that there was no conflict between the various religious groups prior to the French 
occupation. Shiʿas lived with Christians and Sunnis in harmony for centuries with Shiʿas helping 
Christians during the Great Depression and providing them with a haven during their civil strife 
with the Druzes in 1860.   
According to Ẓāhir, the French occupation was rooted in a “politics of separation” that 
created inequalities among the sects brewed by French favoritism toward the Christian 
population. Ẓāhir focused on the French aggressions against the Shiʿi community of Jabal ʿAmil. 
He accused the Christians of the region of heightening this aggression since they were the ones 
bestowed with weapons by the French.109 Although Ẓāhir tried to dismiss sectarian conflicts in 
Jabal ʿAmil, his assessment of the events at the turn of the century implied the makings of Shiʿi 
communitarian entity. Ẓāhir painted a picture of Shiʿas as defenders of the nation against the 
French occupation and proponents of civil unity among religious groups. The nature of Ẓāhir’s 
historical texts revealed many things. The story of Shiʿi origins and racial composition became 
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more readily adhered to as a normalized tradition within Shiʿi historiography. As such, the 
degree of historical analysis to prove this claim dwindled as it became common, and thus 
acceptable, to the point that most Shiʿi historical texts mentioned the Banū ʿAmila/Arab lineage 
in passing or not at all. As Shiʿas were increasingly integrated into the nation-state, the need to 
reassert their origins was lessened so that recent Lebanese Shiʿi historiography did not dwell on 
the topic or even question its legitimacy. However, an emphasis was placed on asserting Jabal 
ʿAmil’s historical importance as a communitarian entity in the region and its political position as 
a supporter of the Arab cause and protectors of the nation against European forces.   
 
Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amīn  
Unlike previous writers, Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amīn hailed from a prominent family of 
ʿulamaʾ and received a religious education in Najaf, where he later became a mujtahid. A 
mujtahid is a learned man who attains an advanced degree of religious training whereby he can 
perform ijtihād (religious judgment) based on the Islamic law that Shiʿi believers can emulate 
and follow. As a religious scholar, al-Amīn maintained a strong interest in historical studies, 
particularly the history of the Shiʿas in Jabal ʿAmil and Greater Syria.  
In his work Khiṭat Jabal ʿAmil (The Lands of Jabal ʿAmil), al-Amīn provided a rich 
history of Jabal ʿAmil describing the economic and agricultural composition of the region and its 
educational and religious establishments. Al-Amīn provided a prolific list of literary 
contributions of the ʿAmili while also illustrating vivid pictures of the everyday lives and 
traditions of the community. Although the book began with a historical evaluation of the 
prominent ʿulamaʾ of Jabal ʿAmil, whereby much attention was given to the al-Amīn family, the 
remainder of the text focused on the cultural and socioeconomic conditions of Jabal ʿAmil. 
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Unlike other Shiʿi historians of his time, al-Amīn’s work did not dwell on the political state of 
post-Ottoman Lebanon and the conflicting movements that beset the region at that time, but 
rather focused on local customs and flavors of Jabal ʿAmil. Al-Amīn provided a historical 
lexicon of the villages of Jabal ʿAmil, listing all the mosques, schools, and thinkers from within 
the community. 
Nevertheless, al-Amīn reiterated the same history of Abū Dharr’s conversion of Jabal 
ʿAmil to Shiʿism as recited by Riḍā, but al-Amīn questioned the validity of such a claim. 
Although al-Amīn did not refute the legitimacy of this lineage, he also did not find it necessary 
to uphold this connection to Abū Dharr to prove the longevity of Shiʿism in Jabal ʿAmil. 
According to al-Amīn, by the tenth century Shiʿism was widespread throughout the Middle East, 
whether in Egypt with the Fatimids or in Aleppo and various parts of Syria under the rule of 
Banū Hamdan; " by the twelfth century all of Jabal ʿAmil was undeniably all Shiʿa.”110  At one 
point, al-Amīn ruminated that “Shiʿas outnumber Sunnis” in Damascus during the twelfth 
century, which was proof enough to establish the Shiʿi legacy in the region. Rather than going 
back to the story of Abū Dharr as the spiritual father of the community, al-Amīn examined a 
myriad of texts to establish the history of Shiʿism and its various pockets of governance in the 
Arab world between the tenth and twelfth century to further reinforce the Shiʿi presence in Jabal 
ʿAmil and Greater Syria way before the twelfth century. 
 Al-Amīn, however, allocated much time to the Arabness of the ʿAmila community and 
their homogenous origins from the tribe of Banū ʿAmila. Al-Amīn focused on this matter in Man 
huwa ʿAmila? (Who is ʿAmila?) in which he traced the historical meaning and validity of the 
term and Jabal ʿAmil’s connection to the Banū ʿAmila tribe of Yemen. Al-Amīn cited evidence 
                                                           




from various intellectual figures to conclude that the people of Jabal ʿAmil are descendants from 
this tribe. Al-Amīn reverted back to the time of the Prophet who was recorded saying that the 
ʿAmilas were Arabs.111 Like his predecessors, al-Amīn confirmed the historically timeless 
lineage of Shiʿas to the Banū ʿAmila who “. . . settled in this mountain and their ancestors 
remained there until today and who the people of Jabal ʿAmil emanate from.”112 Al-Amīn was 
most angered by books published and found in the al-Azhar University quoting one particular 
text which declared that “the Matawilas are a branch of the Shiʿas and are of Persian origins.”113 
Angered by this statement, al-Amīn advocated for a thorough examination of the history of the 
ʿAmila community before assuming that the Shiʿas of Jabal ʿAmil were of Persian origins 
simply because they shared the same religious denomination.114 Al-Amīn adhered to the 
formative narrative of Shiʿi Arabness to assert their place in Jabal ʿAmil and the Arab world. His 
determination to prove the Arabness of Shiʿas became a prominent component of al-Amīn’s 
narrative. Al-Amīn argued that the mannerism and customs of the ʿAmili Shiʿas were 
recognizably Arab in nature as they were filled with generosity and etiquette.115 The need to 
affirm the group’s authentic Arab identity was prevalent in al-Amīn’s writing. Al-Amīn devoted 
a section to illustrate the Arabness of the Matawilas’s lineage to Banū ʿAmila; their language, 
mannerism, and tradition. Although al-Amīn tried to assert the relevance of the ʿAmilas to the 
larger Shiʿi world, he was cautious about embellishing this relationship at the expense of the 
ʿAmilas’s Arab identity and link to the Arab/Muslim world. Thus, al-Amīn overlooked any 
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sectarian discord in the post-Ottoman nation advocating for a pan Arab/Muslim umma (nation). 
However, the implications of a Shiʿi communitarian entity are evident in the subject matter of 
the manuscript and al-Amīn’s emphasis on the historical relevance of Jabal ʿAmil. 
This group of men became the main voice of the community and had an immense 
influence on the method the historical events within the ʿAmili history was recorded. They 
created a normative discourse of their community, which dominated the nature of Shiʿi 
historiography in the early twentieth century. The proclivity of their texts revealed their concern 
with constructing Shiʿi identity and historical origins. Shiʿi historians were interested in erecting 
a particular identity that emphasized their eternal Arabness and indigenousness to the land. 
Consequently, the nature of the writings was clearly meant to reach a wider Sunni and European 
audience by aiming to prove the racial origins of the Matawilas to the land as a way to assert 
their historical and political claims. It is true that Lebanese historiography as a whole cannot be 
divorced from the Maronite prototype narrative, which Tamara Chalabi argued, dictated the 
historical writing of various other communitarian narratives, including those of the ʿAmili 
community.116 However, for the ʿAmili community there was an impetus to reclaim history, 
which had long been dictated by the Oriental image portrayed by various European and Sunni 
historians who had erected the Shiʿas of Greater Syria as both primitive and foreign to the 
region. However, in doing so Shiʿi historians of the early twentieth century adhered to the same 
interpretative discourse of racial origins of Europeans in reasserting their political and historical 
claims in the nation and the region. The writing of modern Lebanese Shiʿi historiography 
inevitably adhered to the nationalist historiography of the West. 
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The ʿAmilis attempted to assert their community into the historical narrative of the region 
by championing their lineage and mountain as a form of inclusion. Formulating the authorizing 
body on Shiʿi history at the turn of the century, the writings of al-ʿIrfān and Shiʿi historians 
painted a potentially distorted image of the historical events of the time. The twentieth-century 
writings of Riḍā, al-Ṣafā, Ẓāhir, al-Amīn, and al-ʿIrfān utilized the same language, knowledge, 
and modes of analysis constructed by the West in reasserting their historical claims and 
formulating a collective communal identity. Shiʿi intellectuals emerged from a particular stratus 
of ʿAmili society hailing from similar backgrounds and educational upbringings. Although these 
men provided different versions of historical events at times, they remained focused on recording 
historical events from the standpoint of their political allegiances to particular leaders and 
institutions. Hence, they all sought to mark ʿAmili participation in the regional happenings 
focusing on loyalties of the Shiʿas to Amir Faysal and the Arab cause, and the group’s 
opposition to the French mandatory authorities. They painted a picture of an eternally united 
Arab community with common political allegiances within a loosely defined national boundary. 
By the advent of the French Mandate, Shiʿi historiography moved from a more localized to a 
nationalized dimension. Writings that emerged during the Mandate period sought to move Shiʿas 
from the periphery to the center of historical narrative by recording and documenting the legacy 
of a collective community long forgotten in the annals of history. This discussion now moves 
from the writing of modern Shiʿi historiography to the historical reality of the Shiʿas in Jabal 
ʿAmil and the Bekaa Valley (Baalbek al-Hirmil region) prior and during the French Mandate, 
just as the community integrated into a burgeoning Lebanese nation-state. 
 
Part Three: From ʿAmilis to the Shiʿas of Lebanon- 
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From Jabal ʿAmil to Janub Lubnan (The South of Lebanon) 
 
With the fall of the Ottoman Empire, colonial powers demarcated borders and 
constructed new national entities in the Levantine. The French Mandate defined the boundaries 
of a new Lebanese nation-state that had far extended the Mount Lebanon of the Maronite 
community. The southern region of Jabal ʿAmil, whose population was predominantly Shiʿa, 
was incorporated into the Greater Lebanon nation greatly unbalancing the religious makeup of 
the new nation-state. Where the Mutaṣarrifiyya (Ottoman semi-autonomous province of Mount 
Lebanon) constituted a largely Maronite population the extension of Petit Lebanon to include the 
regions south of Beirut incorporated a largely Muslim population and increasing Shiʿi 
constituency of the south. Moreover, the Shiʿas of Jabal ʿAmil, the Bekaa Valley, and Beirut 
came to be politically intertwined and united as a collective entity. 
The formation of the Lebanese nation-state transformed Shiʿi Muslims from a peripheral 
Ottoman population to a politically recognized minority within a new nation-state. However, it 
would be erroneous to think that Shiʿas residing in Jabal ʿAmil and Greater Syria in general did 
not have any relationship to the Mutaṣarrifiyya of Mount Lebanon prior to their integration into 
Grand Lebanon. Jabal ʿAmil had been historically linked to Mount Lebanon agriculturally, 
economically, and politically, serving as one of the main reasons the southern region was 
incorporated into the boundaries of the new nation-state. In his dissertation, “Pouvoir et Société 
au Jabal Amil de 1790 a 1920 dans la Conscience des Chroniqueurs Chiites et dans un Essai 
d’interprétation,” Mounzer Jaber traced the political connection between Jabal ʿAmil and Mount 
Lebanon in the eighteenth century, arguing that the political leadership in the two regions was 
intertwined to some extent. During moments of civil conflicts between the Maronites and Druzes 
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in Mount Lebanon, Jaber argued, Shiʿi zuʿamāʾ (political leaders) of Jabal ʿAmil aligned 
themselves with particular ruling families whereby the outcome of the clash affected the fate of 
the political leadership in Jabal ʿAmil. For example, during the 1860 civil war in Mount 
Lebanon, a number of leading Shiʿi zuʿamāʾ of Jabal ʿAmil aligned themselves with the Azm 
family of Damascus against the Shihabi amirate of Mount Lebanon.117 Consequently, the 
political leadership of the traditional zuʿamāʾ was weakened as a new class of Shiʿi notable 
families (wujahāʾ), who had linked themselves with the Shihabis, and started to exercise greater 
political weight in the region. From an economic and agricultural standpoint, Mount Lebanon 
relied on the predominantly agricultural society of Jabal ʿAmil and their fecund lands for crops 
and grains. Moreover, the severity of the Great Depression and the magnitude of famine suffered 
by the residents of the Mutaṣarrifiya reflected the areas’ inability to sustain a viable agricultural 
base on its own. Although Jabal ʿAmil experienced the harsh brutality of the Great Depression, 
which was extensively written about in al-ʿIrfān, the region did not endure the gravity of other 
areas and maintained a sustainable amount of agricultural cultivation and production.118 Jabal 
ʿAmil and the Bekaa Valley were predominantly agricultural communities which produced 
various crops. For Jabal ʿAmil, the cultivation of cotton, grains, and tobacco were the region’s 
most prominent yields. The economic viability of Jabal ʿAmil rested on their trade with the 
Palestinian hinterland and the growing demands for cotton and later tobacco by Europeans, while 
the Bekaa Valley was tied to the Syrian interior due to the regions’ lucrative coal and wood 
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production. However, the fate of agricultural production in both regions rested on local Shiʿi 
leaders of the iqtāʿ (Ottoman feudal land grant system). 
After the defeat of the Mamluks by the Ottomans in 1516, Shiʿas remained under the 
muqātaʿjī system that sustained a feudal-like structure whereby a muqātaʿjī (local leader who 
generally hailed from a prominent family which traced its lineage to the Banu ʿAmila tribe of 
Yemen) maintained exclusive control over a given area under the pretense of collecting taxes for 
the administrative Porte.119 Under this system, the Shiʿas of Jabal ʿAmil were under the 
leadership of the shaykhs of the al-Saghir, al-Saʿb, and al-Munkir families while Shiʿas in 
Baalbek al-Hirmil were under the rule of the Harfush and Hamadi clans.120 Their constituency 
consisted largely of a peasantry class with a sizable ʿulamaʾ population which reinforced the 
authority of the ruling zuʿamāʾ or muqātaʿjī class. This form of indirect rule allowed local 
leaders to sustain a monopoly over the economic and political affairs of its constituents as long 
as tax quotas were met.121 Hence, the iqtāʿ system gave Shiʿas much liberty to govern their own 
affairs with relatively no interference from the Ottoman Porte. Jabal ʿAmil and the Bekaa Valley 
prospered during this period of growing European agricultural demand. The Baalbek al-Hirmil 
region specialized in cotton, cereals, and raisin production which was exported to Europe via the 
port in Tripoli. Baalbek’s fertile agricultural land and proximity to the Syrian interior allowed the 
area to prosper and contribute to the economic development of the region during the sixteenth 
and seventeenth century. Jabal ʿAmil experienced substantial economic and agricultural growth 
in the seventeenth and eighteenth century propelled primarily by European demand for cotton. 
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The ʿAmili community sustained a lucrative trade of high-quality cotton production indicative of 
higher taxes which the administrative state imposed on the region in comparison to those 
imposed in Mount Lebanon.122 The demand for cotton declined with the development of cotton 
cultivation in Egypt and the replication of cotton fabric produced by the Shiʿas of Jabal ʿAmil, 
leading to a decline in business in the port of Sidon. The decline of cotton cultivation and the 
execution of administrative Tanzimat reforms by the Ottoman center altered the political and 
economic makeup of the region. 
 
The Impact of Ottoman Tanzimat Reforms on Jabal ʿAmil and the Bekaa Valley 
The Ottoman Tanzimat reforms of the nineteenth century were meant to centralize the 
authoritative bureaucracy of the Sublime Porte of the Ottoman Empire, which brought about 
administrative changes that transformed the nature of land tenure, taxation codes, and 
administrative municipalities of the Arab lands. First, Tanzimat reforms incorporated Jabal 
ʿAmil into the wilaya (Ottoman province) of Beirut by 1864. Prior to this provincial 
reorganization, Greater Syria was divided into three wilayas, namely Aleppo, Damascus, and 
Tripoli with Jabal ʿAmil and the Bekaa Valley included into the wilaya of Damascus. However, 
in 1660 Jabal ʿAmil was incorporated into the newly-created wilaya of Sidon while Baalbek al-
Hirmil was integrated into the Mutaṣarrifiyya of Mount Lebanon. By 1887, the wilaya of Beirut 
was formally created, incorporating Jabal ʿAmil into it. Consequently, the integration of Jabal 
ʿAmil into the wilaya of Beirut shifted the trade route away from Jabal ʿAmil as the maritime 
trade ports of Beirut and Damascus were accentuated. The construction of the Beirut-Damascus 
road between 1859 and 1863 created a new land-based trade route between Mount Lebanon, 
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66 
 
Palestine, and Syria, further making Jabal ʿAmil insignificant in a growing capitalist society of 
European intervention. Growing Western capitalist interests and investments in the region were 
emphasized with favorable land reforms brought about by Tanzimat changes. 
The Ottoman Land Reform of 1858 prompted by the Tanzimat brought about changes to 
land tenure and codes while also opening up the market to new landowners to acquire 
property.123 In Jabal ʿAmil, most of the land existed in the form of miri (state-held land) for 
lease, whereby leading families, such as the al-Saghirs, al-Assads, and al-Fadls, were assigned 
the administrative role of collecting taxes and regulating the land for the Ottoman Porte.124 As a 
society consisting of largely public or state-owned land, there was a limited amount of mulk 
(private-held land). Land reform initiatives of the nineteenth century placed the sale of land on 
the open market heightening interest in public lands of Jabal ʿAmil. The land law of 1858 
allowed individuals to register land as mulk land, which resulted in individuals registering land in 
their name even though the land was being cultivated and run by peasants. Consequently, the 
1858 land law saw the emergence of new land-owning families, as well as the creation of large 
land estates. A group of wujahāʾs (new landowning families) emerged, who “were in origin a 
mid to late nineteenth-century group of grain merchants, a small number of whom made use of 
the new Ottoman law to break into the more lucrative and more prestigious class of zaʿīm 
through becoming multazims and officers of the state.”125 This rising Shiʿi class was able to 
foster their political affiliations and collaboration with leading Sunni and Maronite families 
linked to the Ottoman state to gain political ascendancy and land acquisitions. For the most part, 
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the ʿAmili peasants’ lack of political affiliation and administrative savvy resulted in their laxity 
to register their land while the threat of “increased taxation and a fear of army conscription” 
forced peasants to give up their property.126 Prominent Shiʿi families, such as the Zayns, 
ʿUsrayans ,and al-Khalils, emerged as beholders of large land acquisitions and positions of 
power that continue to have political relevance today. Property speculators from Mount Lebanon 
also took this opportunity to tap into the agricultural production of Jabal ʿAmil. Various leading 
Sunni and Christian families acquired land in Jabal ʿAmil, such as the Sulh family from Sidon 
and the Francis and Abella families from Mount Lebanon. As a result, land reforms brought an 
end to the iqtāʿ system that disrupted the political power system of the leading muqātāʿjī and 
zuʿamāʾs by creating alternative centers of power and a new social class. Although Tanzimat 
reforms instituted greater administrative regulations, they also came at a time of growing 
European colonial expansion and capitalist investment in the region. 
On the economic front, the growing regional capitalist expansion, coupled with Tanzimat 
reforms, brought about the monopolization of tobacco cultivation in Jabal ʿAmil by ʿAmili 
Ottoman and French authorities. Tanzimat reforms allowed for greater European involvement 
and control in the economic affairs of Greater Syria. The overall impact of European capitalist 
expansion affected Jabal ʿAmil negatively as greater European consolidation and monopolization 
of agricultural production ensued. The cultivation of tobacco took place in Jabal ʿAmil as early 
as the eighteenth century and it later became the most prominent crop under Ibrahim Pasha, who 
opened the ʿAmili production of tobacco to the Egyptian market in 1840. With growing Western 
capitalist investment and expansion in the region the cotton industry became lucrative with the 
advent of the French Mandate. The cultivation of tobacco became the main source of economic 
                                                           




livelihood for nearly 90 percent of the workforce in the South.127 Although this had always been 
a prosperous business for the ʿAmili community, the institution of the Tobacco Régie by the 
Ottomans and the French limited and regulated the production in the region. The monopoly of 
the Tobacco Régie instituted severe regulations which limited the amount of land that could be 
cultivated while also imposing heavy taxation on the tobacco produced by peasants. Permission 
had to be granted by the Régie to cultivate land for tobacco production, thus not allowing 
peasants to profit from all the viable and fertile land on hand. Tightening regulations of the 
Ottoman government forced conscription of Shiʿas into the Ottoman army while growing 
European interventions in the region, following Tanzimat reforms, led to growing unrest and 
rebellion among the Shiʿi communities of Jabal ʿAmil and the Bekaa Valley.128 
Although Tanzimat reforms granted Christians and Jews additional rights to participatory 
citizens in the Ottoman government, this was not extended to Shiʿi Muslims of the region. 
Although the Shiʿas of Jabal ʿAmil and the Bekaa Valley remained relatively unnoticed in the 
political affairs of the Empire, the severity of taxation imposed on the Shiʿi Muslims of Lebanon 
led to a number of rebellious uprisings against the Ottoman authorities. A historical important 
uprising occurred in 1775 when the Shiʿas of Jabal ʿAmil aligned themselves with Dhahir al-
Umar, a rebellious tax farmer and governor of Acre who opposed the Ottoman authorities and 
local tax administrators in the wilaya of Sidon.129 The uprising reached a large following that 
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resulted in the Ottoman authorities requesting the assistance of the Maronite Amir of Mount 
Lebanon, Bashir I Shihab, to suppress the resistance. The outcome of this uprising proved 
detrimental to the Shiʿas of Jabal ʿAmil as the Ottoman Porte utilized this moment to assert 
authority and set an example of the community for the rest of the empire. The Ottomans enlisted 
the forces of Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzar (1775–1804), the newly appointed wali (governor) of 
Sidon, to punish the supporters of al-Umar and residents of Jabal ʿAmil. The massive military 
campaign headed by al-Jazzar pillaged the region and destroyed the homes of their leading 
zuʿamāʾs, as well as a number of their educational and cultural institutions. Al-Jazzar took direct 
control of the region’s cotton production, monopolizing its cultivation and regulating prices.130 
The severity of al-Jazzar’s assault on the region continues to be imprinted in the historical 
memory of the community. 131 Sporadic Shiʿi rebellions that transpired under the Ottoman 
Empire were provoked by the heavy tax burden faced by the local shaykhs of Jabal ʿAmil and 
peasants of the Bekaa Valley rather than any direct political opposition to the Sublime Porte.132 
With the advent of World War I and the slow disintegration of the Ottoman Empire the number 
of uprisings and rebellions increased throughout the Arab lands, particularly with the rise of 
Arab nationalism.   
 
The Arab Nationalist Movement and the Hujayri Conference of 1920 
The Allies’ victory in 1918 brought a new set of hopes for an Arab nationalist dream 
among the Arabs of the former Ottoman territories. The Husayn-McMahon correspondence of 
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1915–1916 promised King Husayn, the Sharif of Mecca, and his followers independence in parts 
of Syria and Mesopotamia in exchange for their support against the Turks. Vibrant Arab 
movements and secret societies emerged in support of Arab unity despite the fact that the Sykes-
Picot Agreement of May 1916 invalidated the aspirations for an Arab government whereby the 
French and British agreed to divide the region among themselves. Although this dissertation does 
not focus on Shiʿi involvement in the Arab nationalist movement, which has been well-
researched, the opposing Shiʿi voices for and against the Arab nationalist unity reflected the 
diversity of Shiʿi political leadership depending on the geographical region. Tamara Chalabi has 
thoroughly analyzed the political happenings and divergent views among the political leadership 
of the Shiʿi Muslims of Jabal ʿAmil during this uncertain time period.133 The divergent views 
among Shiʿi notables were rooted more in their political survival and interests than in a 
collective communal incentive or agenda. The arrest of a number of Shiʿi intellectuals in 1915, 
as a result of their involvement in secret Arab societies, indicated a burgeoning Arab nationalist 
sentiment among a specific sector of society. The ʿAley trials led to the imprisonment of a 
number of Shiʿi intellectuals and in August 1915 to the death of the leader of the Society of Arab 
Revolution (Jamʿiyya al-Thawrāt al-Arabiyya), ʿAbd al-Karīm al-Khalīl, who was a Shiʿi 
Muslim with ties to Jabal ʿAmil.134 At the ʿAley trial in Mount Lebanon a number of Shiʿi 
notables were arrested, including Ahmad Riḍā, Sulaymān Ẓāhir, and Muhammad Jābir al-Ṣafā, 
on the grounds of treason. The main objective of the Society was the demand for greater political 
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rights for Arabs in the administration rather than separation from the Empire.135 Nonetheless, the 
severity of the Empire’s response was a sign of the rapid dissension arising in the Arab lands. At 
this historical point, support for the Arab cause among Shiʿi Muslims was not yet in full swing. 
However, the end of World War I and the physical presence of French occupying forces on Arab 
lands triggered a growing Shiʿi collective initiative by 1920. Shiʿi Muslims of Jabal ʿAmil in 
particular regarded French occupying forces as agitators to the political balance in the region and 
accused the French of supplying Christian villages with weapons and creating communitarian 
tension in the region. Favoritism toward Christian villages was seen as a direct threat to Shiʿi 
villages and only further exhorted the ʿAmili community to join the ranks of Faysal and the Arab 
cause, which culminated in the Wadi al-Hujayr Conference of 1920.  
  In April 1920, the Hujayr Conference was organized by Kamil al-Assad, a leading 
muqātāʿjī and zaʿīm from a prominent family of Jabal ʿAmil as ʿAmili notables, intellectuals, 
and ʿulamaʾ gathered to delineate the “official” position of the community toward the Arab 
nationalist movement and French occupying forces.136 This was the first collective effort 
publicly made by the Shiʿas of Jabal ʿAmil in defining their political position as a 
communitarian entity and respond to Faysal’s call for resistance.137 It is also believed that leaders 
of ʿiṣābāt (local militias or armed bandits) were invited to attend the meeting to jointly discuss 
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the political fate of the community. Local ʿiṣābāt among Christian and Muslim communities 
became prominent during this period as Shiʿi ʿiṣābāt were recognized for their anti-French 
stance in the early twentieth century.138 Sulaymān Ẓāhir noted the presence of ʿiṣābāt leaders 
Sadik Hamza and Adham Khanjar at the conference.139 At the Hujayr Conference, Shiʿas 
gathered and declared their unilateral support for the Arab government of King Faysal and their 
desire to be integrated into the Syrian nation with local administrative autonomy for Jabal 
ʿAmil.140 The fact that conference members demanded a separate administrative status for the 
Jabal ʿAmil region indicated the growing communitarian sentiment for the geographical territory 
deemed to be the home of the Twelver Shiʿas of Greater Syria. The declaration of the Hujayr 
Conference was reported back to Damascus and King Faysal. 
The proceedings and impact of the Hujayr ʿAmili Conference have been dismissed in 
Shiʿi historical texts. Firsthand records on the specifics of the conference remain ambiguous and 
non-existent with very little documentation and mention by ʿAmili intellectuals and historians 
who attended the event. Accounts about the meeting appearing in al-ʿIrfān minimized its 
significance and happenings, partially because of the decision that the ʿAmili community 
concurred and the transpiring events afterwards. The ambiguity surrounding the Hujayr event 
stemmed on the one hand from the palpability of a Lebanese national entity as espoused by 
French mandatory authorities, and the ʿisāba attack on ʿAyn Ibl, a Christian village in Jabal 
ʿAmil, adjacent to the town of Bint Jbeil, less than two weeks after the proceedings of the Hujayr 
Conference. The formal declaration endorsing Faysal as the king of Syria came at a time when 
French mandatory rule was reality and the manifestation of a Lebanese nation was already in the 
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making. The declaration at Hujayr came a few months after the declared creation of Greater 
Lebanon, putting the community on the outskirts of political dialogue of the new nation and in 
opposition to the governing power of the mandatory authorities. The attack and massacre of the 
Christian town of ʿAyn Ibl was carried out by Maḥmud Bazzi’s ʿisāba from Bint Jbeil on May 5, 
1920, which resulted in the killing of 50 people and injuring many others.141 The town was 
pillaged and devastated by the gruesome massacre as Christian newspapers recounted the 
eyewitness accounts of that day.142 ʿAmili sources have denied any connection between the 
Hujayr Conference and the attack on ʿAyn Ibl. ʿAmili notables have denied any form of 
provocation made at the conference to attack Christians. Sulaymān Ẓāhir refuted allegations by a 
prominent Lebanese intellectual, Amin al-Rihani, for insinuating that the ʿAmilis uniformly 
decided at the Hujayar Conference to kill Christians. He vehemently asserted that Shiʿi notables 
and leaders had no hand in the massacre.143 Although Ẓāhir did not condone the attacks, he did 
not discuss the particularities of the massacre in ʿAyn Ibl, but rather argued that tensions in Jabal 
ʿAmil between Christians and Shiʿas were due to the French “politics of separation” that armed 
Christians and divided the people.144 In his account, Ẓāhir focused instead on the Christian 
ʿiṣābāt and their attacks on Shiʿi villages which went unpunished by the French.145  
Despite the vagueness and outward denial of any sort of concurrence, many, however, 
accused Sayyid ʿAbd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Dīn of inciting the crowd of ʿiṣābāt at the conference 
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to take up arms against supporters of the French. The ʿiṣābā of Ṣadiq al-Hamza attacked French 
troops in Tyre a few days after the ʿAyn Ibl massacre, which led to the direct retaliation of 
General Gouraud and the Mandate authorities under the command of Colonel Nieger, the 
commander in Tyre. In June 1920, Nieger began his campaign against Jabal ʿAmil, which 
involved severe aerial attacks and a ground expedition of 3,600 soldiers, who pillaged and 
devastated the entirety of Jabal ʿAmil from Nabatiyya to Bint Jbeil with the assistance of 
Christians who, in turn, indiscriminately “killed any Shiʿa in their path.”146 The Nieger campaign 
burnt villages and destroyed thousands of homes and agricultural harvests, silencing the ʿAmili 
community. The ʿAmili community was forced to give up all weaponry and pay a reparation fine 
of 100,000 Syrian gold pounds, which burdened and financially devastated the region.147 The 
brutality of the French left a mark on the ʿAmili community, who saw themselves as the only 
martyrs of the Arab cause. Ẓāhir noted that Jabal ʿAmil was the only area of Lebanon that 




The Nieger campaign marked the unofficial withdrawal and abandonment of the Arab 
government, and the official creation of Grand Lebanon in September 1920 that annexed the 
Jabal ʿAmil region into the newly defined nation-state.149 French economic and colonial 
interests, coupled with Maronite demands for an independent homeland, converged in the 
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creation of Greater Lebanon on September 1, 1920, and finally culminated in the establishment 
of the Lebanese Republic on May 23, 1926. The area was transformed from a geographical land 
historically known as Jabal ʿAmil to a predominantly Shiʿi communitarian entity residing in 
what was now the Southern region of Lebanon or Janub Lubnan. The area was no longer seen as 
a separate geographical and historical entity but as an extension of Mount Lebanon and 
connected to the Bekaa Valley through its religious and sectarian commonality. This was 
highlighted by the growing Shiʿi historiography that sought to inscribe its history as a sect into 
the narrative of the Lebanese nation-state. With the official recognition of Shiʿas as a ṭāʾifa by 
the mandatory state, and the creation of Jaʿfari shariʿa courts to govern matters of Shiʿi personal 
status or family law, Shiʿas were integrated as a sect in the national framework, deepening their 
sectarian belonging. To an extent, from this point onward, Shiʿi Muslims of Lebanon can be 















Constructing Boundaries and Negotiating Citizenship: The Nationalization of Shiʿi 
Families and the Jaʿfari Shariʿa Courts in Lebanon, 1926–1943 
 
The contents of law and the forms of institutions may appear to retain uniformities 
over long periods but it is the feelings, ideas, interests, and ambitions of those who 
administer them which give them their real meaning and shape their workings.150 
 
Muhammad first appeared before the Jaʿfari shariʿa court in Beirut on June 13, 1937, 
requesting that the judge order his wife, Badīʿa, to return to his authority and place of residence 
while at the same time contesting a divorce that took place in the Hanafi shariʿa court in Haifa.151 
During court proceedings, we learned that both individuals lived in Palestine, and were married 
in Haifa under the Hanafi shariʿa. A lengthy debate between their legal representatives (wakīls) 
ensued, questioning whether the Jaʿfari court had the jurisdiction to review this case. In her 
testimony, Badīʿa argued that all Islamic religious courts are one, and no differentiation should 
be made between Sunni and Shiʿa shariʿa courts. She insisted that the case return to the Haifa 
courts where the dissension between the couple took place. Muhammad’s legal representative, on 
the other hand, contended that his client was Jaʿfari, and thus only the Jaʿfari shariʿa court had 
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the jurisdiction to rule on communal matters. He reiterated the provisions of the French High 
Commission that gave the Jaʿfari madhhab (legal sect) the authority to rule on matters of 
personal status pertaining to its sect, asserting that each sect must follow its own communal 
courts.152 During the case, it was revealed that Badīʿa had gone before the Hanafi court and 
divorced herself after Muhammad swore ṭalāq (divorce) for the third time during an argument. 
After a lengthy deliberation, the Jaʿfari court argued that since a woman cannot divorce herself, 
such a divorce was against the Islamic tenets of the Jaʿfari madhhab, therefore invalidating the 
ruling of the Hanafi court in Haifa. The court ruled that Badīʿa was still married to Muhammad 
and compelled her to return to his authority.   
In her appeal (iʿtirāḍ) to the court, Badīʿa raised the issue that she and Muhammad had 
been living in Haifa for the last eight years, and held Palestinian identity cards, and thus were 
married in the Hanafi court in Haifa. For that reason Badīʿa argued that she should therefore 
have the right to divorce there. Accordingly, the first president of the Jaʿfari court, Munir 
ʿUsayran, confirmed the courts’ previous ruling on the condition that Muhammad verifies that 
his wife was of the Jaʿfari madhhab, and whether or not they were Palestinians. In his final 
words, ʿUsayran maintained that this was necessary to determine if the Jaʿfari court had the 
authority and jurisdictional power to rule on the case.  
On July 17, 1938, nearly a year later, Muhammad returned to the court to affirm that his 
case against Badīʿa fell within jurisdiction of the Jaʿfari court.153 He asserted that he and Badīʿa 
were of the Jaʿfari sect and of Lebanese nationality, hailing from the southern town of ʿAnatha in 
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Jabal ʿAmil.154 Using the Tyre census files, Muhammad confirmed his Lebanese lineage and 
Shiʿi identity. He demanded that the court validate his marriage, as it fell under the precepts of 
the Jaʿfari madhhab, as well as confirm his sectarian identity as a Shiʿi. Muhammad’s legal 
representative adamantly argued that only this court can rule on the matter of marital separation 
since no Jaʿfari judge existed in Haifa. Although Badīʿa was not present on the last day of trial, 
the presiding judge, Muhammad Yaḥyā Safi al-Dīn al-Husayni, ruled that a wife should abide by 
the Islamic tradition of her husband. He also added that since their marriage in 1929 took place 
after the establishment of the Jaʿfari personal status court in Lebanon in 1926, all affairs relating 
to this case must be handled by only this court and no other. In his final words, the presiding 
judge asserted the institutional authority and jurisdiction that the Jaʿfari court held on matters 
pertaining to Lebanese Shiʿas. 
 
Introduction 
 With the end of World War I in 1918, Europeans skirmished over the remnants of the 
Ottoman Empire. As agreed upon by the Sykes-Picot agreement, the French occupied the 
territories of Greater Syria while the British administered control of Palestine. By 1920, the 
French proclaimed the formation of Greater Lebanon under their mandatory authority as they 
instituted an official state constitution by 1926 which was modeled after that of the French.155 On 
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January 27, 1926, the French High Commissioner issued decree 3503, which declared that Shiʿas 
constituted “an independent religious community,” whereby matters of personal status were to be 
judged “according to the principles of the rite known by the name of the Jaʿfari.”156 Article 3 of 
the decree specified the creation of a Shiʿi religious court of cassation, and the hiring of Shiʿi 
qadis (judges) to administer this newly founded legal institution. At this moment, law, as a form 
of discipline and power, was “inextricably connected with the rise of nation-states” and a by-
product of the larger project of European modernity.157 Such disciplinary measures were taken as 
a means of controlling and governing colonial subjects based on a system of classification and 
power in order to create colonial citizens and states.158 The designation of personal status law 
and courts contributed to this classification system in the case of Lebanon. Personal status law, in 
many ways, contributed to the segregation of the local population through the same system that 
sought to give them legal recognition.159 In the case of Lebanon, the very nature of French 
mandatory politics was based on the distinction of sectarian identities with a particular interest in 
bolstering specific religious sects, particularly those of Maronite Christians.160 In many ways, the 
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French authority crafted a sovereign nation with sovereign individuals; however, their 
sovereignty as subjects of the nation-state was embedded within a sectarian entity. The inevitable 
consequence was the creation of a sectarian society and citizenship. Within this context, the 
Shiʿas emerged as a nationalized sect among other Lebanese sects. 
This chapter examines how the creation of Jaʿfari shariʿa courts and their usage by 
individuals both complicated and reinforced the legal and political categories of citizenship that 
were instituted by the Lebanese nation-state. The above mentioned case between Muhammad 
and Badīʿa, like many others who appeared before the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts, signified how 
categories of sectarian and national identity were practiced in the most intimate affairs of 
people’s lives before the Jaʿfari courts.161 By thoroughly profiling five specific court cases,162 all 
pertaining to matters of marriage and divorce, I demonstrate that these courts and their 
participants went beyond the regulatory process of the state by molding and contesting legal 
categories of Shiʿi sectarian and national belonging. The recognition of Shiʿas as a sect, and the 
creation of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts, endorsed new state categories of collectivity along sectarian 
and national lines (as citizens of the Lebanese nation-state) within the domain of the family. Yet, 
these cases show how notions of identifications were practiced, manipulated, and reinforced 
before the court to suit the personal needs of litigants. This chapter begins the dissertation’s 
focus on the space of the family and how familial and gender roles became intertwined in 
sectarian and national modes of identification. It was within the space of the family that political, 
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press from the 1920s to the 1940s. 
 
162 My research reveals how many cases of this nature appeared throughout court records; however, for the purpose 
of this chapter five specific cases are thoroughly evaluated.  
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social, and cultural constructions were antagonized, practiced, and normalized within the newly 
founded shariʿa courts. 
This chapter begins by examining the overall historical transformation of Islamic law into 
a legal institution that relegated familial matters and “religion” into the private sphere as separate 
and distinct from the “public” sphere. This inevitably dictated the form that shariʿa courts would 
take in the modern nation-state. This will be followed by an examination of the colonial 
establishment of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts in Lebanon under the French as a part of modernity’s 
nation-building process rooted in sectarian differences. Based on archival research conducted at 
the sijillāt (court archives) of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts in Beirut, Sidon, Tyre, Baalbek, 
Marjayoun, and Bint Jbeil, I start by examining cases that originated “outside” of the national 
borders of Lebanon, which then found their way into the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts, contesting the 
court’s legal jurisdiction on both national and sectarian grounds. This precedes an examination of 
cases that challenged sectarian categories “within” the contours of the Lebanese nation-state. 
These cases not only show the level of ambiguity in these categories of identification, but also 
the performative nature of such categories of belonging as it pertained to the domain of the 
family during this Mandate period. While new state structures created categories where they did 
not exist previously, the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts and their litigants still saw movement within them; 
I show the volatility of these boundaries as seen in the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts’ records.163 My 
analysis of these court records demonstrates how the legalization of personal status courts 
                                                           
163 In 2008 and 2009, I was able to access records in the Jaʿfari courts in Beirut, Tyre, Sidon, Baalbek, Bint Jbeil, 
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access to these records is Max Weiss. See Weiss, “Institutionalizing Sectarianism: Law, Religious Culture and the 
Remaking of Shiʿi Lebanon, 1920–1947” (PhD diss., Stanford University, 2007). Weiss’s dissertation has been 
recently published as a book under the title In the Shadow of Sectarianism: Law, Shiʿism, and the Making of Modern 
Lebanon (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2010). Reference will be made to both where discrepancies appear. 
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propelled a discursive space where notions of sectarian identity, religious norms, national 
belonging, and normative and familial roles were debated, performed, and constructed under the 
auspices of the new nation-state. Within these contested boundaries, the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts and 
the individuals who came before them inadvertently helped to construct sectarian and national 
categories—at times multiple and competing notions of such categories—in the very process of 
negotiating familial matters.  
 
Colonial Legacies: Public vs. Private/ Secular vs. Religious 
 In The Nation and Its Fragments, Partha Chatterjee made a distinction between material 
and spiritual domain of nationalism. The material domain as defined by Chatterjee was the 
“outside” domain of the state, economy, science, and technological enterprise while the spiritual 
or “inner” domain, “bearing the essential marks of cultural identity,” constituted of elements 
such as the family, home, women, religion, and tradition.164 The inner domain, as Chatterjee 
argued, allowed for national culture to develop independent of the material sphere consecrated 
by the colonial presence and distinct from the West. In the case of India, according to Chatterjee, 
the question of women and family became “removed from the arena of political context with the 
colonial state.”165 What happens though when the inner domain of the family and home is 
arbitrated and defined by the material domain? Does the outer domain forcibly impose itself on 
the inner domain? Are the two not contingent upon one another to some extent? Does the 
spiritual domain inevitably become involved with the politics of nationalism of the material 
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domain? The establishment of personal status law and judicial shariʿa courts within the 
boundaries of the modern nation-state put into question the very distinction and autonomy of 
these two domains, particularly in regard to the family, and how the politics of nationalism was 
part of the very essence of the spiritual domain during the advent years of the Lebanese nation-
state.166 In many ways, as this dissertation shows, the familial domain, and hence gender 
relationships, was linked and intertwined to the political and cultural progress of the Lebanese 
Shiʿas as a sectarian entity within this nation-state. For the Shiʿas of Lebanon, the 
interconnectedness between these two spheres appeared with the creation of the Jaʿfari shariʿa 
court and its everyday practices. 
The terms “Islamic law” or the more recent “personal status law” have come to strictly 
mean the practice of shariʿa, or Islamic jurisprudence, that governs the intimate familial affairs 
of Muslims within the contours of the modern nation-state.167 This refined understanding of 
shariʿa law that relegated its jurisdiction into the private realm was a fairly new understanding 
imparted on shariʿa studies by the impact of European modernity and the rise of the nation-state. 
Jamal J. Nasir has argued that the term al-aḥwāl al-shakhsiyya (personal status) was “non-
existent in all classical texts of Islamic jurisprudence.”168 Even as early as 1880, when the first 
Shariʿa Courts Bill was established, the Arabic term mawād-dul-Shariyya (matters of the shariʿa) 
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was used to reference personal status.169 The Arabic term for personal status was introduced into 
the language from the European notion of “statut personnel.”170 It was not until 1934 when the 
first definition for personal status appeared in the Egyptian Court of Cassation.171 At the time, 
personal status was defined as: 
. . . the sum total of the physical or family descriptions of a known person which  
distinguish him from the others and give legal effects under the law in his  
social life, such as being male or female, married, widowed or divorced, a 
parent or a legitimate child, being of full legal capacity of defective capacity 
due to minority, imbecility or insanity, being of absolute or limited legal  
capacity.172 
Designated as the “private sphere” of Muslim life limited to the affairs of religion and family, 
personal status law was prescribed as separate and distinct from the public or secular sphere of 
the nation-state and political order.173 This Eurocentric understanding of shariʿa law and Islam in 
general places it in opposition to the nation-state and proclaimed secular order of modernity. As 
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such, Islamic law was considered an immutable fixed and archaic entity opposed to modernity 
that ultimately restricted the civilizational development of Muslim societies and communities.174 
 This characterization of Islamic law has thwarted our understanding of this field, and 
hampered the complexity behind it. Islamic law, as recently argued by numerous scholars, was in 
itself a by-product of European modernity and westernization that it is so vehemently pinned 
against the West.175 In his work, Sami Zubaida antagonized the presumed fixity of shariʿa as 
perceived by the West as its archaic “other.”  He traced the practices of shariʿa and legal 
adjudication in Islamic history to the present and how it varied according to the patterns of 
society and politics.176 Zubaida illustrated the transformations of shariʿa law that led up to its 
codification into a modern legal system within the centralized modern state.177 In Sharīʿa: 
Theory, Practice, Transformations, Wael Hallaq argued that Islamic law was an episteme or a 
discursive system of knowledge and practice, in the Foucauldian sense, cultivated by European 
modernity and the rise of nation-states. Consequently, the domain of personal status law and the 
discipline of Islamic legal studies, as conceived by the West and engineered by the modern 
nation-state, became a way to regulate Muslim family law into a separate sphere preserving “the 
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semblance of Shariʿa substantive law.”178 Despite the fact that Islamic law was relegated to the 
private domain, shariʿa was not abandoned, but simply restricted to matters of personal status 
that could be easily codified, normalized, and controlled in the secular nation-state. As 
anthropologist Talal Asad eloquently argued, it was precisely in the construction of society into a 
secular space that religion was conceptually redefined into the private domain under the auspices 
and oversight of the state. As a distinct sphere regulated into the private domain, Islamic law 
became a “subdivision of legal norms” that was “authorized and maintained by the centralizing 
state.”179 The common colonial practice of designating shariʿa law into a separate subdivision of 
the state incorporated it in the “officializing” and documentation procedures of the nation-
state.180 The codification process was not only imbued by the written word and documentation 
process, but through a Western mechanism that required a new system of legal professionals 
with a modern legal education in shariʿa law to intercede on behalf of litigants, replacing 
“traditional” experts, ʿulamaʾ, and schools of training.181  
 Despite the fact that colonial governments claimed not to interfere in the private affairs of 
the family, the designation of Islamic law and courts by the state to administer personal status 
matters, according to Asad, provided a “secular formula for privatizing “religion” within the very 
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179 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 227. 
 
180 Bernard Cohn, Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1996), 3. Asad also argued this element of the “documentation” in judicial procedure. See Asad, Formations 
of the Secular, 211. 
 
181 Traditional madrasa and universities, such as al-Azhar, no longer served as the source of legal shariʿa training 
and production of lawyers who served as experts of shariʿa law and its legal culture. Joseph Massad termed such a 
transformation as “colonial effects.” See Joseph Massad, Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in 
Jordan (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001). 
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body of the nation-state.182 Understanding shariʿa or familial law in this context, I agree with 
Chatterjee that it is within the inner domain that the sovereignty of national culture blossomed. 
Where I take issue with this claim is how this sovereignty changed when the very essence of its 
parameters and boundaries were defined by the authorization of the material domain.183 The 
establishment of an “officializing” system not only transmuted shariʿa, but more importantly 
provided a systematic way of governing that determined the legality and illegalities of the 
political, economic, and social order of society as ordained by the all powerful state.184 As I hope 
to show in the case of Lebanon, and particularly with the creation of Jaʿfari shariʿa courts in the 
French Mandate, the spiritual domain of family questioned and debated the essence of the 
material or public domain. Categories of sectarian and national identities (the material) were 
negotiated on the grounds of marriage and divorce in the realm of the family (the spiritual), 
contesting the dichotomy between these domains while they mutually constructed one another. 
Due to the state structure in Lebanon, citizens were tied to sectarian categories that governed 
both their personal and public practices of citizenship. The very scope of the juridical boundaries 
of shariʿa courts was transformed by the expanding power of the modern nation-state. 
 
Transformations of Shariʿa Law: From the Ottoman Empire to the Colonial Gaze 
Shariʿa was not always the arbitrator of family law solely, but rather the formation of the 
modern state reduced shariʿa to matters pertaining to family. Studies on the Islamic tradition 
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have shown how shariʿa had previously pertained to a larger span of societal matters, ranging 
from crime to governmental disputes.185 For example, the shariʿa law of dimāʾ (homicide), 
which permitted the next of kin to seek retribution for the crime committed through the payment 
of blood-money, retaliation, or pardon, was completely extracted from the domain of shariʿa law. 
Instead, the state seized the exclusive right to exercise the use of violence and regulate 
retribution.186 Homicide became a public offense and no longer a matter to be taken up by the 
victim’s family, but rather as subjects of the state. Only the state had the power to retaliate 
against crimes it considered worthy of retribution. Crimes between individuals were deemed 
crimes against the state, and only the state could regulate the consequences, if any, reckoned 
necessary for such actions.   
This fundamental change to the scope of shariʿa occurred for a number of reasons, 
largely linked to the growing economic and political changes in the world during the Ottoman 
Empire.187 Under the Ottomans, shariʿa went from a fluid and independent body of Islamic 
jurisprudence, administered by religious jurists with limited supervision, to a highly formalized 
and centralized arm of the state that was authorized, controlled, and funded by the sultan. During 
this period, the ʿulamaʾ were integrated into the state bureaucracy creating a highly 
institutionalized hierarchy, yet the further away from Istanbul they were the more freedom these 
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ʿulamaʾ and their courts had.188 To an extent, shariʿa remained arbitrary as it was not codified 
and no judicial tribunal of Islam existed.189 Drastic changes began to emerge under the Ottoman 
government with the dismantlement of the Janissary corps and the expansion of minority rights 
in the Empire in the early nineteenth century whereby foreign subjects were granted greater 
rights in their economic and political maneuverings. These changes occurred in part to the rise of 
European power and the decline of the Janissaries, the military force of the Ottoman Empire, 
which consequently permitted the encroachment of European capitalism and modes of 
production. This imposed new reforms on legal codes and procedures of the empire, ones that 
favored Europeans and their interests.190 Under pressure from European-Christian subjects and 
their increasing economic and political interests in the region, new freedoms were given to 
religious minorities. The expansion of rights for foreign subjects granted by the 1828 Treaty of 
Turcomanchay, the 1838 Treaty of Balta Limani, and the 1856 Humāyūn Decree, for example, 
gave foreigners special tribunals to adjudicate their own affairs, ultimately erecting a class of 
middlemen who operated in the interest of Europe and advocated indigenous support for 
Westernized policies in the Empire.191 The creation of special tribunals curtailed the domain of 
shariʿa by exempting foreigners from its jurisdiction. From this point onward, the authority and 
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domain of shariʿa was abridged and altered. The establishment of the Supreme Council of 
Judicial Enactments or Ministry of Justice by the Ottoman Porte separated shariʿa law from 
qānūn (penal law), which resulted in a dual system of shariʿa and niʿāmiyye courts. Whereas the 
latter came to judge matters of commercial, civil, and penal codes, the former was curtailed to 
personal status or family law.192 The codification of shariʿa in its modern form within the law of 
the state cut it from its traditional frame of reference rooted in interpretations of sacred texts and 
autonomous judgments from authoritative ancestors.193 Court procedures came to follow 
European models rooted in solidified codes and procedures, perpetuated by a new system of 
legal shariʿa training and intermediaries.194 
Prior to such drastic codification and centralization of shariʿa courts into a state 
bureaucracy based on a European template, the ruler needed the approval of shariʿa and its 
representatives to govern the community or umma.195 By the 1860s, this all changed as shariʿa 
court officials were salaried and appointed by the state, and the sultan stood above the law as he 
chose and approved the nomination of the shariʿa judiciary.196 This was expounded on by the 
1917 Ottoman Law of Family Rights that codified the Islamic law of personal status under the 
state, defining it as an institutional body of it.197 As Hallaq argued “the Family Law of 1917 
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generally did not depart from the provisions of shariʿa, but it did codify them, and thus subjected 
them to the rigidity of a single linear language devoid of the plurality and multiple juristic 
nuances and variations that the fiqh had afforded.”198 This law reduced the fiqh (Islamic 
jurisprudence) discourse to be used in court as it codified shariʿa law into a limited legal body, 
and appropriated it into the nation-state.199 This was only reinforced and enhanced during the 
period of colonialism that saw European forces implementing Western systems of governance 
and law that enhanced the codification and bureaucratization of personal status law in newly 
formed nation-states.   
Scholarly literature on the impact of colonialism and postcolonialism on shariʿa law and 
personal status law has been well-established. The ways in which British and French colonial 
forces dealt with “religious” or “customary” law differed to some extent as each took varying 
measures to integrate it into the colonial states. British colonial treatment of “traditional” law 
stemmed from their experiences in India and its state structure that regulated religious or tribal 
law as separate and distinct from civil law whilst recognizing and creating these distinctions 
within the law of the nation-state.200 Martin Chanock’s extensive work on the impact of British 
colonialism on instituting customary law in Malawi and Zambia revealed how it came to be 
conceived as “tradition” and a component of cultural nationalism in their fight against colonial 
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dominance.201 Chanock examined how customary law should not be seen as continuity with the 
past, but rather as a process of legislation and a transformation in African institutions due to 
colonial policy and the impact of European capitalism that came to envision these customs as 
tradition.202 The impact of British colonialism on customary law transformed it as it became 
foundational to African identity and to indigenous efforts in reclaiming their “tradition” and 
national claims. British colonialism claimed not to interfere in the “traditions” and “religions” of 
their colonizers while designating a place for these practices in the confines of the nation-state, 
which ultimately transmuted, codified, and narrowed such categories of practices.   
In regard to French colonial policy on shariʿa courts, Allen Christelow’s work on Algeria 
illustrated how the establishment of these courts regulated what entitled matters of personal 
status.203 He showed how marriages came to be regulated through the institution of permanent 
contracts while the notion of waqf (family endowment land) was transformed and banned as all 
aspects of property law in shariʿa were replaced by French law.204 As a means to control access 
to land and capitalist ventures, the French recognized and centralized shariʿa law, but imposed a 
European rationality that suited their interests.205 By placing shariʿa law within the legal body of 
the nation-state, French authorities were also able to regulate it to a separate and distinct 
“religious” space. However, French policy in Morocco differed slightly as it crafted different 
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tribal customary law for Berbers and Arabs, dividing the people along these lines rather than 
directly interfering in Islamic family law.206 Colonial policy, whether British or French, 
attempted to instill a European rational rooted in the principles of modernity on Islamic shariʿa 
law that defined its perimeters in the bureaucracy of the nation-state and impacted its procedures 
within this institutional body. 
With the recognition of the private “religious” sphere as a component of the nation-state, 
shariʿa law came to strictly mean family law, particularly that of marriage, divorce, inheritance, 
child custody, and the regulation of land and immovable property, known as waqf (although this 
last element became more and more state controlled with time).207 As a by-product of modernity, 
shariʿa law became the legal episteme we perceive of today, embodied in the state and an 
appendage of it. Changes to the shariʿa law were only perpetuated under colonialism and the 
establishment of nation-states. It is with this background that the creation of the Lebanese nation-
state ensued, propelling the establishment of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts and the making of Shiʿi 
citizenship and the nationalization of their families under the French Mandate.  
 
To Support or Not: The Formation of the Jaʿfari Shariʿa Court 
In the case of Lebanon, the change in shariʿa was not a teleological pattern toward 
modernization, but an “inherent part of the power dynamics of the evolving modern state” that 
appropriated personal status law into its hegemonic and centralizing process of governance and 
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citizenry.208 The formation of the modern Lebanese nation-state in 1920 and its official 
independence in 1943 was rooted in politicized sectarianism as the only form of governance and 
presumed egalitarianism. Lebanese citizenship became contingent on sectarian identification and 
national belonging. Due to the Lebanese state structure, citizens were tied to sectarian categories 
of identification that governed both personal and private practices of citizenship in the nation-
state. For Shiʿi Muslims living in what would become the Republic of Lebanon, these 
administrative reforms imposed by the French Mandate became the first and only form of 
legitimate and legal representation for the group. The expansion of sectarian rights under the 
French Mandate laid the foundation for Shiʿi citizenship in the postcolonial state, which was 
expounded upon by the formation of Jaʿfari shariʿa courts. 
In 1926, the Shiʿas of Lebanon were formally recognized as a separate madhhab under 
the Mandate.209 Under the Ottoman Empire, Shiʿas were never recognized as a separate religious 
entity with a distinct political or legal status. During the Mutaṣarrifiyya period, the Sublime Porte 
only sanctioned shariʿa courts in Sidon, Tyre, Nabatiyya, and Marjayoun, which were 
administered by Hanafi judges.210 Followers of the Jaʿfari madhhab would have to adhere to 
these Hanafi courts for any official legal matters and jurisprudence.211 Without any officially 
acknowledged status, practicing Shiʿi Muslims usually conducted their own religious-civil 
affairs under the guidance of local ʿulamaʾ who possessed a communally respected degree of 
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knowledge and experience in their towns and villages.212 The recognition of the Jaʿfari madhhab, 
the Shiʿi legal school named after the Sixth Imam, formally integrated Shiʿi Muslims into the 
state and gave them communal autonomy as a ṭāʾifa.213 Under these new constraints, the political 
integration of Shiʿi Muslims in the Lebanese state was established through sectarian lines as the 
imagined nation envisioned a Lebanese Shiʿi collective.214 
 Following the recognition of the Jaʿfari madhhab, the first Jaʿfari shariʿa courts to 
administer Shiʿi personal status or family law were established. The personal status courts 
                                                           
212 The earliest scholars and qadis of shariʿa gained legal training in Islamic study circles or halaqa and/or personal 
schools run by local ʿulamaʾ until the early nineteenth century. For the most part, some sort of religious training 
would have taken place in Najaf or Qum while in small towns the qadi may have had no official training at all. As 
respected members of society, the earliest qadis were tribal mediators who were communally hailed for their 
experience and wisdom. Consequently, the qadi and litigants who came before the court had a shared understanding 
of the societal norms and moral understanding. This all changed with the emergence of doctrinal shariʿa schools and 
state endorsed shariʿa courts where legal experts and lawyers became a permanent fixture of the court. See Sabrina 
Mervin, Un Reformisme Chiite: Ulemas et Lettres du Gabal ʿAmil (Actuel Liban-Sud) de la Fin de L’empire 
Ottoman a l’independence du Liban (Paris: Editions Karthala, CERMOC and IFEAD, 2000); and Hallaq, Sharī ʿa: 
Theory, Practice, Transformations. 
 
213 The impact and emergence of sectarianism in Lebanese society has been examined in depth by Ussama Mikdasi. 
See Makdasi, The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History and Violence in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman 
Lebanon; and Ussama Makdasi, “Revisiting Sectarianism,” in Religion Between Violence and Reconciliation, ed. 
Thomas Scheffler (Beirut: Orient-Institut, 2002), 179–91. 
 
214 Thus far, it has been argued that the official recognition of the Jaʿfari madhhab and the establishment of Jaʿfari 
shariʿa courts propelled a sense of Shiʿi sectarian identity and unity. The reference to the Jaʿfari madhhab has been 
used interchangeably with the term, the Shiʿi sect or ṭāʾifa. As Makdisi has argued, the Arabic term ṭāʾifa, which 
has come to mean religious sect today, signified a class of public notables in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. 
Even when the term ṭāʿīfa was used in reference to the Maronite sect, it alluded specifically to the public notables of 
the Maronites as a distinct and separate group from the rest of the community. As Maronites came to see themselves 
as a sect, the meaning was still predominantly ecclesiastical and not political. According to Makdisi, it was during 
the late nineteenth century with the establishment of Mutaṣarrifiyya of Mount Lebanon that a culture of sectarianism 
developed. In many ways, the term ṭāʿīfa is specific to Mount Lebanon and later the modern nation-state of 
Lebanon. The political and religious transformation of this term is unique to Lebanon, so even though the term ṭāʿīfa 
refers to a particular religious sect, such as the al-ṭāʾifa al-shiʿiyya or al-ṭāʿifa al-sunniyya, the term (ṭāʿīfa) itself is 
in many ways historically specific to the Mount Lebanon/Lebanese context. It is my contention that the term ṭāʿifa 
or sect is particular to the Lebanese case despite the fact that the term itself has been used to refer to a greater 
transnational sects. The term ṭāʿīfa emerged in a specific time and space, and has become synonymous with the 
Lebanese nation-state. The term madhhab, on the other hand, suggests a transnational community whereby members 
of the Jaʿfari madhhab, whether in Iraq, Iran, Syria, or Pakistan, share a common religious understanding, history, 
doctrines, and authoritative institutions. With the creation of the Lebanese nation-state, the notion of al-madhhab al-
jaʿfariyya (the Jaʿfari madhhab) became bounded by a territorial space limiting it to and making it synonymous with 
the politicized form of al-ṭāʿifa al-shiʿiyya (the Shiʿi sect). It is for this reason that individuals appearing before the 
Jaʿfari shariʿa courts of Lebanon demand its intervention as members of the same maddhab, even though they are 
citizens of a different nation-state. 
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allowed only “recognized” communities to administer their legal affairs while defining a place 
for “religion” to make its public appearance within the state.215 Consequently, the standardization 
of the family law’s legal system by the state in many ways constructed and proliferated Shiʿi 
communal affiliation along kinship lines in the public sphere. Based on a two-tiered system, the 
mandatory state established first instances Jaʿfari shariʿa courts (al-maḥākim al-badāʾiyya, 
equivalent to the French Cour de Première Instance) in Sidon, Tyre, Nabatiyya, Marjayoun, and 
Baalbek al-Hirmil, with Beirut housing the higher appellate court (al-maḥkamat al-ʿulyā).216 
This marked the first time that the Shiʿas in Jabal ʿAmil (South Lebanon), the Bekaa Valley, and 
Beirut were politically and legally identified as citizens of a collective sectarian entity within the 
borders of the modern nation-state.217 More importantly, the application of personal status law 
came to have no meaning independent of the judicial institutions belonging to the Lebanese 
nation-state.218 The French assigned the state an unprecedented role in monitoring Lebanese 
Shiʿi men and women, changing the nature and role of shariʿa courts. As a body authorized and 
protected by the state, the Jaʿfari shariʿa court became the prime regulator of the conjugal affairs 
of Lebanese Shiʿas as it played an integral role in their daily lives. The state structure in Lebanon 
based on sectarian categories of identification governed both personal and private practices of 
citizenship in the nation-state. It created a legal body where “categories of practices,” as defined 
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216 French authorities initially sanctioned provincial Jaʿfari courts in Beirut, Sidon, Tyre, Nabatiyya, Marjayoun, and 
Baalbek, with Beirut also housing the higher appellate court. The staff of the Jaʿfari shariʿa court was initially hired 
and paid for by the mandatory state. The first thorough examination of the history of the Jaʿfari shariʿa court can be 
found in Weiss, In the Shadow of Sectarianism, 107–9. Weiss argued that the Mandate period and the creation of the 
Jaʿfari court institutionalized a process of sectarianization, which has also been argued to some extent by Tamara 
Chalabi.   
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by Brubaker, were shaped by both the state and individuals who came before it as citizens of the 
modern nation-state, whether or not they supported the initial formation of these shariʿa 
courts.219 As an institution of the state, it came to normalize and discipline Shiʿas according to 
codified procedures of what became Jaʿfari shariʿa laws within the Lebanese nation-state. 
 Elizabeth Thompson has argued as “colonial people waged nationalist battles for 
independence they inevitably participated in the very political order that they rejected.  
Colonialism involved, as do most other political systems, constant negotiation of power 
relationships and identities.”220 Colonizers could not and did not unilaterally impose a system of 
rule, but perpetuated one which entailed the intricate maneuvering of powerful notables and 
colonizers, which laid the foundation for postcolonial states and citizens.221 In the case of the 
Jaʿfari shariʿa court, this was most apparent with the administrative staffing of the court and the 
reception it received by various Shiʿi individuals and groups. The selection of Munir ʿUsayran as 
the first president of the Jaʿfari shariʿa court was controversial among Shiʿi ʿulamaʾ and 
intellectuals. As the first president of the court, ʿUsayran did not possess the traditional Shiʿi 
legal training to be bestowed with the esteemed titled of mujtahid.222 However, the appointment 
of ʿUsayran served both colonial and local interests since ʿUsayran was a notable hailing from a 
                                                           
219 Rogers Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and National Question in the New Europe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 16. This idea is later expanded on by Wedeen as performative practices of the 
nation. See Lisa Wedeen, Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power and Performance in Yemen (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2008), 1–21. 
 
220 Elizabeth Thompson, Colonial Citizens: Republican Rights, Paternal Privilege, and Gender in French Syria and 
Lebanon (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1999), 1. 
 
221 Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (New York: Warner Books, 1991). 
 
222 A mujtahid is an individual qualified in religious principles and teachings, allowing him to decree independent 
judgment based on shariʿa. In Shiʿism, a mujtahid is a leading authority in shariʿa law. See Mahmud Raymar, 
“Ijtihand and Marja’iyat” in Shiʿism: Doctrines, Thought, and Spirituality, eds. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Hamid 




prominent political urban family with favorable ties to French authorities.223 The works of 
Sabrina Mervin and Max Weiss examined in detail the politics behind the selection of ʿUsayran 
and the staffing of the courts. Despite the initial resistance to the creation of the Jaʿfari shariʿa 
courts by many Shiʿi notables and intellectuals, they ultimately came to defend the sects’ right to 
establish these courts as other sects had already done much earlier.224  
 Moments of support and opposition for the Jaʿfari court in many ways reflected the 
political and historical situation at hand. In the 1920s, there were numerous calls for the 
recognition of separate and equal personal status courts for the Jaʿfari madhhab. In January 
1924, al-ʿIrfān published an article calling for the right of Shiʿas to have their own state-
sponsored jurisprudence.225 However, in the 1930s with the height of Arab nationalism, and 
nearly 10 years after the establishment of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts, al-ʿIrfān called for the 
abolition of separate shariʿa courts for Sunnis and Shiʿas, demanding that both sects should be 
seen as one.226 By the time of the official independence of the Lebanese nation-state in 1943, 
Shiʿas came to outwardly support their recognition as a separate sect as demands for greater 
political rights were made, resulting in the allocation of the position of Speaker of the Parliament 
                                                           
223 Both Muḥsin al-Amīn and ʿAbd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Dīn as prominent Marjaʿ al-taqlids within the Shiʿi 
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ways propelled by the opposing political fractions among the Shiʿi notables at the time. For more on the political 
situation and parties during the French Mandate see Tamara Chalabi, The Shiʿis of JabalʿAmil and the New 
Lebanon. For more on the history of Munir ʿUsayran and his selection by the French authorities see Sabrina Mervin, 
Un Reformisme Chiite; and Max Weiss, In the Shadow of Sectarianism. 
 
224 “ al-maḥkāma al-Jaʿfariyya” [The Jaʿfari Shariʿa Court], al-ʿIrfān 9, no. 4 (1924): 363; and Al-ʿIrfān 12, no. 2 
(1926): 239. 
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to Shiʿas.227 As the most marginalized and underrepresented group at the time, Shiʿas as 
“subaltern” or “minority” citizens came to eventually accept the mandatory government and the 
establishment of the nation-state as an officially recognized sect.228 Concessions made to Shiʿas 
were a recognition of their subaltern presence by the Maronite and Sunni ruling elites who 
sought to produce consent in the state process.229 The Shiʿi Muslims of Lebanon went from an 
unrecognized group with no legal or political status to a legitimate sectarian minority of the 
modern nation-state during the Mandate period.  
The creation of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts helped shape and produce Shiʿi collectivity 
through the negotiation and standardization of family law as debates over citizenship and 
sectarian recognition colored the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts’ sijillāt in its advent years. This is not to 
say that ethnic or religious affiliations did not exist prior to this moment, but rather that 
precedence was given to this kind of sectarian identification as a form of legal and political 
inclusion under the Mandate. It became the only available and legitimate means to bargain their 
place in the state and rule of law.230 The changes that came about under the mandatory state not 
only fashioned Shiʿi citizens, but also propelled the Lebanese Shiʿi community to continually 
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reform and remake itself as a unified sect within the nation.231 It was the legalization of personal 
status courts that propelled a Shiʿi discursive space where notions of sectarian identity, religious 
norms, national belonging, and familial roles were debated and constructed under the auspices of 
the state. This was most evident in the first records of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts. 
The Jaʿfari shariʿa courts, as well as the individuals who came before it, were 
inadvertently forced to draw lines of sectarian and national/territorial identification. In the case 
of the Shiʿas of Lebanon, the courts became a place where individuals rejected and redefined the 
nation as they were framing the parameters of their sect. Whether or not Lebanese Shiʿas 
approved the creation of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts, it became the sole authority over personal 
status matters, and the only means to legitimize legal and ultimately political participation. 
Personal status was embodied in the body of the state as shariʿa courts became the prime 
regulators of familial affairs in Lebanon, producing the institution of the family as an element in 
the nation-building process. By recognizing the Shiʿi sect, the nation-state assumed that this 
communal entity existed prior to its existence. However, as I reveal here through these early 
court records, communities were not bounded and natural, but rather loose and shifting according 
to the historical context and time.232 It is in this environment that the nationalization of Shiʿi 
families ensued and by which individuals were socialized into sectarian citizenship.233  
                                                           
231 Although this point is argued to some extent by Tamara Chalabi, and more explicitly later by Max Weiss, who 
investigated the institutionalized form of “sectarianization” (as he coined it) by examining the intricacies of the 
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Sunni-Shiʿi marriages. However, here I argue that the very essence of the Jaʿfari court, the types of cases and the 
demands made before the court on the basis of sect point to the fact that sectarian difference, as well as national 
boundaries, were drawn and contended within the court. I take an in-depth look at actual court cases to see how the 
nationalization of Shiʿi families was negotiated, debated, and constructed within the very fluid confines of the 
Jaʿfari shariʿa court during this formative period of the Lebanese nation-state. 
 
232 Joseph makes this argument in reference to the construction of sub-national patriarchal communities due to the 
recognition of religious family law as the only civil code of Lebanese society, which serves as a “purposeful fiction” 
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Contesting National/Territorial Borders: Lebanese or Not?  
As Rogers Brubaker argued “to understand nationalism, we have to understand the 
practical uses of the category ‘nation,’ the ways it can come to structure perception, to inform 
thought and experience, to organize discourse and political action.”234 Rather than envisioning 
nationalism as modular, the nation should be conceived of as a performative category, as 
expounded on by Lisa Wedeen, in order to understand how nationalization takes place in the 
everyday practices of society.235 The Jaʿfari shariʿa court, as an extension of the Lebanese 
nation-state, reflected how the nation as a category came to practice in the everyday lives of 
Shiʿi individuals. Categories of belonging or not belonging to the nation-state protruded familial 
affairs of individuals who came before the court demanding its intervention during these 
formative years. 
These debates and contestations within the boundaries of the institution of family can be 
seen in Jaʿfari shariʿa courts’ records. Most of the cases that appeared before the court during the 
Mandate addressed similar concerns, such as the terms of divorce, controversies over 
inheritance, child custody and support, obedience suits, and requests for alimony or unpaid 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
in the state-building enterprise. The next chapter examines this matter of gender roles further. Suad Joseph, “The 
Public/Private: The Imagined Boundary in the Imagined Nation/State/Community: The Lebanese Case” Feminist 
Review  57 (Autumn, 1997), 73–92. 
 
233 This notion of nationalization of family is argued by Balibar. See Etienne Balibar, “The Nation Form: History 
and Ideology,” in Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities, eds. Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, 101. 
(London: Verso, 1991). 
234 For Chatterjee, there is nothing left to imagine if the “modular” forms from Europe and the Americas are the only 
types of nationalism to choose from as argued by Benedict Anderson. For Anderson, the nation is an imagined 
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Chatterjee opposed the universalism of classical nationalism of homogeneous empty time that regards the 
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Brubaker, Nationalism Reframed, 7. Wedeen expands this argument by critiquing Anderson’s shift from messianic 
time to homogeneous empty time in his nationalism modularity. Wedeen, Peripheral Visions, 10. 
 
235 Wedeen, Peripheral Visions, 16.
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dowry. As a space regulating the daily lives of Lebanese Shiʿas, the Jaʿfari court, in many ways, 
negotiated and constructed sectarian and national markers while also normalizing familial and 
social norms for the sect (which will be addressed in the following two chapters). The Jaʿfari 
shariʿa courts came to define physical and national boundaries along sectarian lines, and more 
importantly became a modern (and “secular”) means to privatize and nationalize “religion” as a 
way to create modern Shiʿi families and citizens, and manage Shiʿi civil society.  
The case between Muhammad and Badīʿa, at the beginning of this chapter, blended 
issues of nationality and sectarianism, highlighting the “performative” aspect of identity 
formation and categories of national belonging embedded in the institution of the Jaʿfari shariʿa 
court.236 In this case, Muhammad and Badīʿa made different and contradictory claims on the 
basis of sectarian and national markers before the Jaʿfari court, questioning and challenging its 
authority and legal jurisdiction, as well as the categories of belonging marked by the nation-state. 
Muhammad first appeared in court in order to sanction the authoritative power of the Jaʿfari 
court to rule in his favor on the basis of his madhhab , while Badīʿa attempted to dismiss the 
authority of the court on the grounds that her nationality was Palestinian due to the fact that she 
resided there and had so for years. The case posed the following questions: What does it mean to 
be a citizen of the Lebanese nation-state? How do we define one as a national or belonging to a 
specific sect? Who defines such categories of belonging of the nation? Does the individual or 
state define such forms of identification?   
For both Muhammad and Badīʿa the performative nature of identity was evident in the 
contrasting claims made in the name of the nation. It was quite clear from the case that the 
Hanafi court in Haifa had already granted the divorce to Badīʿa, and for this reason she wanted 
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to discredit the intervention of the Jaʿfari court summoned by Muhammad. Muhammad, who 
was well-aware of the French constitutional decree recognizing the Jaʿfari madhhab right over 
sectarian personal status, used this in his favor to sanction the authority of the court to intervene. 
As seen in this case, the Jaʿfari court requested that Muhammad produce evidence of both their 
madhhab and nationality. The request for proof legitimized the court’s authority over this trial, 
which enabled it to use its state-authorized power to overrule and reverse the divorce 
administered in the Haifa Hanafi court by establishing that Muhammad and Badīʿa were not only 
Jaʿfari, but also Lebanese.  
Despite the fact that Badīʿa and her legal representatives asserted that there should be no 
distinctions between Sunni and Shiʿi courts, the court still demanded the replication of proof of 
the couples nationality and madhhab on Muhammad’s demand. Written documentation of their 
national identity based on geographical and ancestral lines, as well as sectarian allegiance, were 
requested to establish legitimacy and jurisdiction. As modern apparatuses of the state, the written 
word came to hold authority over and supersede the oral nature of the shariʿas’ practices of pre-
modern society. 237 In the case of Lebanon, political representation and citizenship in the nation-
state was based on the 1932 census as the official state record and proof of national belonging.238 
Interestingly, instead of using the 1932 census, Muhammad presented his registration in the 1921 
census from the Tyre personal registries as evidence of his Jaʿfari affiliation and his lineage to 
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the town of ʿAnatha in the southern region of Lebanon.239 The 1921 census was the first census 
taken after the creation of the modern nation-state; however, this census was not used to 
determine citizenship in the territory that came to be known as Lebanon. His submission of the 
1921 census record as proof of identity was interesting on many levels. First, the Tyre census 
Muhammad provided in his case actually antecedes the juridical establishment of the Jaʿfari 
court that he sought to sanction to rule over his marriage. Ironically, Muhammad reverted back 
to the Tyre registries of 1921 that preceded both the official recognition of Shiʿas as a political 
and legal sect and the formation of the Jaʿfari shariʿa court in 1926 to provide proof of his 
citizenship in the Lebanese nation-state. Secondly, his usage of the 1921 Tyre census rather than 
the 1932 census alluded that Muhammad and Badīʿa lived in Palestine at the time of their 
marriage eight years before in 1929, and thus were not present when the 1932 census was 
conducted as the official determinant for citizenship.240  
During this period of national ambiguity, the procedure and process of documentation 
needed to determine national and sectarian affiliation remained unclear. With the creation of the 
Lebanese nation-state and subsequent establishment of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts, new markers 
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and boundaries were formed which had not existed before. Conflicting evidence and methods to 
determine legality were purported during the advent years of the Jaʿfari court as seen in the case 
above. This case between Muhammad and Badīʿa revealed how notions of sectarian and national 
identities (material/public sphere) were debated on the grounds of marriage and divorce in the 
space of the family (spiritual/private sphere), contesting the dichotomy between these domains. 
The immutability of these national and sectarian categories of identification was evident in how 
they were practiced and articulated in the everyday lives of individuals. For many individuals 
living in what became the South of Lebanon, the construction of territorial borders created much 
ambiguity and displacement.241 Commercial and social exchanges between Northern Palestine 
and Jabal ʿAmil have historically been vibrant and fluid. It was common practice for individuals 
of the Jaʿfari madhhab living in Jabal ʿAmil to document their marriages and divorces in 
Palestine as opposed to the Hanafi courts in Tyre or Sidon merely on the grounds of proximity. 
The construction of borders under the Mandate period only complicated the legal status of these 
individuals.    
 Muhammad, as well as Badīʿa to some extent, used the ambiguity of these territorial 
borders to summon different identity markers and citizenship. However, the Jaʿfari court, after 
receiving proof of madhhab and Lebanese citizenship, was able to negate the ruling of the Haifa 
court on several grounds. First, on the grounds that Badīʿa was able to go before the Haifa 
Hanafi judge and divorce herself on one occasion without the presence of Muhammad. The 
court’s President, ʿUsrayan, asserted that this action was against the “Islamic shariʿa of the 
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Jaʿfari madhhab,” and hence the divorce in Haifa was indeed invalidated. Secondly, ʿUsrayan 
added that the divorce in Haifa came after the creation of the Jaʿfari shariʿa court and the legal 
recognition of the Shiʿi as a sect, so it was not permissible for the Hanafi court to administer 
divorce in this case when a court of their madhhab was available. Finally, the Jaʿfari court judge 
remarked that even without proof of Badīʿa’s madhhab, she must abide by her husband’s 
religious madhhab, ending his court decree by confirming that Badīʿa was of Jaʿfari identity.242 
Oddly enough, Badīʿa’s self-identification conflicted with what the nation-state identified her as 
or how she sought herself to be recognized. Whether or not she mobilized these categories of 
identification to attain her desired outcome is another question. Regardless of how Badīʿa 
identified herself, the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts through the authority of the state began to follow 
specific legal procedures and codes rooted in documentation to delegate these categories of 
identification. However, in these court records we observe how these categories were practiced 
and continued to be debated and mobilized in this early period. At a time when the Lebanese 
nation-state was establishing its boundaries, the Jaʿfari shariʿa court became an institutional 
space where Shiʿi sectarian identity, national affiliation, and religious norms were debated and 
deployed within its legal jurisdiction as the prime authority over personal status law. Not only 
was the court acting on behalf of its state-endorsed authority, individuals such as Badīʿa 
indirectly rejected the Lebanese nation in their efforts to attain their desired outcomes. 
As an extension of the Lebanese nation-state, the Jaʿfari shariʿa court was sanctioned to 
rule over personal status matters for the Shiʿi sect, inadvertently normalizing citizenship for 
litigants who came before it. Categories of belonging, whether sectarian or national or both, were 
                                                           
242 This rule applies to Islamic groups whereby women and children were required to follow the religion and 
madhhab of the husband/father. Something could be said about ʿUsayran’s usage of this argument to support the 
court’s authority over this case. By using this logic, ʿUsayran dismissed any claim made by Badīʿa, whether or not 
she could demonstrate proof of her sect and nationality. 
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contested in the legal space of the Jaʿfari shariʿa court, defining what it meant to be as Shiʿi 
citizens of the Lebanese nation-state.243 Although the court was defining such identity markers, it 
was Shiʿi individuals who came before the court which framed the tenets of the Jaʿfari maddhab 
as a sect within the Lebanese nation-state. Sectarian identity and citizenship was a performative 
act propelled by the Jaʿfari shariʿa court on behalf of Shiʿi individuals who either rejected or 
accepted the court and the nation that endorsed it. Individuals sought the court to intervene in 
their familial matters on the basis of collective belonging. However, in this case, like many 
others, it revealed how uncertain these modern borders (territorial, national, sectarian) were 
during this initial period as individuals used different aspects of the nation-state’s authority to 
make claims of belonging or not belonging. At times, however, the Jaʿfari court extended its 
jurisdiction beyond the Lebanese nation-state and citizenry on behalf of individuals of the same 
madhhab who demanded its intervention, further complicating these modern categories bolstered 
by the nation-state during this period. 
 
Beyond the Nation: Extending the Boundaries of the Jaʿfari Shariʿa Court 
On May 17, 1938, Mūsā Ahmad came before the higher appellate Jaʿfari shariʿa court of 
Beirut with a rebuttal summons from the Damascus court in Syria to negate a divorce granted to 
his wife, Waṭʿa, on April 5, 1938, in the Jaʿfari court of Baalbek.244 In the decree from the 
Damascus court, Mūsā demanded that the ruling from Baalbek be nullified and voided since he 
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244 The case first appeared in the records of Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt, Waṭʿa vs. Mūsā 
Ahmad, case 68 (April 5, 1938). The case reappeared on Mūsā’s accord in Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī 




and his wife were from ahālī Dimashq (the people of Damascus). Mūsā refuted the authority and 
jurisdiction of the Jaʿfari court over his marriage, claiming he was from Damascus where they 
married and lived. According to the Jaʿfari court records, Mūsā did not appear before the court 
on the set court date, and thus an absentee ruling by the Baalbek court granted Waṭʿa, who had 
apparently been living in Baalbek at the time, a divorce based on testimonies of six witnesses she 
put forth. In his rebuttal, Mūsā demanded that the case go back to the Damascus court, whereby 
the witnesses could be reevaluated under the appropriate legal authority. In its final ruling, the 
higher appellate Jaʿfari court sustained the divorce granted by the lower Baalbek court on the 
grounds that Waṭʿa supported her claim with six testifying witnesses, while Mūsā did not 
provide any reason for his absence, dismissing the rebuttal made by the Damascus court on 
Mūsā’s behalf. 
 In this case, the Jaʿfari shariʿa court overextended its authority beyond the Lebanese 
borders on behalf of Waṭʿa by ruling on a marital case between two individuals who hailed from 
Syria and identified themselves as such, completely rejecting the claims made by the Damascus 
court. Evident from the records in Baalbek, Mūsā and Waṭʿa were of the Jaʿfari madhhab, and 
hence Waṭʿa summoned the court to rule on her marriage on this accord.245 The case beckoned 
the question: What legal authority did the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts have to rule on this case? And on 
a deeper level, how did women utilize these courts to obtain their desired outcome? Both the 
marriage and nationality of the two individuals lay outside of the scope of the Jaʿfari shariʿa 
court and newly defined Lebanese nation-state. Yet, Waṭʿa was able to sanction the court to rule 
on her marital status on the grounds of her being a follower of the Jaʿfari madhhab, despite not 
                                                           
245 However, this is not noted in the records of the Jaʿfari shariʿa court of Beirut when the rebuttal decree comes 
from the Damascus court. No mention of the religious orientation of the decree is made. Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya 
al-jaʿfariyya fī Baalbek, Waṭʿa vs. Mūsā Ahmad, case 68 (April 5, 1938). 
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being a legal “citizen” of the Lebanese nation-state. In this case, it would seem that categories of 
religious belonging supersede those of national demarcations despite the fact that the court 
utilized the authority of the nation-state to rule over the case. In many ways, this case reflected 
how the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts and its constituents questioned the very nature of the territorial 
boundaries created by the nation-state and the colonial powers that expanded their juridical 
authority over their private (familial) domain. Ironically, even as the Jaʿfari court and the 
individuals who came before it contested the created national boundaries, they utilized the 
authority given to them by the state to expand their legal jurisdiction and power. More 
importantly, this case demonstrated the ambiguity of national lines and lack of affinity to it 
during this period, whereby nearly 18 years after the formation of the Lebanese nation-state and 
over 10 years after the establishment of the Jaʿfari shariʿa court these categories of sectarian 
identification and citizenry were contingent on the needs of the individuals who sought to 
mobilize them.  
Cases of this nature appeared frequently in the Jaʿfari shariʿa court records during this 
period. In one such case, Fatima, an Iranian, appeared before the Jaʿfari shariʿa court in Beirut 
demanding that her husband, ʿAbbas al-Sayyid, an Iraqi, provide her with her rightful nafaqa 
and pay her remaining dowry.246 The case revealed that the couple had been married in Beirut, 
but had been living in Baghdad until Fatima’s recent return to Beirut. On the day of the court 
date, November 18, 1937, ʿAbbas did not physically appear, but sent a letter proclaiming that the 
appropriate Baghdad court had already ruled against Fatima on this matter and that she should 
return to his authority in Baghdad where he lived. In his letter, ʿAbbas dismissed the jurisdiction 
of the Jaʿfari court on this ground, and demanded that Fatima return to Baghdad. At the request 
                                                           




of Fatima, the hearing continued with an absentee judgment, ruling in favor of Fatima and her 
petitioned expenses. The court noted that ʿAbbas could appeal this decision if he could bring 
proof that Fatima had disobeyed his authority. Although no explanation was provided as to why 
the court thought this case fell under its jurisdiction, it was evident that Fatima, who was clearly 
of the Jaʿfari madhhab, thought that the shariʿa courts in Beirut would rule in her favor. 
Whether or not litigants intentionally sought to redefine their citizenry, these individuals 
utilized any method possible to have the court rule in their favor, which inadvertently played into 
these modern categories of identification. This was also telling of the period whereby such 
categories of national and sectarian belonging were relatively new structures of institutional 
significance.247 Individuals such as Fatima questioned the legality of such national distinctions 
and citizenry, by asserting her desire to identify with the Jaʿfari court of Beirut, and hence 
inserting her social and political representation in this national space. Ironically, the very 
authority of the Jaʿfari shariʿa court was stipulated on Lebanese citizenry and political 
representation in the nation-state. However, during this state-building period such categories 
were not fixed as seen in these cases. It was within the private sphere of shariʿa law that notions 
of citizenry and nationality imposed by French colonial powers were renegotiated and contested 
during the Mandate period. Dealing with two individuals of varying nationalities and citizenship 
who lived outside the borders of the Lebanese nation-state, the Jaʿfari court extended its 
authoritative boundaries and interceded in the case of Fatima and ʿAbbas on the grounds of 
Jaʿfari jurisprudence. In this case, as well as the previous one, the litigants’ adherence to the 
Jaʿfari madhhab superseded that of national belonging and affinity.   
                                                           
247 This is not to say that notions of sectarian affinity did not exist prior, but rather that it took on political, social, 
and cultural significance with the rise of the modern nation-state.  
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These types of cases presented before the Jaʿfari courts revealed the performative nature 
of such categories whether they be sectarian or national during this foundational period when 
boundaries were newly demarcated by the French colonial authorities. What it meant to be a 
Lebanese (sectarian) citizen of the nation-state remained highly contestable and open for 
interpretation at this time.248 Litigants utilized such blurry demarcations to support and/or oppose 
certain claims made on their religious and national identifications as they manipulated such lines 
to favor their personal claims. Individuals questioned the authority of the nation-state and the 
Jaʿfari shariʿa court on their familial life by declaring and/or refuting a particular sectarian and 
national affiliation before the judge, highlighting the performative nature of such identity 
markers. These lines of sectarian difference, within the borders of the nation-state, also 
proliferated in the pages of the Jaʿfari court records during the Mandate period. 
 
Contesting Sect within National Borders: Being Jaʿfari or not  
As previously shown, the Lebanese nation-state operates on established lines of sectarian 
difference as a rule of governance. It was precisely during these advent years of the Lebanese 
nation-state that these categories of sectarian difference were continuously endorsed and 
reproduced by the institutional apparatuses of the colonial power. Throughout the sijillāt, cases 
pertaining to marriages that had been performed outside of the judicial body of the Jaʿfari shariʿa 
court, yet within the Lebanese national context, reappeared. In most cases, individuals came to 
the court to certify or refute the tenets of their marriages according to the Jaʿfari madhhab. In 
one such case found in the Jaʿfari shariʿa court in Beirut recorded on March 7, 1938, Husayn 
                                                           
248 In the case of Lebanon, such categories remain performative in the lives of its citizens today; however, in the 
early years of the nation-state such markers were relatively new as institutional practices regulated by the state. 
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Khalīl appeared before the court to confirm the legality of his marriage (thabat al-zawāj) to 
Nāʿisa. Husayn claimed that they were married in a Sunni shariʿa court in Beirut, and for that 
reason he would like to make certain that their marriage was legitimate under the Jaʿfari 
madhhab. In its final ruling, the Beirut court judge, Muhammad Yaḥyā Ṣafā al-Dīn al-Husayni, 
maintained that it did not matter under what sect a marriage occurred, and certified the legality of 
their marriage despite the fact that it took place in a Sunni court. In this case, Husayn found it 
necessary to come before the Jaʿfari shariʿa court to reconfirm his marriage simply because it 
had taken place in a Sunni shariʿa court. There was no evidence of any legal contestations 
between Husayn and Naʿsa argued before the court other than the requested affirmation of the 
court that their marriage was indeed legitimate under the Jaʿfari madhhab, and hence authorizing 
the court’s jurisdiction over their marriage.249 Many cases of this nature appeared before the 
Jaʿfari court, requesting the court’s institutional authority to revalidate the terms and legality of 
Shiʿi marriages according to the tenets of the Jaʿfari madhhab.250 Individuals like Husayn came 
before the Jaʿfari shariʿa court to probe and legitimize decisions made in the Sunni courts, 
imbuing the Jaʿfari court with power over sectarian matters while also affirming Shiʿi sectarian 
identification.   
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reappear before the court. This is not to say that it did not come up again, considering that the records of the court 
were very sporadic and poorly kept due to years of civil war and relocation of the Jaʿfari high court. It would not be 
surprising if this revalidation was a way for either party to make future claims before the court to favor their 
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250Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt, case 164, no. 68 (March 7, 1938). Another case of this nature 
appeared on November 15, 1934, case 4: Mustafa Ibrahim came before the court to confirm that the amount of 
nafaqa ordered in the Hanafi court was legitimate in the Jaʿfari court. Mustafa was able to get the amount of 
alimony verified in the Jaʿfari court for his wife Hasma (this case further supports my argument). Many cases of this 
nature appeared where thabat al-zawāj was requested. Refer to Husayn vs. Fatima, case 18 (December 17, 1938); 
Muhammad vs. Sikina, case 6 (December 6, 1937); and Ahmad vs. Lamya, case 257 (November 19, 1929) in Al-




In many ways, these individuals imposed on the court to legitimize the identity and 
madhhab they prescribed onto themselves and desired the state to recognize this as well. While 
doing this they reproduced the lines of differences proclaimed by the nation-state. As many have 
argued, the very existence of a Shiʿi sect was contingent on a Sunni other, which the state and 
the Jaʿfari shariʿa court perpetuated in the Lebanese case.251 In his discussion of the state, 
Timothy Mitchell argued that “one can trace it to methods of organization, arrangement, and 
representation that operate within the social practices they govern, yet create the effect of an 
enduring structure apparently external to those practices.”252 The sectarian recognition of the 
Shiʿas created the appearance that a collective Shiʿi category and entity was a constant, ever-
present practice of society outside of or external to the state without acknowledging the 
institutional effect of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts in perpetuating this category of identification. The 
insistences on the court to define, recognize, and intervene by individuals who came before it 
extended the authority of the state. Through the examination of these cases, we witnessed the 
making of such a “structural effect” through these juridical practices which enforced lines of 
differences that reorder “space, time and personhood” while simultaneously creating the Jaʿfari 
shariʿa courts as external from the state’s authority and power.253 Although sectarianism as a 
political system was established as the rule of governance, practices of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts, 
on a daily basis, reproduced and rearticulated Shiʿas as sectarian citizens of the Lebanese nation-
state. Not only did Shiʿi individuals come to reaffirm marriages that may have happened in 
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252 Mitchell, “Society, Economy, and the State Effect,” in The Anthropology of the State: A Reader, eds. Aradhan 
Sharma and Akhil Gupta (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006): 170. Mitchell continued by arguing that “the order 
and precision of such processes created the effect of an apparatus apart from the men themselves, whose “structure” 
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shariʿa courts other than the Jaʿfari courts, they also appeared before the court to dispute 
marriages on the basis of sectarian differences.   
In another case, ʿAli al-Ḥajj al-Sayyid came before the court on December 10, 1932, 
alleging that he was married to Zahra bint Ahmad Sultani in Beirut a year before. After four 
months of marriage, he traveled to Baghdad to visit his ailing father. Upon his return, he found 
Zahra married to another man. In his testimony, he requested that the court order Zahra to return 
to his authority and honor their marital relationship. When Zahra appeared before the court on 
December 24, she affirmed that she married ʿAli a year before, but that after a month of marriage 
they divorced before a Sunni Hanafi judge in Beirut. At the time of the divorce, Zahra claimed 
that the Sunni judge decreed it was haram (forbidden) for her to be with ʿAli since he was of the 
Hanafi madhhab. ʿAli rebutted this allegation arguing that he was indeed Jaʿfari and held a Shiʿi 
identity card. The court judge, ʿAli Fahs al-Husayni, then ordered ʿAli to bring proof of his 
Jaʿfari identity. On the last day of trial, ʿAli did not appear. The court adjourned with an 
acquittal ruling.254 
In this case, Zahra used the court to affirm her Jaʿfari identity while simultaneously 
employing her sectarian identity to differentiate herself from ʿAli, whom she claimed was Sunni. 
Although it was probably unlikely that the Hanafi court prohibited her from marrying ʿAli 
simply on the grounds that he was Sunni, Zahra made claims to the Jaʿfari court on the basis of 
her sectarian affiliation in order to justify the suspension of all marital ties. Structural institutions 
of the state such as the shariʿa courts were utilized by Zahra not necessarily to uphold the 
sectarian markers the state authorized, but rather to attain her desired outcome from these courts. 
                                                           




She marshaled the Jaʿfari court on the grounds of her madhhab in the hope that it would rule to 
her advantage. It was evident that Zahra was well aware of the power of the Jaʿfari court, and 
how that power was rooted in sectarian difference as she evoked this element of her marriage to 
delegitimize it. Ironically, Zahra claimed that the Hanafi Sunni court had pronounced that this 
marriage was forbidden for her as a Shiʿi, in a sense inviting the Hanafi court into the courtroom 
by making religious claims on Shiʿi Islamic jurisprudence and tenets.255 Although the Jaʿfari 
court did not extract the history of the case from the Hanafi court, it adhered to Zahra’s claims by 
demanding proof of ʿAli’s Jaʿfari identity. This proof was never provided; however, the fact that 
regular requests for written proof of identity were continously made, reflected the courts 
proliferation of sectarian lines.256 By doing this, the Jaʿfari court reiterated its authority over 
matters concerning Shiʿi Muslims.  
Sectarian lines were drawn by both Shiʿi Muslims like Zahra, as well as the Jaʿfari 
shariʿa courts, to fortify a Shiʿi identity vis-à-vis other Lebanese sects. Many cases such as 
Zahra’s appeared in the sijillāt, whereby Lebanese Shiʿas came before the shariʿa court to assert 
their Jaʿfari madhhab so that the court could intercede on their behalf in personal matters. These 
cases show the participation of individuals in the Jaʿfari courts in the making of national and 
sectarian identification as new categories of collectivity were bolstered by the Lebanese nation-
state under the French Mandate. The position of the Jaʿfari court, as the arbitrator of Shiʿi family 
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that intervenes when there are jurdical disputes between different shariʿa courts.  
 




matters, reflected the performative nature of identity formation that solidified their sectarian 
collectivity while crystallizing Shiʿi social norms within Lebanese society. 
The Jaʿfari court became the governing body on which Lebanese Shiʿas sought to 
regulate their societal and religious norms on the grounds of sectarian belonging. What was most 
significant about these cases was not that sectarian differences were downplayed in some cases 
and accentuated in others, but rather that such claims of sectarian belonging and legitimacy were 
readily brought in front of the court to mediate the everyday affairs of Shiʿi Muslims. The 
shariʿa court emerged as a space where Jaʿfari identification could be asserted vis-à-vis other 
sects within the Lebanese nation-state. The Jaʿfari shariʿa court not only penetrated the lives of 
Lebanese Shiʿas, but also became a way for Shiʿas to negotiate and construct social norms and 
conjugal relations.   
 
Conclusion: 
 For Shiʿas of Lebanon, the expansion of sectarian rights under the French Mandate laid 
the foundations for citizenship in a postcolonial state, which was expounded upon by the 
formation of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts. The Jaʿfari shariʿa court became a means by which Shiʿi 
national citizens and families were produced and amalgamated into the new nation-state. Shiʿas 
were actively engaged in the definition of their civil status and colonial civil order as colonial 
citizens living under the French Mandate and as citizens engaging in the power dynamics of the 
state that defined their legal rights.257 Timothy Mitchell’s Colonising Egypt reflects on how new 
technologies of governmentality informed and constructed the national subject as new 
                                                           




disciplinary methods informed new conceptions of space, personhood, and reality.258  Mitchell 
analyzes the technologies of the colonial age as in the military, village planning, print, and 
schooling, and how they created an effect of a structure apart from reality. The establishment of 
the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts was a prime example of such modern state techniques that informed 
colonial citizenship under the Mandate. The penetration of the state into the lives of Shiʿi 
Muslims led to the nationalization of the family along sectarian lines.259 More importantly, the 
creation of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts by the mandatory authorities reflected the constant 
negotiation of power relationships, particularly in the domain of the family, just as Shiʿas came 
to see themselves as a collective sect in the Lebanese nation-state.260 Shiʿi men and women came 
before the Jaʿfari shariʿa court in the hope that it intervened in their personal matters, which 
came to produce shared practices and knowledge on Shiʿi familial matters as a sectarian entity of 
the state and citizens of it.261 
 The purpose of this chapter was to historicize the multiple struggles of identity 
formations whether they were sectarian and/or national in the deployment of Lebanese Shiʿi 
citizenship, community and family, and how they played a role in a state-building enterprise. 
These boundaries and legal categories as defined by the modern nation-state were sites of 
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259 A similar argument is made by Kholoussy in her dissertation, although in the case of Lebanon communal 
identity, and thus national identity, was made along sectarian lines. Hanan Kholoussy, For Better For Worse: The 
Marriage Crisis that Made Modern Egypt (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010).   
 
260 Even though the mandatory state did not directly interfere with the rulings of the Jaʿfari shariʿa court, it instituted 
a public arena where the making and remaking of Shiʿi individuals and collectivity transpired along national and 
sectarian lines. This is not to say that Shiʿas prior to the establishment of Jaʿfari courts did not have an 
understanding of their Islamic rights and practices, but rather as members of society they participated in the religious 
foundations, moral foundations, and social examples in this newly constructed state apparatuses. 
 





struggle and categories of practices. As Joseph argued “boundary making is about difference 
making for purposes of empowering and disempowering.”262 Not only did the Jaʿfari shariʿa 
court demarcate and negotiate sectarian and national identity, the court intervened both directly 
and indirectly in the lives of Lebanese Shiʿas by producing and demarcating appropriate roles 
and behaviors for Shiʿi men and women. This further normalized social norms and communal 
identification just as Lebanese Shiʿas were defined as a sect within the burgeoning nation-state. 
During this formative period of the nation-state, the norms and practices of sectarian and national 
identification were continuously being debated and shaped through the Jaʿfari shariʿa court and 
the individuals who came before it. Although sectarian and national boundaries were negotiated 
and many times resisted in the contents of the court cases, these modes of resistance, as 
Mithchell argued, were formed within the institution space of the court and colonial state, and 
not external to it.263 These new categories of collectivity ultimately fostered a sense of Shiʿi 
citizenship as a sectarian entity of the Lebanese nation-state. The construction of the public-
private spheres by the modern state also bolstered a new male-female dichotomy in the colonial 
and postcolonial period, significantly changing familial life.264 It was within this environment 
that a new patriarchy or “subnational patriarchy” emerged to modernize the family in the 
Lebanese Shiʿi case rooted in sectarian and national tradition.265 By examining the Jaʿfari shariʿa 
court coupled with an analysis of the prominent Shiʿi journal al-ʿIrfān, the following chapter 
investigates the simultaneous production and reproduction of normative gender roles for Shiʿi 
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263 Mitchell, Colonising Egypt, xi. 
  
264 This was argued by many. See Hallaq, Shariʿa Theory, 22. Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments, 
125–27. Elizabeth Thompson, Colonial Citizens, 224.  
 
265 Joseph, “The Public/Private,” 75–83. 
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men and women as “modern” citizens of the Lebanese nation-state. The following chapter 
focuses on the production and proliferation of normative behavior and gender roles during a 



















Molding Shiʿi Families: Fashioning Fathers and Husbands, and Mothers and Wives 
through the Shiʿi Press, al-ʿIrfān 
 
To envisage the womb not simply as a vessel but as a school (maktab) 
imputed all the disciplinary and regulatory functions of school to the 
womb. Not only did the bearer of the womb regulate the character of the 
fetus, but now the regulatory process turned back upon the womb/woman. 
National formation began with the womb.266 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines how marital roles became a contested site of modernity and 
sectarian awareness for the Shiʿas of Lebanon under the French Mandate. As shown in the 
previous chapter, the marginalization of Shiʿas, coupled by a growing sectarian awareness in the 
newly created nation-state, brought attention to the home as a site of fashioning national 
sectarian subjects. The creation and utilization of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts were instrumental in 
these processes of sectarian identification, as were opinions about family, marriages, gender 
roles, and spousal relationships written about in al-ʿIrfān. In these articles, we observe changes 
in the concept of motherhood and wifehood as women were envisioned as the vessel of the 
nation-state and Shiʿi sect, and thus requiring reform. As reflected in al-ʿIrfān during the 
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Mandate period, advancement of the Shiʿi sect in the Lebanese nation-state depended on the 
progress of women as the future bearers of its children. As Afsaneh Najmabadi argued in her 
work on Iran, this shift in notion of womanhood was “at once a regulating and an empowering 
moment.”267 This chapter addresses the following questions: What gender roles did al-ʿIrfān 
advocate and under what pretenses? What image or images were prescribed in the press, and 
what purpose did they serve? How were the projections of women different from those placed 
upon men? More importantly, how did such constructions of gender, both masculine and 
feminine, compare to the everyday lives of Shiʿi individuals? Although these issues regarding 
women and the nation-state have been addressed in other contexts,268 no other work has 
examined the Lebanese Shiʿi case as it related to gender roles and sectarian formations.269  
More significantly, by examining both the Shiʿi press and Jaʿfari shariʿa court records, 
this chapter, and the one that follows, investigates how notions of masculinity and femininity 
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268 The literature in this field is vast. See Leila Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1992); Beth Baron, “Mothers, Morality, and Nationalism in Pre-1919 Egypt,” in The Origins of Arab 
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Likes Be Multiplied: Biography and Gender Politics in Egypt (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
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Social history of Women and Gender in the Modern Middle East, eds. Margaret L. Meriwether and Judith E. Tucker 
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and the Political Process in Twentieth-Century Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
269 In regard to Lebanon and Shiʿi women only Max Weiss has written an article discussing Shiʿi modernity, gender, 
and cultural politics as he focuses mainly on the ʿAshura debates. He briefly analyzed al-ʿIrfān in this article in that 
regard, but not to the extent and scope this chapter does. See Max Weiss, “The Cultural Politics of Shiʿi Modernism: 




were deployed differently by Shiʿi individuals of various socioeconomic statuses. In these two 
chapters, I show how the Shiʿi press and the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts produced multiple and, at 
times, conflicting notions of masculinity and femininity as they negotiated ways in which Shiʿi 
men and women became modern sectarianized citizens of the new Lebanese nation-state. This 
research demonstrates how varying notions of “appropriate” gender roles in Shiʿi society were 
perceived and practiced in the daily lives of Shiʿi individuals. By placing these chapters 
alongside each other, I show the disconnection between what was constructed as “ideal” gender 
roles and marriage in al-ʿIrfān, and what actually took place before the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts in 
this regard. By examining the Jaʿfari court records in Chapter four, I illustrate how contradictory 
and convoluted gender roles were in Shiʿi everyday life when compared to the commentary 
perpetuated in the press. Before undertaking this chapter’s objective, it is important to 
understand how the press, particularly al-ʿIrfān in this case, spoke of and embodied the 
perceptions of a growing Shiʿi middle class.  
This chapter in particular focuses on al-ʿIrfān’s constructions of manhood and 
womanhood and the various ways that gender was utilized to dictate Shiʿi men and women’s 
marital, sectarian, and national roles. It examines new modes of middle-class femininity and 
masculinity as prescribed in al-ʿIrfān during a time of growing Shiʿi sectarian awareness and 
nationalization. Society made different demands of Shiʿi fathers and mothers as sectarian 
citizens of the nation-state—all of which were a reflection of the perceived social norms on 
gender in the press. In this chapter, I argue that the urgency to reform gender roles increased as 
this loosely-defined Shiʿi community came to see itself as a national sect within the newly 




Al-ʿIrfān: The Shiʿi Middle Class and New Mode of Gender Formation 
In this chapter, I refer to a new form of middle class masculinity and femininity 
perpetuated by the Shiʿi press. By the Shiʿi press, I refer to the popular journal al-ʿIrfān 
specifically since it was the only Shiʿi journal to continuously publish under the French 
Mandate.270 Through my extensive investigation of al-ʿIrfān from the 1920s to the 1940s, it has 
become clear that heightened attention was placed on the institution of the family and the gender 
relationships within it as it pertained to the Shiʿi sect. The recognition of Shiʿas as a sect within 
the Lebanese nation-state, as I have argued, propagated a growing sense of sectarian awareness 
over their national inclusion, particularly as it pertained to the familial space.271 The proliferation 
of articles on this matter in the journal, a middle-class forum, informed a new mode of gender 
formation.  
As the prime Shiʿi newspaper based in Sidon, al-ʿIrfān spoke to the small literate and 
educated Shiʿi segment of society.272 The journal promoted itself as a Shiʿi platform that 
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the founder of al-Qalam al-Sarīḥ who frequently published articles addressing the state of Jabal ʿAmil in the Greater 
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Liban (Paris: Editions Karthala, CERMOC and IFEAD, 2000); and Max Weiss, In the Shadow of Sectarianism: 
Law, Shiʿism, and the Making of Modern Lebanon (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
 
272 There was also a transnational element to al-ʿIrfān as it addressed a wide range of issues from the emergence of 
Marxism to the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. For more on this see Tarif Khalidi, “Shaykh Ahmad ʿArif al Zayn 
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addressed the needs of the Shiʿas in Lebanon. In his research on the journal, Tarif Khalidi stated, 
“it is as if a commercial product became synonymous with an individual brand name, and this 
was particularly so in the period between 1909 and 1939. Al-ʿIrfān was not simply a faithful 
mirror of its region and period. It was also a direct agent and medium of intellectual change.”273 
During this period, al-ʿIrfān was an abundant source of Shiʿi cultural, political, and social 
production as the most prominent members of Shiʿi society contributed to it.274 The journal 
served, in many ways, as a self-reflection of the community without prescribing to “any distinct 
ideological line or party commitment,” but rather functioning as a forum for intellectual 
debate.275 Al-ʿIrfān was also “a major literary source for the history of Jabal ʿAmil” as it 
documented the current events and memories of the community’s past.276 For the most part, the 
journal spoke for a literate, culturally informed segment of the ʿulamaʾ class and to a new class 
of notables known as the wujahāʾ. As Tamara Chalabi has noted, the wujahāʾ were a group of 
urban bourgeois who emerged outside of the traditional political power of the zuʿamāʾ class in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century due to Ottoman land reforms and shifting political 
alliances at the end of the Ottoman Empire.277 Prominent families, such as the ʿUsayrans, Sulh, 
Khalils, and Zayns (founders of al-ʿIrfān), composed a new social category with political power 
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273 Tarif Khalidi, “Shaykh Ahmad ʿArif al Zayn and al-ʿIrfān,” in Intellectual Life of the Arab East, 1890-1939, ed. 
Marwan Buheiry (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1981), 110. 
274 For an extensive overview of the journal see Chapter one. 
 
275 Tarif Khalidi, “Shaykh Ahmad ʿArif al Zayn and al-ʿIrfān,” 111. 
 
276 Ibid., 112. 
 




in the major urban centers of Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre.278 It was within this environment that al-
ʿIrfān was founded by Ahmad ʿĀrif al-Zayn whereby prominent Shiʿi intellectuals and religious 
scholars contributed to the body of the journal in the urban center of Sidon. Al-ʿIrfān was 
popular and familiar among local Shiʿi cirlces despite the fact that Shiʿas had a literacy rate of 
only 17 percent, the lowest of any group in Lebanon.279 Despite its popularity and familiarity, its 
accessibility was limited to an educated middle-class portion of society because of the low 
literacy level among Shiʿas. In this sense, al-ʿIrfān spoke of the concerns and perceptions of this 
small urban middle-class segment of Shiʿi society, which made up approximately 10 percent of 
the total Shiʿi population.280 However, the journal projected itself as a “self-image” of the Shiʿi 
Muslim community that continued to see itself as a minority in the Lebanese nation-state and 
Greater Middle East.281 Al-ʿIrfān promoted itself as a paper “for the Shiʿi community,” and thus 
it spoke of its concerns.282 Due to the nature of the press, al-ʿIrfān, like other journals of its time, 
projected the social concerns of the middle-class even as it spoke to and about a larger Shiʿi 
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279 Boutros Labaki, Education et Mobilité Sociale Dans la Societé Multicommunautaire du Liban, Approche Socio-
historique, (n.p. 1988), 87. See also Masʿūd Ḍāhir, Tarīkh Lubnān al-Ijtimāʿi 1914–1926 (Beirut: Dār al- Farabi, 
1974); and Farid El Khazen, The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon 1967–1976 (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2000). 
 
280 The contents of the journal were usually transmitted orally in local circles among friends and families, which 
explained why its contents were widespread among the Shiʿi public. See Tarif Khalidi, “Shaykh Ahmad ʿArif al 
Zayn and al-ʿIrfān.” 
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audience. Among these concerns, al-ʿIrfān expressed apprehension over the state of marriage 
and familial life in Lebanon, particularly within Shiʿi society.283 
The proliferation of articles on this matter informed a new mode of gender formation. 
Influenced by the work of Hanan Kholoussy, who examined the Egyptian press in the early 
twentieth century as an embodiment of middle-class perception and norms, in this chapter I also 
read al-ʿIrfān as a forum for middle-class perception and anxiety under the French Mandate 
period, just as Shiʿas came to be recognized by the Lebanese nation-state. Print culture created a 
new space of shared political consciousness in the pages of al-ʿIrfān during this colonial 
period.284 In this shared sectarian space, al-ʿIrfān disseminated images of the modern subject 
embodied in the mapping the Shiʿi household. The heightened questions over Shiʿi families and 
the institution of Shiʿi marriages, as seen in the pages of al-ʿIrfān during this period, perpetuated 
new modes of middle-class masculinity and femininity. Anxiety over sectarian and national 
identity was evident in the growing concern over the state of Shiʿi families and congenial roles. 
It is within this environment that this chapter approaches constructions of masculinity and 
femininity produced in al-ʿIrfān.    
 
                                                           
283 This was not unique to the Shiʿi community or Lebanon, but particular to postcolonial contexts (as referred to 
previously) whereby national independence was granted. This is my main argument in the previous chapters that the 
French Mandate imposed sectarian unity even when it was contested at times in the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts. 
 
284 The impact of print capitalism in the Middle East has been widely studied. For more on how new techonologies 
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Part One: Dictating Appropriate Female Roles: Embodiments of the Sect and the Nation’s Future 
                             . . . the family is a mini model of the nation.285 
As in other postcolonial contexts and newly formed nation-states, the family became a 
site of contestation and reformation as a means of modernizing and fashioning its subjects into 
national citizens. Not only did the family emerge as a unit of society, it became synonymous 
with the nation as its microcosm. With the creation of the modern Lebanese nation-state, and 
subsequently the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts, “the family emerges as a category in law, in welfare 
administration, and in public moralizing discourse. The family was the prototypical unit of 
‘society’ in which the individual is physically and morally reproduced and has his or her primary 
formation as a ‘private’ being.”286 It was for this reason that the family and individuals who 
constituted families took on a central importance in the Shiʿi press and among ruling elites. 
Despite the anxieties about the state of Shiʿi marriages in the press, the brunt of the 
responsibility over this state was placed on women as wives and mothers of the nation-state, as I 
discuss below.  
During this period, Al-ʿIrfān produced numerous articles dictating marital duties and 
prescribed gendered behavior for Shiʿi wives and husbands, and explained how to be befitting 
parents to Shiʿi children. Various articles appeared signifying the family as a mini reflection of 
the nation and highlighting that a struggling family represents a failing nation. The correlation 
between the nation and the family appeared frequently in the colonial and postcolonial 
nationalist movements of the Middle East. Extensive research on this topic has been published 
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particularly in the context of Egypt.287 Beth Baron’s work investigates how the family served as 
a metaphor for a new Egpytian national identity in the late nineteenth century.288 The nation as 
Baron noted “became a family writ large, a fictive household, with elites at its head.”289 The 
adherence to a bourgeois family model brought an end to harem slavery and the extended 
household model as it informed a new model for the Egyptian nation.290 The Egyptian nuclear 
family was reimagined as a modality of the nation during a period of British colonialism. Lisa 
Pollard’s study observes how “family politics” were integrated in the remaking of Egytpian 
national subjects.291 Pollard examines the images and modalities of men, women and children, 
and how they informed gender and national formations in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
century. Pollard suggests that the home was central to the nationalist project as the question of 
women became a crucial component to the process of Egyptianizing the nation in terms of the 
nation.292 The question of women became potent to the nationalist project as it constituted the 
gendering of home and nation. The issue of gender and role of women will be addressed in the 
Shiʿi case below as it appeared in al-ʿIrfān. Although scholarly literature, analyzing the family 
as a unit reflective of the nation, has been well-developed, in the case of the Shiʿas of Lebanon a 
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unique dimension was added, because the family emerged in a sectarian form as a product of the 
structure imposed by the Mandate state.293 With the creation of the Lebanese nation-state under 
the supervision of the French Mandate individuals, as members of the family, were forced to 
adhere to their sectarian affiliation when it came to marital matters, as well as the way 
citizenship was practiced due to the nature of the Lebanese nation-state.294 Little to no literature 
has focused on how the sectarianization of Lebanese society affected the daily affairs of Shiʿi 
families, marriages, and gender roles.295 This chapter looks at how the family and marital 
relationships became a site in need of sectarian reform as a requisite for national inclusion and 
citizenship. Marriage as a unit, producing future citizens of the Shiʿi sect, became, as illustrated 
by Kholoussy, “a site of contested national identity formation.”296 Impediments in Shiʿi 
marriages were setbacks to the future of the sect and nation. In the case of Lebanon, sectarian 
identity based on kinship blood lines became the only form of nationalized citizenship, and thus 
marriage was the institution that continuously produced future national subjects, needing 
regulation and reform. 
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 As a specifically Shiʿi journal, concern over the institution of marriage and appropriate 
congenial roles was present throughout the pages of al-ʿIrfān during this period. In one such 
article titled “Our Familial Life,” the author, who used the pseudonym Fatāt al-Furāt (Girl of the 
Euphrates), described the grievances of Shiʿi families and increasing divorce rate. She argued 
that “we need to understand the meaning of marriage and its place in society,” since “the family 
is a mini model of the nation,” and at this time “the foundation of our household is missing.”297 
Considering there was no data on the state of divorce among Shiʿas during this period, largely 
because no institutional body existed prior to the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts documenting marriages 
and divorces, the author’s statement seemed to reflect a societal concern over the present state of 
marriage within the community. In reading this article, there was angst over the rate of divorce 
and concern over the state of marital relationships despite the fact no statistical evidence was 
reported. This concern propelled the author to declare that marriage was in a worse state now 
than ever before whereby “the word marriage has become synonymous with hell.”298 She 
continued by blaming the lack of communication and cooperation between a husband and wife 
for the crippling familial state.299 Due to this stagnant state of marriage, she claimed, men have 
decided to remain single or marry foreign women threatening “the nation and its future.”300 The 
author correlated the future of the nation with the success of marriage—the state of marriage 
must be internally improved and in need of protection from the Western woman.301 Although the 
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threat of the foreign woman to Shiʿi marriages will be taken up later in the chapter, in stating 
this, the author placed, to some extent, responsibility on both Shiʿi men and women. By 
highlighting that Shiʿi men had to be protected from this exterior threat to secure the future of 
the nation, the author saw a need to reform Shiʿi marriages to avoid such perils. 
In order to attain this goal, Fatāt al-Furāt suggested the appropriate conditions that must 
arise in any marriage. She claimed that it was necessary for husbands to financially support their 
families and treat their wives with respect, and for mothers to maintain a proper household, so 
that happy and healthy marriages were produced.302 The author faulted both husbands and wives 
for the crumbling foundation of Shiʿi households while representing a sense of anxiety over the 
state of Shiʿi marriages, and the affects this had on the burgeoning Lebanese nation-state. 
Although this chapter does not address the political underpinnings, during this Mandate period, 
particularly in the 1920s and 1930s, the Shiʿas for the most part supported the Arab cause and 
national allegiance to Greater Syria. With the failure of this movement and manifestation of a 
Lebanese nation-state, the Shiʿas imagined their place in it as a sect.303 Therefore, healthy 
marriages were deemed the cornerstone of the nation, and thus of the Lebanese Shiʿi sect. The 
crumbling state of Shiʿi families became a point of contestation. As this chapter shows, this 
correlated with the recognition of the Shiʿas as a sect by the Lebanese nation-state.304 However, 
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303 For more on this see Tamara Chalabi, The Shiʿis of Jabal ʿAmil and the New Lebanon, ch. two and three.  
 
304 Kholoussy argued that marriage became a site of contested national identity formation in the case of Egypt in 
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it was women who were required to do the protecting and preservation of Shiʿi marriages, so that 
the outside threat did not succeed in harming the nation’s future. In this examination of al-ʿIrfān, 
sectarian advancement was the responsibility of good mothers and wives since it was women 
who reared healthy, productive sons for society. The bulk of the attention regarding marriage and 
spousal roles was directed toward Shiʿi women as mothers of the new national sect. Women 
were seen as the repositories both of the nation’s progress and backwardness. 
From the 1920s to the 1940s, over 100 articles were written directly addressing the role 
of Shiʿi women as mothers, housewives, and spouses.305 Article topics ranged from matters on 
child nurturing to cleansing oneself after childbirth to the principles and practices of 
breastfeeding. The articles instructed Shiʿi women how to properly raise a child, as well as how 
to act in order to maintain a wholesome household and happy family. In particular, the journal 
ran two continuous sections during this period titled “Upbringing and Education” and “The 
Health and Education of the Home.” It was in these sections along with others that women’s 
issues were tackled and prescribed. This chapter will now address the contents of these articles 
and how they spoke to the sectarian concerns of the Shiʿas regarding marriage and gendered 
roles. From the nature of these articles and the approach of the journal, the question regarding the 
role of Shiʿi women as wives and mothers was important due to its presumed connection to the 
nation, and correspondingly to the place of Shiʿas as a sect within it. 
 
The Importance of Women to the Nation  
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The suckling from the mother’s breasts, is suckling from her character.306 
The literature on the embodiment of the nation through women, particularly in the 
colonial and postcolonial setting, has long been studied by the likes of Beth Baron, Marilyn 
Booth, Lisa Pollard, and Judith Tucker, to name a few. According to this extensive body of 
literature, the progress of the nation became dependent on the progress of women as the family 
was envisioned as the foundation of the nation.307 For this reason, emphasis was placed on 
women and their role as mothers. In her book, Women with Mustaches and Men without Beards, 
Afsaneh Najmabadi were “reimagined as companionate wives for the modern citizen-men,” of 
Iranian modernity.308 Uneducated women companions were seen as an obstacle to the progress of 
the nation. If women could not manage the household then how would they support their 
husbands and bear productive sons for society.309 Omnia Shakry has also argued, motherhood 
“was fundamental to the constitution of the national identity and entailed the formation of a 
series of discursive practices that demarcated women as both a ‘locus of the country’s 
backwardness,’ and a sphere of transformation to be reconstituted and raised up onto the plane of 
enlightened rationality.”310 For this reason, women had to be reconstructed in order “to produce 
children worthy of modernity” as they were the ones who could raise the nation and lift it from 
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its state of abyss.311 For the Shiʿas of Lebanon who remained marginalized and held the highest 
illiteracy rate among the various sects, reforming and educating Shiʿi women became a major 
obstacle to the progress of the sect. Whereas in Najmabadi’s work modernity was defined by 
comparsions between Iran and the West, for the Shiʿas of Lebanon their “other” was an 
internalized sectarian one.312 Thus, not only was the Shiʿi woman‘s role as a mother important, 
but so was her function as a man’s companion for the sake of sectarian advancement.  
In the context of the Lebanese nation-state, Suad Joseph has written extensively on the 
notion of family and women as it related to the nation; however, her research focused little on the 
Shiʿas.313 Through the examination of al-ʿIrfān’s articles, we get a better understanding of why 
women—more specifically Shiʿi women—were vital for the birth and growth of the nation. 
During the French Mandate, numerous articles appeared in al-ʿIrfān, describing the need to 
uplift the nation and particularly the Shiʿi sect. In the unique case of Lebanon, nationalism was 
defined by growing sectarianism. For the newly recognized Shiʿi sect, the family, specifically 
Shiʿi women, became important to their inclusion into the nation-state. In order to raise the status 
of the sect, Shiʿi women had to take an active role in society as “half of humanity,” as one author 
argued.314 The notion of women as half of humanity was emphasized repeatedly when discussing 
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32. In another article, the author argued that women make up half of the population of 70 million Muslims and in 
order for the revival of the Muslim world to occur, there must be a revival of Muslim women. “ʿanāṣir nahaḍa al-
marʾa al-Islāmiyya wa sir al-najāh” [The Origins of the Islamic Women Awakening and the Secret to Success], al-
ʿIrfān 18, no. 1 (1929): 13. If articles did not discuss the relation of woman to the future of the nation and humanity 
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the state of society, and why improving the situation of women was necessary for future 
(sectarian) growth.315 As another article emphasized, women must not be separated from the 
“journey of men.”316 In the pages of al-ʿIrfān, Shiʿi women were envisioned as companions of 
men, and their negligence and ignorance was seen as hindering the advancement of society. 
Emphasis was placed on women as a component of society; one that was necessary for both Shiʿi 
men and the nation to succeed. As a necessary component of society, al-ʿIrfān highlighted the 
need to modify and amend the situation of women during this period. In one article on al-ʿIrfān’s 
front page of the April 1921 edition titled “Women between Excess and Negligence,” women 
were criticized for “their weakness,” as the article attempted to diagnose why women were a 
“weaker species” than men.317 The article then continued by noting that women as a gender were 
too emotional and cried readily, even though they were not burdened by “the significant work” 
that men endured.318 Despite this inequality, the article noted, women still had rights and held 
importance in society.319 A woman must possess appropriate manners and character, the author 
added, since it was the woman who taught “national pride and religion.”320 This connection 
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between women and their role as the bearers of nationalism was repeatedly propagated in al-
ʿIrfān, and it was predominantly for this reason that women had to be reformed and enlightened. 
The woman was not only the womb that birthed the future children of the nation, but she was 
also the vessel of national formation whereby “the suckling from the mother’s breast,” as noted 
in one article, was not only a physical act but a transmission of morals and character.321 The need 
to reform Shiʿi women was deemed important, because it was through women that the nation 
was born.322 As Najmabadi argued in her work on Iran, the womb was not only a vessel but a 
school (maktab), and as such it embodied the same disciplinary and regulatory functions as a 
school.323 This nation was birthed through the development and reform of Shiʿi women to 
enhance the sect.324 In another article titled “Al-ʿIrfān and Women,” the author acknowledged 
the excessive attention given in the journal on “upbringing, education, health, and 
housekeeping,” and claimed that this was due to the fact that women must be modernized in 
order to “bring honor (karama) to the nation” and “make you (the Shiʿas) into nationals.”325 
Women became a repository of sectarian and national honor. The Arabic word used in al-ʿIrfān 
to denote honor was karama or ʿird.326 In her work on Egypt, Beth Baron reveals how national 
honor developed in the wake of imperial intervention and occupation among Egyptian 
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nationalists.327 With the nation imagined as a family, the projections of women became a means 
to protecting national honor. In the case of Egypt, as Baron has shown, “notions of family and 
national honor varied over time and in different contexts and could be used in reference to 
internal and external cultural and political threats.”328 In the context of the Shiʿas in the Mandate 
period, the threat was both an internal and external one. As this dissertation has shown, the 
marginalization of Shiʿas coupled by their legal recognition by the mandatory state brought a 
growing awareness of sectarian concerns and need to bolster the status of the Shiʿas among the 
other Lebanese sects. The colonial external threat, as discussed in Chapter one, spurred an anti-
French, pro-Arab movement among prominent Shiʿas during the 1920s and 1930s. These 
circumstances brought about an urgency by the Shiʿas to affirm their “Arabness” and nativeness 
to the land and nation.329 It was in this atmosphere that Shiʿi women were promulgated as 
mothers of the sect and nation in al-ʿIrfān. Women had to be ameliorated to become 
marriageable in order to raise the stature of the nation and give birth to promising Shiʿi national 
subjects. As the vessel of the future children of the sect, women had to be reformed to save the 
institution of the national sectarinized family. The reformation of women as future spouses and 
housewives had to be achieved for Shiʿi men and the sect to advance in the Lebanese nation-
state. 
In another such article titled “What is the Path for Women in Our Country,” Suʿādat 
Qaddureh, one of the few female contributors, recounted how even Napoleon Bonaparte’s 
observed “the ignorance” of the women of this nation, and saw the need to “respect and preserve 
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women and their capabilities.”330 Qaddureh took Napoleon’s remarks to argue that women must 
join in the process of advancement and progress, and it was for this reason that Shiʿi men were 
lagging. Rather women, as Qaddureh argued, were concerned with “adornment and beauty as 
though she is not a member of this nation.”331 In her lengthy account, she argued that Shiʿi men 
have not attained advancement since their fate was tied to that of women, and a national revival 
could only be attained “with the contribution of women to men” to solidify this cause.332 
Qaddureh referenced the success of the West and its progress as a template to adhere to, although 
not to emulate completely.333 In her article, as well as others that appeared in al-ʿIrfān, the West 
appeared as a model when it came to marital relationships and companionships between men and 
women. However, there were many reservations in following this Western model.  
In another article entitled “Between Eastern and Western Women,” the author argued that 
Western women worked hand in hand with their spouses while still raising kids, whereas the 
“Eastern man does not look at the woman as a friend.”334 The writer continued by noting that 
“there is no life if a woman is ignorant and suppressed living in a state of unworthiness,” but 
rather an effort to make women knowledgeable was best for the nation’s future and 
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independence.335 Just like Qaddureh, this article envisioned Shiʿi women as part of the process 
toward sectarian advancement and national revival, and only with their assistance would this be 
attained (how this relates to the schooling of women and development of education will be 
addressed in Chapter five). Both writers relied on allusion to the West to justify their 
contentions, and push for the progression of women. As repeatedly evoked in al-ʿIrfān, women 
were vital to society as the “other half of humankind,” but the journal stopped short of emulating 
the West and advocating for women in the workforce.336 In her final words, Qaddureh stated that 
this article was written “to encourage the education and advancement of women,” emphasizing 
that her advice “comes out of love for this glorious nation” and her “desire for a revival so that 
the ‘true’ woman blossoms in the future.”337 Once again, the theme of the woman as the mother 
of the nation and partner of man for the advancement of the nation was emphasized. However, 
Qaddureh, as a woman, ended her argument by assuring that her words were for the sake of the 
nation and not a claim for women’s rights.338 The call for the progression of women was based 
not on the advancement of the sex but on their ability to produce happy and productive men for 
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society. In the case of al-ʿIrfān and its contributors, the nation was a sectarian one, and the call 
for the advancement of women spoke to a Shiʿi audience and readership. 
Not only was the progression of women linked to the fate of the nation, but also to the 
future children of this nation. In an article titled “The Upbringing of Girls,” the author 
proclaimed that “minimal education for girls” has been considered sufficient since fathers have 
always thought schooling girls was unimportant.339 Girls, as the author argued, were only trained 
in household duties. It was due to this logic, the author claimed, that girls were ignorant and 
weaker than men, but this was an inherent flaw in society since women “are the foundation of 
human life and thus the decay of the world lies in their hands. She is the head of the 
household.”340 Unlike other writers, this author pinpointed the role of education in the 
advancement of women, and thus the nation. He continued by noting that a mother must improve 
her abilities to raise children through education so that her children grow up “properly.”341 The 
fate of the nation lay with the fate of the household and its ability to succeed. The lack of a 
proper upbringing was continuously reiterated and connected to the fate of the nation and its 
families as seen in al-ʿIrfān.342 The connection was most readily made in connection to the 
mother and her role in teaching her children to “love the nation” (ḥubb li-l-waṭan). Through the 
descriptive nature of al-ʿIrfān’s articles, mothers were given the primary duty of imbuing their 
children with the “appropriate” character and morals to love the nation. 
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From Mother to Child to the Nation: Ḥubb li-l-waṭan    
In a series titled “The Ten Commandments of a Housewife,” which I discuss in greater 
detail below, one particular section, subtitled “The Love of the Nation is Righteous,” highlighted 
the role a woman had in teaching her children to adore the nation.343 In the article, the author 
emphasized the proper behavior of a woman in the home as a mother. Her job, as the author 
described, was to raise children and imbue them with love for the nation.344 According to the 
author, “if a child is not instilled with nationalism from his mother, he will grow up without a 
nation to call his own.”345 National pride was to be engraved in childhood by the mother in the 
home, and if women did not fulfill their duties properly then men would be raised without 
affection for their nation. The author made a poignant assertion about the role of the mother from 
the stage of infancy to adulthood in blossoming national pride and love for the future generation. 
Blame was placed on the mother if children and grown men did not have nationalist pride. More 
importantly, proper women produced noble men for the nation. As one article underlined, an 
individual with character removed from evil was a product of a proper upbringing at home by his 
mother.346 The author recounted social maladies present in men today, such as a lack of respect 
for parents and elders, and the consumption of alcohol resulting in diseases.347 The writer blamed 
mothers for the lack of character and morality in Shiʿi men, and advised them that “a proper 
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upbringing is a combination of religious and national upbringing.”348 This author extended the 
contention that the mother, through her role in the home, was the vessel to the nation’s future and 
its men. Shiʿi women were blamed for the social ills present in society.349 The author alluded to 
apparent societal problems in Shiʿi men, their character, and lack of national pride, yet the 
culpability was imparted on the mother as the embodiment of the nation. Women and their 
bodies were the repositories of society’s social norms and anxieties; hence, they were the ones 
that needed reform and modernization.  
In all the articles mentioned, education, advancement, and progression of women were 
highlighted, but only for the sake of the nation and in particular for the future men of the 
Lebanese nation-state. The fate of the nation’s future lay in the hands of women, not as active 
participants but as producers of future male contributors to the nation. For this reason, education 
of mothers and girls, which will be elaborated on in Chapter five, became a prerogative during 
the Mandate period, which brought about the development of the first Shiʿi schools. As set out in 
the pages of al-ʿIrfān, however, education provided by the mother in the home was regarded as 
her most important contribution to the nation and Shiʿi sect. 
 
The Fate of the Future: A Mother’s Education Before Schooling: A Proper Upbringing  
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The upbringing of the house is the foundation for the future, and the upbringing of school 
only strengthens the foundation of the home upbringing.350 
 
The above quote appeared in an article titled “The Upbringing of the Youth,” in which 
the author, Adeeb Farhat, outlined the steps necessary for a mother to raise her children, so that 
they emerged as upright and moral individuals in society. For Farhat, children began their 
education in the home by emulating the mother as an archetype who holds the direction of the 
future and the nation.351 During the early years of the French Mandate, emphasis placed on the 
upbringing of the home (tarbiyat al-bayt) over that of formal schooling became evident in the 
pages of al-ʿIrfān. As Timothy Mitchell has noted, the meaning of tarbiya, or education, was a 
new usage. Until the last third of the nineteenth century, the word tarbiya meant to “breed” or 
“cultivate.”352 It was not until the last third of the century that it came to mean “education.”353 
This new usage of the word distinguished two understandings of the word. One was tarbiya in 
the sense of the culitivation or growth of the human being. The second refered to “the tarbiya of 
individual human beings, which means the tarbiya of communities and nation. It was the second 
meaning that was new and that came to count.”354 In this second sense, tarbiya was connected to 
the disciplining of individuals to function as part of a community and nation. Thus, schooling 
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became a part of the “political process of discipline and instruction” that informed national 
identification.355 Najmabadi has connected Mitchell’s understanding of tarbiya to images and 
constructions of the mother as a school (maktab) in her research on Iranian modernity. 
Mothering became a form of schooling that was defined by “nurturing and educating” the nation, 
and for this reason mothers needed reform.356 Embodying the form of a school, mothers could 
also be disciplined and reformed. This notion of the mother as a school was frequently 
referenced in the pages of al-ʿIrfān during the Mandate period. The foundation of the future was 
the home, which was ultimately in the hands of mothers. In a similar article titled “The 
Comprehensive Upbringing,” the author complained that Shiʿas copied the French by educating 
children in schools, and filling their brains with knowledge and language, but neglected 
upbringing in the home.357 For the author, schools were supposed to build on the upbringing 
bestowed in the home, but when that was absent the foundation itself was lacking. Farhat 
continued by noting “in order for daughters to become mothers we must improve upbringing.”358 
In the end, the author asserted that Shiʿas emulated the French in education, but that Shiʿas were 
better than the French in the area of home upbringing.359 And as it was frequently reiterated in 
al-ʿIrfān, it was only through the upbringing of the home that a child would eventually love the 
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nation as mothers were ordered to “teach them to love the nation and show them how to bestow 
love toward their national splendor.”360 
 In a similar article titled “Upbringing and Education: Be Concerned with Upbringing 
over Schooling,” the author argued that schools and their students would not benefit if children 
did not have the necessary upbringing bestowed by the mother.361 In the nationalist discourse of 
al-ʿIrfān, society was advised to improve and enrich the home by amending the character of 
mothers and the future children of the sect as members of the Lebanese nation-state. In numerous 
articles that addressed this topic, the mother was depicted as “the first school” as one author 
called it, while formal education only followed in the years to come.362 In order to create and 
nourish a suitable environment for the schooling of the home, character of the mother, as the 
head of the home and holder of future Shiʿi citizens of the nation, had to be amended and 
enhanced, and thus the Ten Commandments emerged.   
 
The Ten Commandments  
 Starting in 1920, a series titled the “Ten Commandments for a Housewife” was readily 
published in al-ʿIrfān, dictating proper conduct to be exhibited by women in the home as 
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mothers and wives.363 The series continued until 1928 with over a dozen articles dedicated to the 
roles of housewives. Only one article was found that focused on the Commandments for a 
husband. The name given to the series, “The Ten Commandments,” was interesting as it alluded 
to a Judeo-Christian tradition while addressing a predominantly Shiʿi Muslim audience. No 
explanation was given as to why such a title was chosen by the journal.364  
All the articles were written as a numbered list of 10 items. At times, the Commandments 
were concise, but most of the time they were lengthy and detailed. The series spoke directly to 
Shiʿi women as housewives and spouses when it advised them on a range of issues from how to 
treat their husbands and children, how to dress, how to conduct oneself in public among friends 
and strangers, and how to maintain a healthy home environment. In most of the articles, the 
Commandments emphasized basic things, such as the cleanliness and organization of one’s 
home. The articles highlighted how a housewife’s home and children must always appear clean 
to the outside world as a “woman is a woman if she has knowledge in sweeping and 
cleanliness.”365 Cleanliness was a sign of fulfilling the appropriate duties of a housewife and 
mother. In one article dedicated to the Commandments of health in the home, mothers were 
ordered to teach children bodily wellness, which entitled how to properly clean, eat, and 
exercise.366 
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One of the most important roles for a woman was her duty as a mother, and the type of 
character she should instill in her children. The Commandments were specific on the mother’s 
role as the first (madrasa) for children, dictating to mothers the appropriate way to raise children. 
The articles told mothers to be aware of whom their children associated with and the company 
they aligned with. The Commandments addressed simple things, such as to not teach one’s 
children hatred and fighting so that they would not turn into hostile individuals.367 Mothers were 
to serve as a “model of excellence” by not teaching children through hitting and spanking, but 
rather by talking and taking away things as another article highlighted.368 The articles advocated 
women not to teach their children lying by filling their heads with fairy tales and superstition, 
resulting in fear, but by enriching them with extraordinary stories of “worldly men” and scholars 
that would empower their sons with images of “triumph and accomplishment.”369 This, the 
article noted, would teach children to “aspire for greatness.”370 Mothers were encouraged to 
bestow their children, particularly their sons, with a hatred for “injustice and humility.”371 They 
were told to develop in their children a sense of self-pride in order to “nourish your child from 
birth to be a true national,” and to “love his nation, defend it, sacrifice self and money for it, and 
strive for the highest conditions and independence.”372 The Ten Commandments articles 
provided a place where discussion on the mother’s role in crafting future sovereign citizens and 
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nationals could be revisited. The future citizens referenced in these articles were Shiʿi boys and 
men. As in most colonial and postcolonial contexts, the mother was deemed responsible for 
representing the nation and its struggles for independence. If the mother was reformed then it 
was believed that able men would be born to take on such nationalist roles. For the Shiʿas, it was 
a representation of the sect in the the national framework that made it important to bestow their 
sons with the proper characteristics and morals. 
One of the most common demands listed in the Commandments directed toward mothers 
and their children related to financial spending. Mothers were repeatedly told to teach their 
children to be economical and “avoid excessive spending” because it would “destroy the 
household.”373 Throughout the Ten Commandments series, the issue of excessive spending was 
repeated in nearly every article.374 Women were constantly told to save and not spend above their 
means on clothing, the house, or the children as that would result in financial debt and family 
hardship. Women were constantly reminded that “saving is virtuous” while “wasting was 
despicable so follow the path of virtue.”375 Women were told not to demand too much of their 
husbands and their capabilities to the point that it would “hinder living expenses.”376 In many of 
the articles, excessive spending was connected to a woman’s desire for fashion and clothing. 
Shiʿi women were told not to adore themselves nor desire to emulate others, particularly Western 
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women, when it came to fashion and dress.377 In one of these articles, women were told “do not 
appear Europeanized in clothing and orientation as though it is a fashion show, you are to 
complete the soul because that is where one finds constant beauty.”378 The Westernization of 
society was seen as a threat to the social and financial fabric of Shiʿi families.379 Although the 
construction of the sectarian home was based on a Shiʿis self-imagining in relation to the other 
national sects, a perception of the West and its impact was also present. Thus, a sense of 
sectarian identification was both internally and externally informed to some extent. This Western 
factor will be discussed in greater detail below. For the most part, Shiʿi women were advised not 
to lose their honor and morality like the women of the West. Consequently, women were 
reminded to improve “their manners and modesty,” and not garnish “embarrassment” by the 
clothing they wore.380 Most importantly, women were told neither to scrutinize their husbands if 
they could not afford luxuries for them nor to compare what they had to what their friends may 
possess.381 Although no direct reference was made about the economic conditions of the time, 
these articles were written just as World War I came to an end, and the political, financial, and 
social situation in the region remained uncertain. What was clear from the attention given to the 
issue of spending was that this was probably a common problem in Shiʿi marriages and society 
as a whole during this period.  
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One of the main reasons why women were advised in the Commandments not to 
overspend was the discomfort it would cause their husbands, and how this conflicted with the 
proper way a wife should act toward her spouse. Women’s excessive spending threatened the 
ability of men to be sufficient providers, and hence their primary responsibility as breadwinners 
(discussed below). The Commandments told women not to burden their husbands, but rather 
help them save while making the home environment as pleasant as possible. Women were 
reminded to always greet their husbands “with happiness and smiles and bidding him farewell 
and wellness,” while always being “delightful with her words and speech.”382 Thus, women were 
told not to demand too much from their husbands, and “move away from everything that 
bothers” them or may cause them discomfort in the home.383 A wife must be “patient” and 
“praiseworthy” of her husband at all times, so that he doesn’t distance himself from her and the 
home.384 A wife was told to always be concerned with her husband and “to never leave the house 
if he was home,” but to be attentive to his every need when he was around.385 Women were told 
to be “attractive for their husbands” but not too attractive to beget attention from others since 
“men are jealous” by nature.386 
The Commandments were directed solely toward Shiʿi women. The Commandments 
were a guideline to maintaining a healthy and wholesome home for which the Shiʿi woman was 
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deemed responsible.387 By obeying these Commandments, mothers of the nation were raising 
proper Shiʿi citizens worthy of modernity while also producing happy husbands. A prosperous 
nation would blossom out of blissful Shiʿi homes. Consequently, the underlying objective of the 
Commandments was to avert familial problems since an unhappy home could result in divorce, 
which would signal a failing nation. 
 
How to Prevent Divorce: For Shiʿi Women  
The Ten Commandments series was intent on enriching the home by bestowing women 
with the right character on the one hand, and on the other hand informing Shiʿas how to maintain 
happy marriages, and most importantly, avoid divorce. Divorce statistics among Shiʿi Muslims 
living in Lebanon during the Mandate period are not available, but from the articles in al-ʿIrfān 
it can be inferred that divorce was a significant societal issue frequently discussed within the 
community. In one such article titled “How to Prevent Divorce,” Shiʿi women were constantly 
reminded to pay attention to their husbands, and not to neglect them so that it would not lead to 
other marital repercussions.388 They were reminded to stay attractive for their husbands, so “they 
didn’t look elsewhere.”389 In several articles, women were warned about the effects of spousal 
neglect. They were told to be mindful of men “so that he does not run to the coffee shops and 
places of entertainment.”390 The meandering of men to idle and immoral places was deemed the 
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woman’s fault for not meeting the needs of her husband. Women were told to remain attractive 
and engaging for their husbands and “to do whatever it was to please and entertain him to keep 
him home.”391 One way to keep a man away from the coffee shops was by enhancing herself 
with “knowledge” since an educated woman was “captivating to her husband.”392 According to 
the article, a man would “no longer need to visit the coffee shops” if his wife was able to engage 
him intellectually.393 Ironically, women were once again blamed for their husband’s deviation 
(just as in the issue of alcohol discussed below) from the home and his lack of investment in the 
family. To avoid such an occurrence, the Commandments told women to enrich themselves with 
beneficial readings related to “religion, child bearing, housekeeping, and worldly knowledge,” 
not only for their children but for their husbands.394 However, they were to educate themselves 
just enough so that they could converse and engage in discussion with their spouses but not 
counter them, especially in front of others.395 Women as future wives were not only mothers and 
bearers of offspring for Shiʿi men, but companions and partners needing to be disciplined and 
reformed to become suitable spouses. 
For the sake of keeping men at home, al-ʿIrfān instructed women on how to behave and 
act, so that husbands remained happy and invested in their marriages. In another article titled 
“Health and Home Upbringing,” women were told to maintain a positive attitude and character 
imbued in “generosity and forgiveness,” and stay away from “stubbornness and envy,” so that 
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the familial home remained a pleasant place for all.396 Not only were Shiʿi women warned that 
their men may stray to coffee shops, but that they may end up in the arms of a foreign woman if 
they did not adhere to the advice at hand. Reference to the West was both utilized and feared as it 
related to the question of Shiʿi women. Throughout these articles, the West was at times utilized 
to bolster the situation of women, and at other times warned against its encroachment.  
The stance al-ʿIrfān writers took on the West in regard to the question of women was one 
of reference, but stopped short of emulation and maintained a distance from the West. In one 
article titled “About Women” written under the pseudonym akhū muẓīrr (Afflicted Brother), the 
author expressed his concern over the excessive attention placed on the issue of women that 
called for their advancement and expansion of rights in society.397 According to this author, he 
supported the advancement of women, but not “at the expense of the family.”398 He objected to 
the way in which magazines “glamorize women” and call their inclusion in the workforce 
necessary.399 He continued by noting that such a position would harm families and pose a peril to 
society and the nation. He deemed this proliferation of extravagant women’s rights as a Western 
“cultural” attack, “as opposed to a military one,” that was “not in the benefit of the nation.”400 He 
concluded by noting that Shiʿas needed to “preserve their women” and families, and that they 
needed to limit such provocations since “we have yet to attain political rights” as a society.401 
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The threat of the foreign “other” was seen as endangering the family, and thus the nation. The 
presumed encroachment of the foreign “other” informed al-ʿIrfān’s understanding of familial 
roles and directed the methods in which to reform Shiʿi women as it constructed new notions of 
femininity. As a forum of Shiʿi middle-class perceptions, al-ʿIrfān reflected anxiety over 
sectarian formation and national inclusion, which was embodied in the articulation of gendered 
roles.   
  
The Foreign Threat: Eastern Woman vs. Western Woman  
 The troubling state of Shiʿi marriages, as depicted in al-ʿIrfān, was worsened by a 
presumed Western threat in the embodiment of European women. In a few articles focusing on 
the topic of family, marriage, and divorce, the issue of Shiʿi men marrying foreign women was 
addressed as a threat to the nation and its future. In the previous article discussed, Fatāt al-Furāt 
correlated the crumbling state of marriages and spousal problems in Shiʿi society to the 
deprivation of marriages and “the ailment of marrying Europeans.”402 She continued to note that 
young men go off to Europe to be educated and subsequently return with European wives due to 
the dilapidated marital conditions in Shiʿi society and the lack of suitable Shiʿi women. The 
author was troubled by the ability of a European woman “to win the heart of” a Shiʿi man even 
though she did not share his “language, religion, culture, food, and manners.403 The reason for 
this, Fatāt al-Furāt argued, was that a European woman was stronger than an Eastern woman, and 
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thus he could live with her in “comfort and ease.”404 The European woman, she argued, was one 
who makes the home a pleasant place. She behaved as a partner to her husband with whom he 
could converse with and discuss “matters of the heart.”405 According to Fatāt al-Furāt, this only 
worsened the state of Shiʿi families, making it ever so pressing to remedy the marital conditions 
in Shiʿi society. If Shiʿi men were not marrying European women, Fatāt al-Furāt claimed that 
they were deciding to remain single to avoid the horrid state of marriage within the 
community.406 The companionship of the Western woman was more attractive to the Eastern 
man since she was able to fulfill his needs intellectually while still sustaining her duties of the 
household. The Shiʿi woman as perceived in al-ʿIrfān was unable to do either. 
In another al-ʿIrfān article titled “Between the Western and Arab Woman,” it claimed 
that the reason that Shiʿi men preferred Western women as opposed to Eastern women was due 
to the fact that Western women worked hand in hand with their spouses while maintaining their 
childrearing role.407 Eastern women, however, remained ignorant and obedient to their spouses, 
treating their husbands like “father figures rather than companions.”408 Eastern men, the article 
argued, needed women who could assist and support them as partners and friends, and who did 
not treat them as authoritative figures they feared. This article, like that of Fatāt al-Furāt, was 
concerned that the state of Shiʿi marriages was crippling the fate of the nation and thwarting the 
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nourishment of upright citizens. Through this examination of Al-ʿIrfān, the journal saw a need to 
discuss the conditions of Shiʿi marriage, focusing most of its attention on women and their 
marital duties.409 The journal advocated women to become more knowledgeable about the world 
and their homes in order to successfully produce healthy marriages and future children of the 
nation. However, al-ʿIrfān and its contributors were either ambivalent or stopped short of 
advocating full independence to women as members of the workforce.  
The immense proliferation of articles by various Shiʿi notables, ʿulamaʾ, and scholars on 
the issue of family indicated a sense of anxiety over gendered roles, particularly those of women, 
just as the community transformed into a nationalized sect confined to the boundaries of the 
Lebanese nation-state. As previously argued, the newspaper represented similar concerns about 
marriage and gender roles that other colonial and postcolonial nations experienced.410 However, 
in the case of Lebanon, this anxiety over the familial space appeared in a sectarianized form. It 
was this sectarianized need to reform the family space that guided the inclusion of the Shiʿas into 
the Lebanese nation-state. Al-ʿIrfān was on the one hand cosmopolitian in its stance on familial 
and gendered relationships, yet on the other hand localized, particularly to the political and social 
situation and concerns of a Shiʿi community. Citizenship in the Lebanese nation-state was 
guided by sectarian markers and practices, and these modes of identification, as this dissertation 
has argued, affected the practices of marital relationships and gender roles as seen in the Shiʿi 
case. In many ways, Shiʿi Muslims as a national sect in a new modern nation-state encountered 
the same type of anxiety over modernizing; however, for Lebanese Shiʿas this was the first time 
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that a sectarian-driven effort was made in this respect. As I have argued in the previous chapters, 
this growing awareness was based on the recognition of the Shiʿi sect and the institutionalization 
of a politicized sectarian identity as a form of Lebanese citizenship. What I have shown here is 
how that came to play a role in the realm of Shiʿi gendered practices, particularly as it related to 
women, and the proliferation of the sect as a national entity. Despite the emphasis placed on 
Shiʿi women in this effort, al-ʿIrfān did attend to the issue of men even if in a limited scope. 
 
Part Two: Narrating (or Not) Masculinity in the Press and Its Relationship  
to the Shiʿi Sect 
In the opening article to the chapter written by Fatāt al-Furāt titled “Our Familial Life,” 
she briefly made note of the faults of men in her discussion of the staggering state of Shiʿi 
marriages. In her analysis, she blamed men’s lack of knowledge regarding their marital 
responsibilities as one of the main reasons for the “detrimental state of marriage.”411 She argued 
that men had to be made aware of what a marriage entailed in order for it to succeed and the 
future of the nation to thrive. One of the main problems according to Fatāt al-Furāt was that Shiʿi 
men were not made aware of their responsibilities and how to conduct themselves in the familial 
space before their wives and children. As a result, women and children feared the husband (and 
father) “to the point of no communication and hatred.”412 While she did not go on how to amend 
such relationships in-depth, Fatāt al-Furāt did highlight that a husband must be respectful of his 
wife in order to establish an environment of communication and understanding. Although Fatāt 
                                                           






al-Furāt complained about the marital predicament found among Shiʿas, she did not dispense 
much advice regarding men in particular. Wilson Jacob’s study on effendi masculinity reveals 
how through the notion of al-riyāḍa (cultivating) and salvation of self in colonial Egypt both 
informed and limited understanding of the national.413 His analysis of effendi masculinity in print 
culture reflects how the al-Muqtataf and al-Hilal journals were a space of “making and 
unmaking” a “self-conscious modern subject.”414 In an attempt to following Jacob’s analysis on 
the press, this section tries to see where, if anywhere, was masculinity defined and how it 
projected the national Shiʿi man. However, in the case of al-ʿIrfān the journal touched only 
briefly on the question of men during the Mandate period.  
 In my analysis of al-ʿIrfān, only a handful of articles were found between the 1920s and 
1930s addressing men in relation to their proper roles as husbands and fathers. Unlike the 
abundance of articles speaking to women, only a few placed blame on Shiʿi men for the 
suffering marital state among Shiʿas, and its subsequent impact on the nation. In the few articles 
that mentioned the obligations of men, their roles were defined primarily by “monetary 
obligation” as heads of households.415 The impact of World War I coupled with increasing 
European control over agricultural production and encroachment of European capital and 
products in the region brought about economic hardship during a volatile political 
environment.416 In the case of Lebanon, Shiʿas had suffered most profoundly due to their 
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residence in the most economically impoverished and rural parts of the region.417 Heightened 
economic hardships affected the state of marriages as growing emphasis was placed on 
materialistic expenditures of wives in the pages of al-ʿIrfān. The importance of marriage in 
newly formed nation-states, as Khouloussy argued, “did not merely reflect a union between a 
man and a woman; it signified a man’s capability to assert his full economic independence, 
individually and collectively as a member of an imagined nation.”418 Marriage, in many ways, 
proved a man’s capability and independence as a financial provider, and thus as a responsible 
member of society. The inability of a man to provide for his family, or overt financial pressures 
placed on husbands by their wives, contributed to marital problems, and the aversion of men to 
enter the institution of marriage. With the state of marriage threatened, men could not be 
disciplined into being economically responsible members of society and the state. However, for 
the Shiʿas of Lebanon, their recognition as a sect within the nation-state only heightened the 
need to produce able men who could provide for its future families and citizens. In the case of 
Lebanon, sectarian identity based on kinship blood lines became the only form of nationalized 
citizenship, and thus marriage was the institution that continuously produced future national 
subjects, needing regulation and reform. In the one article titled “Commandments to the 
Husband,” the main demand was for the husband to assume financial responsibility for his 
family.419 Even when their roles were defined monetarily, the newspaper never elaborated on 
what this meant, and the financial requirements it entailed, other than that they were to support 
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the family. As seen previously, it was women more than men who were reprimanded on their 
monetary spending. Women were continuously told to curb their financial expenditures and limit 
the demands they made of their husbands in this regard.420 As Khouloussy has argued in her 
research, monetary obligations defined the role of husbands and their masculinity in marriage in 
early twentieth century Egypt.421 The little written in al-ʿIrfān about Shiʿi men focused on their 
ability as financial providers. Marriage proved a man’s capability as a financial provider and a 
responsible member of society. This aspect defined Shiʿi masculinity as their ability to support 
their families proved their independence and responsibility to society. A man’s inability to 
provide for his family was seen as an infringement on Shiʿi marriages and a reason for growing 
marital problems. Growing marital turmoil, as presented in these articles, was seen as the culprit 
in the failing state of the nation. Thus, the state of Shiʿi marriages had to be reformed. Marriage 
as an institution was encouraged as its success led to the success of the nation and the production 
of able citizens.  
For the most part, the few articles that did appear in al-ʿIrfān sought to advocate marriage 
in hopes of persuading its audience that the institution of marriage was more beneficial than 
divorce or bachelorhood. Al-ʿIrfān strongly advocated the importance of marriage and the need 
to remedy the current state it was in. However, the journal made little effort to speak directly to 
men, and the role they played in sustaining a happy marriage. Although a dozen articles dictating 
the “Ten Commandments of a Housewife” were published in al-ʿIrfān in the 1920s and 1930s, 
only one article addressed the “Commandments for a Husband,” and it appeared in conjunction 
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with that on women.422 Unlike the detailed Commandments dictated to Shiʿi women and 
discussed previously, the articles addressing men prescribed the way men should treat their 
wives, so that divorce would not occur.423 Basic advice was iterated to Shiʿi husbands in that 
they had to “be generous” and “respectful” to their wives and approach them with kind words.424 
When the journal addressed married Shiʿi men, it focused on nominal things as seen in the article 
“Beware Husband, Beware Wife.” This article provided men with instructions on how to act, and 
what they should and should not do in front of their spouses. In its transcription of advice, the 
husband was told “not to annoy or hover over his wife,” or “come home smelling of cigarettes,” 
and “not to be serious all the time since humor will delight your wife.”425 The article pondered 
trivial things such as “don’t slouch because your wife likes to see you in an upright posture,” 
while not directly attending to how a husband must treat his wife or behave in the home. Little to 
no advice was given on how to treat his spouse or act as a father. This was in stark contrast to the 
attention Shiʿi women received in this regard in al-ʿIrfān.426 For the most part, the articles that 
appeared elaborated on the importance of marriage and how to avoid domestic unrest. The few 
articles in al-ʿIrfān that spoke to men sought to advocate marriage in hopes of persuading them 
that matrimony was indeed more beneficial than divorce. Unlike the stance of al-ʿIrfān on Shiʿi 
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women, their advice to men was not wittingly intertwined to the future of the nation. On the few 
occasions al-ʿIrfān mentioned desirable characteristics for Shiʿi men in the scope of marriage, it 
was directed toward the traits that would make men model individuals rather than suitable 
husbands and fathers. 
 
Marriage and the Ideal Shiʿi Young Man 
 In the series titled “Health and Housekeeping,” one particular article focused on the 
future of marriage and the “Healthy Character” needed to sustain it. Although the article 
professed to address the issue of marriage, it was geared toward the development of young men’s 
characteristics as prototypical individuals, not necessarily as spouses. It aimed to produce 
“wholesome” young men with appropriate character in both “body and mind.”427 In dictating the 
necessary steps to attain this, the author pointed out the noble traits necessary for a young man. 
A noble young man was defined as one who aspired “for success” and could “handle adversities 
with ease and precision” while maintaining an optimistic perspective on life.428 The article 
concluded by proclaiming that the most important characteristic of an honorable man was his 
aspiration “for the happiness of his family.”429 Although the article was written with the intention 
of tackling the appropriate personalities of men in the institution of marriage, it focused on the 
nourishment and mindset needed to produce young Shiʿi men of healthy body and mind. The 
article made little mention of their roles as future husbands and fathers, but rather as sovereign 
                                                           








members of society and upright citizens of the nation-state. According to the press, the function 
of Shiʿi men was not particularly rooted in their abilities as fathers and husbands, but as national 
subjects who were financially responsible and independent to sustain a marriage. However, this 
did not stop al-ʿIrfān from advocating the institution of marriage as a necessary component to 
constructing the Shiʿi male citizen. 
 The idealized young Shiʿi man was imagined as one who formed a union with a 
physically able and healthy Shiʿi woman.430 In a peculiar article titled “Lessons of Health,” a 
portion was dedicated to the connection between “marriage and disease” as it related to choosing 
a suitable wife. The article advised a man to make sure that his potential wife “did not have a 
disease such as tuberculosis,” or that he not marry “any immediate relatives as it might increase 
health problems or disease.”431 In many ways, the ideal spouse was to be paired with a “healthy” 
body removed from illness as the sovereign citizen was to embody both mental and physical 
“flawlessness” in order to secure the future of a healthy nation-state. The article continued by 
deterring marriage by both men and women to individuals of an older age, advocating them to 
choose a young spouse. In the production of Shiʿi marriages, the ill and the elderly were deemed 
a threat to the fashioning of national sectarian citizens.  
 
Marriage: The Road to Happiness 
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The doctor claims that nothing opens one’s eyes like marriage.432 
In the article “Yes Marriage is the Cure,” the writer made the above claim in his 
endorsement of marriage as the way by which one attained true meaning and purpose in life.433 
Marriage was deemed a necessity in life and one that must be preserved and aspired to.434 
Marriage was seen as the institution that produced future families and citizens of the nation-state. 
The encouragement to marry was presented in al-ʿIrfān during this period. The emphasis on 
marriage and familial relationships, as this chapter and dissertation have argued, was informed 
by a growing sense of Shiʿi sectarian awareness. Another such article “The Happiness of 
Marriage,” began by declaring the following: “If you want to attain a happy marriage which is 
the most important thing that comes out of life then follow these steps.”435 The author proceeded 
by numerating nine steps to achieving this, beginning by offering simple advice to men, such as 
to pick a wife he loved and whose personality corresponded with his.436 At the same time, 
however, the author advised men to be weary of drowning in the notion of love.437 The list 
provided a set of basic principles, such as to respect one’s wife and “request from her what she is 
capable of and not that of excess,” and do not give in to “all her requests even if you can because 
one day it will surpass what you can provide.”438 Once again, the notion of monetary obligation 
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within limits was highlighted as a husband’s responsibility and classification of masculinity.439 
The threat of divorce, or another woman, reflected in many ways the fragileness of not only the 
institution of marriage, but of the future of Shiʿas as a sect and national entity. Marriage not only 
embodied the sanctity of the family, but of the Shiʿi sect as a microcosm of the nation-state. For 
the newly recognized Shiʿi sect, these became more pertinent as it defined a new form of middle-
class masculinity in the pages of al-ʿIrfān.  
 In the few articles addressing men in al-ʿIrfān, they were meant to inform them on the 
significance of marriage as spouses and responsible members of society, but also in hopes of 
avoiding divorce. The possibility of divorce was not only a threat to the institution of marriage, 
but to the newly nationalized sect.  
 
Marriage Over Divorce Or Bachelorhood 
Even more than promoting marriage, al-ʿIrfān warned against divorce or even worse the 
decision of Shiʿi men to remain bachelors. As has been previously noted, women were 
continuously reminded of the possibility of men leaving and finding extracurricular activities 
outside the home if they did not please their spouses. Divorce was not only seen as a threat to the 
institution of marriage, but to the development and nationalization of the Shiʿis as a viable sect 
in Lebanon. Divorce also endangered the fate of the future children, and thus citizens of the 
nation-state. Given that there were no records of the divorce rate among Shiʿi Muslims at the 
time, particularly since the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts were only created in 1926 to document marital 
affairs, the attention given in al-ʿIrfān represented insight on the social happenings of the Shiʿi 
                                                           
439 The author culminated by making sure to warn women once again to please their husbands or they were sure to 
find them in the arms of other women or leaving the house all together. 
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community. This was evident in the increasing number of articles addressing the issue of divorce 
and why marriage was important to sustain. Al-ʿIrfān advised its readership to take preventative 
steps to avoid divorce by assuring that the necessary precautions and agreements were made 
before the consummation of marriage. In order to prevent divorce, marriage had to be modified 
and women were to be reformed and “modernized” as previously discussed. 
In an article titled “Divorce and Polygamy,” the author elaborated on why divorces had 
been happening in larger numbers in Shiʿi society. The author, Hassan Sharārah, described a few 
scenarios in which divorce occurred, and why in such situations it was necessary.440 Sharārah 
noted that marriages were consummated under the pretense of love and emotions; however, 
when insurmountable disagreement between the couple occurred, divorce was necessary. 
Sharārah warned that couples must prearrange matters of nafaqa (alimony) before entering into 
marriage to assure that the unity would be dissolved properly if need be.441 He placed the blame 
on both men and women when divorce occurred in such context. However, Sharārah described 
another scenario by which divorce happened: the husband permits his wife to entertain herself in 
the theater and go out dancing without his presence.442 In such a scenario, the author claimed that 
it would be of no surprise that his wife would be in “the arms of another man” and “cheating on 
her spouse.”443 Inadvertently, Sharārah placed blame on the husband for permitting such 
behavior and digressions, yet endorsed divorce in this kind of situation. In his article, Sharārah 
legitimized the instances that divorce was acceptable and justifiable, yet saw the need to prevent 
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441 Ibid., 579. 
 






such situations from occurring.444 In the end, Sharārah concluded by reasserting the need to 
cherish the tenets of marriage so such circumstances legitimizing divorce did not emerge. 
Although divorce was seen as an inevitable element of life, it was one that had to be limited and 
guarded against. Divorce represented the fragility of not only the establishment of families, but 
of the sect as a national entity. In many ways, Sharārah justified the occasion for divorce because 
such relationships and homes were also not suitable to raise future citizens of the sect. The fate 
of the future children and citizens of the sect were deemed more important than the preservation 
of marriage, and hence divorce was acceptable and not as detestable as bachelorhood.   
Bachelorhood, in many ways, was deemed a greater threat to Shiʿi families than 
legitimized reasons for divorce. During this period, the issue of bachelorhood in the pages of al-
ʿIrfān was seen as problematic to the growth of Shiʿi society. Bachelorhood hindered the 
establishment of Shiʿi families, but also of the sect by producing men who upheld no 
responsibility and economic obligations. Whereas divorced men (and women) were at one point 
married and desirable, and thus continued to uphold financial duties to their ex-wives and 
children, single men did not. As discussed above, women needed to be modified and reformed, 
so that Shiʿi men would be eager to marry them as opposed to remaining bachelors. In one such 
article titled “Marriage and Bachelorhood,” the author reiterated the need to “secure the state of 
marriage from the threat of bachelorhood” for the “mental, physical, and health benefits” it 
provided for society.445 The author encouraged the need to marry for men since bachelorhood 
                                                           
444 Sharārah elaborated on the issue of men marrying multiple wives as permitted in Islam. He illustrated how this 
aspect of Islam, if followed correctly, could work but was hard to do. He argued that if a man desired multiple wives 
to fulfill his needs, he had to treat all (up to four) wives equally in all matters, ultimately making it impossible to 
uphold. Subsequently, he advocated that it would be best for a man to marry one woman rather than place himself in 
such a difficult predicament. “Ṭalāq wa taʿaddud al-zawajāt” [Divorce and Polygamy], al-‘Irfan 19, no. 3 (1930): 
580. 
 
445 “Zawāj wa ʿuzzāb” [Marriage and Bachelorhood], al-‘Irfan 16, no. 3 (1928): 323. 
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was “not beneficial for the family.”446 However, the article cautioned entering marriage before 
making sure the necessary preconditions were made, so that any marital unrest or divorce was 
prevented and therefore any future problems.447 Bachelorhood countered the sanctity of marriage 
by threatening to produce idle, irresponsible men who did not invest in the future of the nation 
and their families. Despite this, al-ʿIrfān placed the burden of marriage and its desirability on 
women.   
As previously discussed, the reluctance of men to get married or even marry foreign 
women was seen as the fault of Shiʿi women for not adhering to men’s needs and standards as 
both a partner and active member in society. For the most part, it was women whose conduct 
would determine the success of a marriage. Women were told to modify themselves for the 
advancement of the nation, thus defining a new mode of middle-class femininity as prescribed by 
al-ʿIrfān. At the same time, al-ʿIrfān pushed Shiʿi men toward marriage and deterred divorce. In 
many ways, masculinity was defined in relation to the excessive attention adhered to femininity 
and the impact that women had in bolstering men of the Shiʿi sect. Al-ʿIrfān had only a few 
articles addressing men and their spousal role. For the most part, the understanding of Shiʿi men 
came through the medium of how women should act in marriage. The problems in Shiʿi 
marriages and the reasons for the divorce hike (although no statistics are presented) were placed 
on the women who were pushing Shiʿi men to remain single or fall in the hands of Western 
women. Whether or not the divorce rate was high, there was a perception among the Shiʿi 
community through the press that divorce was heightened, and hence a threat to the institution of 
                                                           
446 Ibid. 
 
447 Ibid. The article warned against any physical or mental ailments that a man or woman may have before entering 
marriage, and how these should be addressed before marriage in order to prevent divorce. If this was not done, 
bachelorhood would be a better option than marriage leading to divorce. 
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marriage and Shiʿi families. According to the few al-ʿIrfān writers who tackled the issue of 
marriage and potential divorce, reforms in the space of the family had to be addressed and 
modified. Divorce and possible bachelorhood could be prevented if marriages and women were 
reformed to meet the needs of Shiʿi men and the new nation-state. 
 
Conclusion 
Unlike the excessive press coverage on the role of women in parenting Shiʿi children, 
there was little to no reference to the father’s role as a parent. The press by and large did not 
blame men for the failure of marriages or struggles of parenting, but bestowed women with this 
duty. Al-ʿIrfān dictated to women, who happened to be the smallest portion of their reading 
audience, the appropriate parental roles and responsibilities to the nation-state as mothers and 
bearers of the future citizens of the nation-state. Though speaking to women, interestingly men 
made up the majority of readers of these articles.448 Speaking to a (largely) small upper-middle 
class male reading audience, al-ʿIrfān represented the normative discourse of a particular 
segment of Shiʿi society that placed the obligation of the family and the responsibilities for its 
success (and failure) on women. Despite this, this (small class) tier of Shiʿi society possessed 
social and political pull to be a mobilizing force for this group in the larger framework of 
Lebanese politics.449 Al-ʿIrfān projected middle-class perceptions on Shiʿi masculinity and 
                                                           
448 Ironically these articles were addressed to women while read largely by men. There is something interesting 
about men writing and reading articles purportedly aimed at educating women in their roles as they pertain to men. 
An argument can be made that women were to be educated by men. 
449 This minority group of the Lebanese Shiʿi community consisted of the ʿulamaʾ, scholars, and petite bourgeoisies 
who came to play an active role in the pan-Arabist movement and the political demands for Shiʿi rights in the 
nation-state. This aspect is discussed in more detail in Chapter one. For more on the political demands of Shiʿas 
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femininity as it related to familial life and the sect as a whole. Through the proliferation of 
articles on this subject, al-ʿIrfān represented the struggle over sectarian identification and 
inclusion in a newly defined nation-state. Notions of masculinity and femininity were 
constructed and reproduced in relation to one another. In many ways, femininity was defined 
through women’s contributions to men (as mothers and wives), whereas masculinity was defined 
through men’s contribution to the nation (while their roles as husbands and fathers was deemed 
negligible). In many ways, as Najmabadi argued, these prescriptions given to women were “at 
once a regulating and an empowering moment” as women were deemed the cornerstone of 
society, and thus bestowed with a greater role in it.450 However, with this more active role in the 
production of the nation-state came the need to discipline and regulate women in their mothering 
and spousal roles. Marriage and the possibility of divorce or bachelorhood represented anxiety 
over a contested space for Shiʿi sectarian and national formation, which Shiʿi women more so 
than men were deemed responsible for.451 
Although al-ʿIrfān presented a new middle-class perspective on the duties and 
obligations of men and women in marriage, the Jaʿfari shariʿa court records painted a more 
complicated picture of these duties and the understanding of gender roles in everyday Shiʿi life, 
which will be addressed in the next chapter. Whereas Al-ʿIrfān provided a subjective analysis of 
middle-class constructions of masculinity and femininity, records of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts in 
comparison presented a more nuanced record of the ways in which gendered roles were 
practiced. Despite the fact that the Shiʿi press attributed financial responsibility on men as the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
during the French Mandate see Chalabi, The Shiʿis of Jabal ʿAmil and the New Lebanon: Community and Nation 
State 1918–1943. 
 
450 Najmabadi, “Crafting an Educated Housewife in Iran,” 102.  
 
451 Kholoussy, For Better, For Worse, 11. 
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marker of masculinity, by examining the Ja’fari court records in conjunction to the press, we see 
multiple yet contradictory ways in which masculinity was defined and redefined in these two 
social mediums. By analyzing the press, we see a more convoluted and contradictory 


















Realities on the Ground: Negotiating Family through the Jaʿfari Shariʿa Courts 
 
Strategies adopted by litigants in the course of marital disputes give us insight 
into not only power relations in the family but how these relations are sustained or 
modified by the legal order.452 
 
Introduction 
Following the previous chapter on the articulation of gender roles in al-ʿIrfān, this 
chapter examines how marital disputes and gendered roles were contested within the institution 
of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts during the Mandate period. How did women and men perceive their 
rights and obligations in the space of the family, and what contestations were made based on 
such notions? How did the duties ascribed to men and women in the press compare to those 
endorsed in the courtroom, and vice versa? This chapter examines how Jaʿfari court records 
produced multiple, and at times, conflicting notions of masculinity and femininity, especially 
when compared to the depictions presented in al-ʿIrfān, as examined in the preceding chapter. 
The shariʿa courts negotiated ways in which Shiʿi men and women became modern citizens of a 
collective sectarian entity in the new Lebanese nation-state. For the most part, legal institutions, 
such as the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts, were a reflection of the social norms and practices of society. 
This chapter examines whether the proclamations and modifications proposed to women and 
                                                           




men in the press informed the concerns and perceptions of Shiʿi individuals as they negotiated 
terms of marriage and divorce in the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts. In order to undertake this project, the 
chapter analyzes various cases that deal with financial disputes (dowry and alimony), domicile 
accommodations, social grievances, notions of morality (deadbeat spouses and idle husbands), 
child custody, and medical (and bodily) concerns. Court records reveal ways in which gender 
roles were practiced and reproduced in the marital affairs of Shiʿi men and women in everyday 
occurrences, presenting different notions of familial normative behavior and gender roles. 
Parallel to the analyses of the preceding discussion, this chapter investigates whether and how 
notions of masculinity and femininity perpetuated in al-ʿIrfān reflected, and possibly affected, 
the everyday familial affairs and gender identities of Shiʿi individuals during this Mandate 
period as shown in court records. 
 
The Jaʿfari Shariʿa Courts and Its Bountiful Records 
Following the comprehensive discussion in Chapter two, Islamic law, although part of the 
“private” sphere, came to mediate and resolve the disputes of society (the public sphere) as an 
extension of the modern nation-state with the creation of the personal status legal system as an 
institution authorized and funded by the state. This ultimately converted the Muslim believer into 
a “good national citizen,” and in the case of Lebanon this citizenship emerged in a sectarian 
form.453 The authorization of Islamic law, as discussed in Chapter two, by the nation-state 
created new institutional discursive spaces whereby social and moral life was reordered in the 
                                                           
453 Wael Hallaq, Sharīʿa: Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 367. 
Chapter two analyzes how such categories of “citizenship” and “sectarian” identity became performative categories 
in the realm of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts as Shiʿi individuals produced and redefined what these identity formations 




domain of the family. New significance was given to the individual as a member of society and a 
citizen of the nation-state, which was rearticulated in the space of the family.454 Law, and 
particularly shariʿa law, in the modern sense became a flexible sociopolitical resource that 
regulated personal status matters linked to the temporal power of the nation-state.455 However, in 
the case of Lebanon this happened within the auspices of a highly sectarian national 
framework.456 
With the creation of the Lebanese modern nation-state and the establishment of Jaʿfari 
shariʿa courts, personal status law produced and reproduced a sectarian Shiʿi entity, as described 
in Chapter two. Additionally, the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts became a space in which social norms 
and practices concerning the family—in matters of marriage and divorce—were debated and 
produced. The family was rectified as a sectarian institution by the state with the establishment 
                                                           
454 Asad has written that “the family emerges as a category in law, in welfare administration, and in public 
moralizing discourse. The family is a unit of ‘society’ in which the individual is physically and morally reproduced 
and has his or her primary formation as a ‘private’ being.” In the case of Lebanon, the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts were 
first created by the French administration, molding Shiʿi families and individuals as sectarian national subjects. 
Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular, 227. 
 
455 Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on Trial:  Islamic Family Law in Iran and Morocco (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011), 
10–13. 
 
456 Hanan Kholoussy, among others, examines the sociopolitical dimensions of the marriage crisis in Egypt in the 
early twentieth century. See Hanan Kholoussy, For Better, For Worse: The Marriage Crisis That Made Modern 
Egypt (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010). For more on shariʿa courts, the nation, and family, see Iris 
Agmon, Family and Court: Legal Culture and Modernity in Late Ottoman Palestine (Syracuse: Syracuse University 
Press, 2006); Mounira Charrad, States and Women’s Rights: The Making of Postcolonial Tunisia, Algeria, and 
Morocco (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); Brinkley Messick, The Calligraphic State: Textual 
Domination and History in a Muslim Society (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993); 
Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on Trial:  Islamic Family Law in Iran and Morocco (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2011); 
Leslie Peirce, Morality Tales: Law and Gender in the Ottoman Court of Aintab (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1993); Ron Shaham, Family and the Courts in Modern Egypt (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
1997); Amira El-Azhary Sonbol, “Women, the Family, and Divorce Laws” in Islamic History, ed. by Amira El-
Azhary Sonbol (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1996); Judith Tucker, In the House of the Law: Gender and 
Islamic Law in Ottoman Syria and Palestine (California: University of California Press, 1998).  
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of distinct, yet separate personal status courts.457 In most instances, as Ziba Mir-Hosseini argues, 
shariʿa courts are used as a last resort to settle marital disputes since “. . . there is a great deal of 
stigma attached to brining to the courts matters which belong to the private domain of the 
family.”458 As Mir-Hosseini notes the courts provide three levels of reality regarding Muslim 
marriages: the sacred level of the Shariʿa; the legal level embodied in the modern legal codes and 
apparatus; and the existing practices adhered to by the individuals who come before the court.459 
It is in the last level that abundant insight is provided on the power relations in the family to 
understand how individuals strategize and modify their personal situations (and thus the legal 
body of shariʿa law) within a modern legal system to “uphold a model of family.”460 By adhering 
to this framework, my examination of the records of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts discloses how 
norms of honor and responsibility for Shiʿi men and women were debated and modified within 
the shariʿa courts.461 In many cases, the court informed women and men of their rights and what 
they are entitled to, thus producing knowledge about permissible shariʿa law and perceived 
familial obligations and duties. At the same time, we see how Shiʿas who came before the court 
negotiated, informed, and produced societal norms and gender practices. As a modern institution, 
                                                           
457 At the time of the creation of the Lebanese nation-state only four sectarian entities were recognized and 
authorized to establish personal status courts for their sect. Now there are four million Lebanese citizens, 18 
officially recognized religious sects, and 15 personal status law. 
 






461 The Jaʿfari shariʿa courts produced knowledge concerning legal codes as to what was permissible or not. The 
courts informed Shiʿas of what constituted legitimate rights as in one case between Riḍā and Shams in the Beirut 
Jaʿfari court whereby the court explained to Shams the difference between revocable and irrevocable divorce, and 
that her divorce was indeed revocable. The court records also represent the social practices and norms perceived by 
the individuals that came before it. Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt, Riḍā Ali vs. Shams, case 50, 




the court evolved into a space where it policed social boundaries and appropriate family norms, 
and thus became an authority on the production of modern Shiʿi families. 
 
On the Question of Finances and Obligation 
The most remarkable and unique attribute of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts was the diversity of 
Shiʿi individuals that appeared before them. These individuals ranged from different social, 
political, and economic classes from all across Lebanon.462 In the case of Lebanon, shariʿa courts 
were the only medium by which familial matters could be addressed as civil courts did not—and 
still do not—exist.463 As discussed in Chapter two, all familial matters, such as marriages, 
divorces, inheritance, child custody, and alimony cases, had to be presented before the personal 
status court that adhered to the individual’s sectarian identification or inherited paternal kinship 
blood line.464 As the only legitimate legal authority on such matters, Shiʿi men and women of all 
classes appeared before the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts to debate familial norms and obligations within 
the auspices of the courts. In this sense, the Jaʿfari courts policed normative familial behavior 
                                                           
462 In my examination of the records, I found details of prominent families coming before the court, disclosing the 
most intimate details of their private lives. There was a wide range of requests, ranging from large sums of money to 
pay off nafaqa to nafaqa that was measured in pots, pans, and blankets. The status of a family’s wealth and social 
class was evident in the value of mahr and/or nafaqa offered, which ranged from Syrian liras to Ottoman liras to 
gold. This was most evident in the higher appellate court in Beirut, which heard cases from all across Lebanon that 
could not be resolved in the lower Jaʿfari courts. 
 
463 Various efforts have been made to try and implement civil marriage courts but to no avail. The al-Hayʿa al 
ʿĀmma Li-Maḥkamat al Tamyīz was created as the highest civil court in Lebanon to arbitrate disputes between 
personal status courts (over various dominations) and/or civil courts in Lebanon when more than one court rules on 
a case. 
 
464 See Chapter two. Lebanese citizenship could only be transmitted by the father to his children under this sectarian 
guise. Once a child is born in Lebanon, they must be legally registered by the father. A Lebanese woman married to 
a non-Lebanese man cannot pass on citizenship to her children even if the child is born in Lebanon to a Lebanese 
mother. Marriages had to be administered and registered in one of the four recognized personal status courts as no 
civil courts or marriage registry offices existed. Now, there are 18 recognized sects administered within their own 




informed both by court officials and by the individuals who came before the courts with 
perceived rights and demands. 
The vast majority of cases brought to the Jaʿfari courts were women who came to petition 
for their unpaid mahr (dowry), nafaqa (alimony), or spousal support. Many cases were 
financially driven, such as a case brought before the Tyre court by Zamzam, who demanded the 
inheritance (irth) withheld from her by her in-laws following her husband’s death after one 
month of marriage.465 In many ways, the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts were a place that monetary 
expectations, exchanges, and disputes were tackled as these related to familial and marital 
matters. Unlike the Shiʿi journal, al-ʿIrfān, which designated gender roles when it came to 
finances without delving into the intricacies of what their designation meant, the Jaʿfari shariʿa 
courts presented a more nuanced and detailed understanding of how these roles transpired in the 
everyday lives of Shiʿi families and relationships. The issue of monetary obligation was one of 
the most prominent disputes encountered in the Jaʿfari courts, and a way in which gender roles 
were informed and socially constructed. 
 
Mahr 
In most cases, Shiʿi women appeared before the court requesting their mahr after 
marriages had been consummated with the hopes that the court would intervene in their personal 
lives to force their spouses to fulfill their marital obligations.466 In cases relating to mahr, a 
                                                           
465 Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Ṣūr, Zamzam vs Al-Ḥajj Muṣṭafa, case 35, no. 25 (1935). 
 
466 Most of the cases that appeared in the Beirut, Sidon, Baalbek, and Tyre Jaʿfari shariʿa courts were requests made 
for dowry both pre-marriage dowry and post-marriage dowry. Many cases appeared, involving the dispute over 
dowry after the consummation of the marriage. The following are examples of such cases; Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya 
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woman was almost always granted the proposed amount unless witnesses could be brought in to 
prove that what was claimed was incorrect. Mahr, according to Islamic jurisprudence, is the 
agreed amount between a man and a woman, usually represented by her wali (legal guardian) 
and/or wakīl (legal representative), in the making of the marriage contract.467 According to Islam, 
a woman is entitled to request her desired amount along with any marital preconditions at the 
time of the marriage agreement. Mahr (as is still the case today) was comprised of two 
components. There was the al-mahr al-muqaddam (the advanced dowry) presented at the time of 
the marriage performance before the shaykh and/or witnesses, and the al-mahr al-muʾakhkhar 
(the deferred dowry) to be given after the marriage had been consummated within an agreed 
upon time period. For example, a typical al-mahr al-muʾakhkhar in the 1930s would be 50 
Syrian liras to be paid during a span of 10 years. Requests for the muʾakhkhar portion of the 
marital contract were not always made. However, the al-mahr al-muqaddam almost always 
comprised the marriage agreement.468 The designated mahr, both pre- and post-marriage, was to 
be used exclusively by the woman in any way she desired. The mahr was her sole property, and 
thus she was not obligated to share it with her husband or family members, or utilize it to cover 
her daily living expenses for which her husband was responsible.  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
al-jaʿfariyya fī Ṣūr, Fatima Ibrahim vs. Hajj Ahmad Aziz al-Dīn (November 24, 1938); Sulaymān vs. Al-Sayyid 
Minar, case 19 (1934); and Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt, Fadila vs. Muhammad, case 12, no. 
125 (January 16, 1939). 
 
467 A girl was to be represented by a wali if she was underage, and thus needed a legal guardian to represent her. The 
wakīl, on the other hand, was a legal representative who represented women and men before the judge. With the 
institutionalization and formalization of shariʿa courts the wakīl became a staple of the court system with legal and 
professional training.  
 
468 In many cases, no mahr was requested either by the woman or her parents. In general, the mahr was requested by 
the girl’s family, particularly since the girl was usually underage and needed the consent of a guardian or wakīl to 




In the records of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts, the issue of mahr was frequently brought up. 
In the cases initiated by Shiʿi men, it was common for men to verify before the court that the 
mahr was paid off. Many cases of this sort appeared in records during the early years of the 
courts.469 Marriages that took place years before the establishment of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts 
(and had taken place in Hanafi shariʿa courts under the Ottoman Empire) appeared before the 
Jaʿfari courts as a means to verify the payment of past mahr. This act of verifying a marriage 
served as a way to document and legally record the monetary transaction before the authority of 
the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts. As noted in Chapter two, prior to the establishment of the courts by the 
French and the newly crafted Lebanese nation-state, the notion of legally recording and 
documenting hand-written affidavits of personal status matters were not available, and hence this 
was a by-product of modernization and secularization of the nation-state.470 The vast majority of 
mahr cases were propelled by Shiʿi women demanding their unpaid mahr. The courts usually 
favored women’s claims over this matter, and ruled that a husband must pay the contractual 
amount, which may have been expressed verbally before witnesses or documented in writing 
before the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts.471 Even if a Shiʿi husband was unable to pay the allotted mahr 
amount, the newly established Jaʿfari shariʿa courts, as the beholder of the tenets of Shiʿi Islam, 
                                                           
469 This appeared in many cases during the advent of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts. For example, see the following cases 
at al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt, Muhammad vs. Fatima, case 38, no. 97 (November 11, 1937); 
Naʿīm vs. Mariam,( November 12, 1937); Muhammad vs. Zeinab, case 132, no. 127 (March 20, 1939); ʿAbd Amīn 
vs. Fatima, case 173, no. 172 (July 5, 1939). The cases with specific numbers are due to the more detailed quality of 
the court record and clarity of the writing, which made it easier to decipher. 
 
470 This argument is made by many scholars, such as Talal Asad, Brinkley Messick, and Wael Hallaq, in their 
analysis of shariʿa law and the modern nation-state. See Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular; Brinkley Messick, 
The Calligraphic State: Textual Domination and History in a Muslim Society (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1993); and Wael Hallaq, Sharīʿa: Theory, Practice, Transformations. Refer to Chapter two. 
 
471 In the thousands of cases I examined, the issue of mahr was generally not debatable and affirmed by the husband, 
and subsequently the court. If debate over the matter occurred, it was typically surrounding the items given to the 
woman as a form of mahr, such as jewelry, furniture, household things, etc. Disputes were over what entailed 




enforced the mahr requirement and insisted on Shiʿi men to uphold the mahr agreed upon in the 
contractual marriage.472 This is not to say that mahr requirements were not adhered to before the 
establishment of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts, but rather that this was the first time that an 
institutional body funded by the state became the repository of these matters.473 Consequently, 
the courts required Shiʿi men to uphold and sustain their financial obligations to their spouses 
whether or not they could offer it. Although it was unclear if the mahr was always received, on 
many occasions the same cases of women would reappear in the court records reasserting their 
claims. Mahr was enforced in the contours of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts before family and 
community members.   
In one such case, Jamila claimed that her husband, ʿAli owed her four Ottoman gold liras 
for her mahr, which he had refused to pay.474 In his testimony, ʿAli claimed that he owed her the 
stated amount, but that he could not pay her at the time, promising to pay as soon as he could. 
The Jaʿfari shariʿa court of Tyre ordered ʿAli to pay her the mahr amount promptly even if it 
meant he pay her the equivalent of four gold liras in Syrian/Lebanese currency.475 ʿAli agreed to 
                                                           
472 Even when man claimed he could not pay, a legal arrangement was made between the representatives or his 
family members to make sure the woman received her designated mahr. Cases of this sort will be discussed below. 
 
473 Prior to the courts, these matters would be discussed communally among the parties whereby family members, 
community leaders, and local shaykhs would interfere to resolve such marital issues. Muḥsin al-Amīn, Khiṭat Jabal 
ʿAmil (Beirut: Maṭbaʿat al-inṣāf, 1961), 111–12.  
 
474 Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Ṣūr, Jamila vs. ʿAli, case 62, no. 71 (April 30, 1935). 
 
475 The issue of currency during this time period was a common problem revealing the historical and financial 
changes taking place at the time. In many cases, the original mahr was defined in Ottoman gold currency; however, 
in court cases this was converted to the Syrian/Lebanese lira. This indicated the change in governmental authority 
from the Ottoman Empire to newly crafted nation-states ordered by the European powers after World War I whereby 
new currency was sanctioned. It also reflected the financial difficultly adhered to during the post-war period and 
impact of the Great Depression on this region as agricultural production and manufacturing industry suffered 
extensively in the Middle East region. This period also saw the devaluation of foreign currency, and thus of the 
Lebanese lira, which might explain why mahr amounts were being renegotiated from Turkish gold liras to 
Syrian/Lebanese liras. For more on this see Charles Issawi, ed., The Economic History of the Middle East, 1800–
1914 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), 94–106; and Roger Owen, Cotton and Egyptian Economy 
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this, and the case was adjourned. When it came to the issue of mahr, the acknowledged amount 
was always granted to the woman even when the husband claimed he could not afford it. 
According to Islamic jurisprudence, mahr was the sole property of women and the financial duty 
of men to uphold. In a similar case initiated by Raḥima against her husband Khalīl, she claimed 
that her mahr of 20 Ottoman liras had not been given to her. In his testimony, Khalīl apologized 
for this and declared his inability to pay the amount at that time, vowing to pay within five years. 
Raḥima agreed to these terms and the case was closed.476 Under the circumstances, Raḥima had 
to agree to these conditions for the terms of the marriage contract to be altered or changed. 
Nevertheless, Khalīl, like ʿAli in the previous case, was unable to avoid his financial obligation 
imposed by the marriage contract, and the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts became a means to ensure a 
husband’s marital obligation. It was rare for the mahr to be reduced in value despite a husband 
complaining of his inability to fulfill his financial duty. Many cases of this nature appeared 
before the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts. Women for the most part mobilized the courts to guarantee and 
make certain that their marital rights were upheld while forcing Shiʿi men to sustain their end of 
the bargain. In many ways, this reasserted Shiʿi men’s financial obligations and responsibilities 
while the courts by provocation of Shiʿi women defined masculine normative behavior. This 
masculinity was defined by men’s economic accountability to the woman and the household. 
This element was only enhanced with matters concerns nafaqa. 
 
Nafaqa 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
1820–1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969) and The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800–1914 
(London: Methuen, 1981). 
 
476 Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt, Raḥima vs. Khalīl, case 2 (January 5, 1937). This case had 




The question of nafaqa, on the other hand, was more complicated and determined case by 
case. The most common cases came from women who claimed their spouses were not providing 
them with any or enough financial support to cover their daily living expenses. Shariʿa law is 
built on “the assumption of a man’s ability to be the sole provider.”477 Men’s marital and 
parental roles are defined by their financial obligations. According to Islamic jurisprudence, a 
husband must provide his wife with all the necessary living requirements and maintenance 
expenses to meet her everyday needs and standard of living.478 Even after divorce or during a 
period of marital separation, a husband was obliged to meet the expenses of his wife and children 
according to what they were accustomed to, unless he could affirmatively prove it was outside 
his financial means. However, as long as a woman could justify her declared amount for alimony 
or provide witnesses who could testify to her husband’s financial situation if he protested, the 
court in almost all cases ruled in the woman’s favor. If the husband repeatedly protested the 
allotted nafaqa amount, court experts or appraisers were sent to try and determine what was 
within the husband’s financial reach. This aspect of sending court experts to investigate the 
financial circumstances of Shiʿi men was another by-product of the establishment of the Jaʿfari 
court system that inadvertently took part in socially constructing and policing moral codes and 
gender roles.479 One of its side effects was defining the monetary obligations that Shiʿi husbands 
would have to meet. In one such case, Jamila brought a suit against her husband Hassan who 
married her for 12 months for a mahr of 40 Ottoman liras along with nafaqa.480 In her testimony, 
                                                           
477 Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on Trial, 193.  
 
478 Many cases of this sort appeared. One such case was Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt, Ameena 
vs. Muhammad, case 121, no. 155 (March 10, 1939). 
 
479 Refer to Chapter two for more on court inspectors. 
 




she claimed that he did not pay her any portion of the designated amount, and demanded that the 
court subpoena him. In his defense, Hassan claimed that he had yet to have sex with Jamila, 
since she had continuously denied him, and so she was not entitled to nafaqa. He also countered 
her mahr claim, noting that they had agreed upon 10 Ottoman liras in cash, with a blanket, 
mattress, and two cows worth 30 Ottoman liras.481 Jamila refuted this claim and demanded that 
he pay her 40 Ottoman liras, and only then would she reside with him as his wife. In the 
following court session, both parties brought legal experts to determine the appropriate nafaqa. 
Jamila’s representative deemed an amount of 300 Syrian qirsh (piaster) a month was enough to 
cover her expenses while Hassan’s legal expert determined that three-fourths of a lira was all he 
could pay after investigating his financial condition.482 On the final day of the proceedings, 
Hassan admitted that he owed her the 40 Ottoman liras in mahr, while the court ruled that he 
must pay Jamila a nafaqa of 250 Syrian qirsh with the option for her to borrow more from 
Hassan if needed. Both parties agreed on this and the court adjourned.  
In this case, as in many other cases involving nafaqa, the debate over what was an 
appropriate amount and/or what a woman was entitled to was continuously questioned. In 
Jamila’s case, which dealt with the issues of mahr and nafaqa, the nafaqa was contested by both 
parties with the court finally ruling to allot her an amount closer to her demands with the 
possibility of requesting more if she needed to. Thus, the question of nafaqa in the Jaʿfari shariʿa 
courts frequently determined marital relationships and presumed duties of Shiʿi men toward 
Shiʿi women. What appears surprising from these court cases was the frequency and 
                                                           
481 In the many cases during this period, items of clothing and furniture were given as a form of mahr payment as 
opposed to money. 
 
482 This is an example of the discrepancy in currency value and devaluation of the Syrian/Lebanese currency that 
emerged during this period as noted previously. 
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acceptability of Shiʿi women making such financial demands or even requesting their nafaqa to 
be increased without much hesitation by the courts. In this regard, this was contrary to the 
depictions made in al-ʿIrfān. Whereas al-ʿIrfān blamed women for the pecuniary burden they 
placed on men, something that was often attributed to their excessive spending, the Jaʿfari 
shariʿa courts asserted and defined women’s financial claims, and Shiʿi men’s roles and 
obligations to Shiʿi women and children, particularly when it came to expenditures. Even when 
women demanded increased expenditures, the Jaʿfari courts attempted to meet these needs by 
imposing it on Shiʿi husbands. The Jaʿfari shariʿa courts indirectly became a way to police and 
reconstruct Shiʿi manhood, negotiating norms and perceptions of Shiʿi masculinity and men 
becoming fiscal guardians. 
In many cases surrounding the issue of nafaqa, Shiʿi women were brought to court for 
leaving their homes, and thus the authority of their husbands. For the most part, this was a way 
for women to negotiate or renegotiate their alimony or living situation within the confines of the 
shariʿa courts. Women performed an “unacceptable” action that caused men to take them to 
court, which then afforded them the opportunity to renegotiate terms of the marriage contract. In 
one such complex case, Fāyiz came before the Tyre court to appeal a previous court ruling made 
on October 9, 1933, which instructed him to pay Yumna a nafaqa of 12 Syrian liras a month. In 
his appeal, he claimed that “the decision was unfair to his rights and inconsiderate to his 
financial ability.”483 In his testimony, Fāyiz attested that he had not divorced Yumna—as she had 
claimed—but rather that she had left his house without his permission while he was away.484 He 
                                                           
483 Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Ṣūr, Fāyiz vs. Yumna, case 51, no. 184 (October 9, 1933). 
484 This case was long and complicated. Fāyiz claimed that he brought about a case against Yumna for leaving his 
home prior to her demand, yet the court encompassed both cases together while giving her case priority. He also 
disputed the judge in the last court case, claiming that he was Yumna’s father’s brother-in-law making him 
ineligible to rule on this matter due to conflict of interest. Fāyīz also disputed the witnesses Yumna provided as 
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also argued that the experts or appraisers who determined the appropriate nafaqa amount 
miscalculated, and were not aware of his financial situation and existing debt.485 Based on the 
reasons stated, he requested that the Tyre court overturn its decision taken in his absence, and 
rule against Yumna for her estrangement and defiance. In addition to this, Fāyiz also demanded 
that Yumna pay him for his losses and his accumulated legal fees since the date of the first court 
ruling.486 In the court proceedings it was ruled that Fāyiz could not prove that Yumna left 
without permission or defied him, and thus the issue became a matter of nafaqa, focusing on his 
financial means. Fāyiz and his legal representative adamantly argued that the appraisers 
miscalculated and he could not afford the expenses allotted to Yumna as it exceeded his salary. 
Yumna’s representative argued that Fāyiz made an income of 40 Syrian liras while his father 
also supported him and sent him an additional 100 Syrian liras. After much interrogation, the 
Tyre Jaʿfari shariʿa court upheld its previous ruling that Fāyiz pay Yumna the specified nafaqa 
since he was unable to prove his claims. Despite Fāyiz’s attempt to dispense his obligation to pay 
nafaqa by first insisting that Yumna left on her own accord, which would inhibit her from 
receiving nafaqa, and then later by claiming his salary did not allow him to pay the allocated 
nafaqa, he was unable to forsake his spousal financial duty. The Tyre Jaʿfari shariʿa court upheld 
Yumna’s request without questioning if she was petitioning for too much or whether her nafaqa 
demand exceeded her everyday needs, but rather determined its ruling based on whether or not 
Fayīz could afford the exigency. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
testimonies based on hear-say and not legitimate. Fāyiz presented a 10-point rebuttable to the previous ruling during 
this trial.   
 






Despite articulations made in the press against women’s spending and financial burden 
on spouses, the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts did not condemn women for their monetary requests, but 
for the most part supported their claims and even informed them what they were entitled to. The 
courts usually endorsed women’s claims, and sent legal financial experts when they were 
contested. Even when men were unable to uphold their role as financial provider, the Jaʿfari 
shariʿa courts, served as a space to “bridge the gap between law and social practice.”487 By 
undertaking such efforts, the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts, through the efforts of these women, 
negotiated the perimeters of masculine obligations to Shiʿi women, specifically when it came to 
the issue of capital. In one case of this sort, a woman named Fatima was instructed by the court 
that she was entitled to request alimony from her husband even though it was her husband who 
had brought her to court for leaving their home and his authority.488 As has been previously 
shown, the courts produced a body of knowledge of normative actions and behavior even when 
the litigants were unaware of these rights. In my examination of the various Jaʿfari shariʿa court 
records, Shiʿi women were largely aware of these rights and how to utilize the courts to attain 
them. In almost all cases examined, the woman was allotted the mahr and nafaqa she demanded 
even when her husband protested his ability to provide it.  
Whereas in al-ʿIrfān the specifics of a husband’s financial obligations were not given, 
and only the woman was condemned for her spending, the Jaʿfari shariʿa court became the space 
where such spousal monetary duties were defined and regulated, both by the women who came 
before it and by the court that authorized it. Al-ʿIrfān saw financial demands by women as a 
                                                           
487 Mir-Hosseini, Marriage on Trial, 129.  
 
488 She had left the house because her husband was hitting her and had not paid her dowry. Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya 




threat to the stability of the home and thus the nation. Although al-ʿIrfān depicted women as 
extravagant spenders and constantly warned to curb the financial pressures they placed on their 
spouses, Jaʿfari records presented a significantly different picture in this regard.489 For the Jaʿfari 
shariʿa courts, the husband’s role and fatherly duties were asserted, defined, and articulated in 
monetary terms. The court and the women who came before it defined Shiʿi manhood by their 
ability or inability to support their family. In almost all the cases examined, the woman was 
granted alimony, and her alimony was usually increased or her living situation was rearranged to 
suit her needs.490 In one particular case, Fatima took her father, ʿAbd Ahmad, to court claiming 
that she was a poor woman and unable to support herself while her father had substantial wealth 
to assist her.491 During the case, she recounted the surmountable wealth her father had, and his 
ability to support her. In its final ruling, the court granted her request. Fatima was able to bring 
her father to court to sustain her own maintenance expenses, and have the court legally sanction 
this action. It became an institutional space where such monetary demands were constructed and 
where Shiʿi men were instructed on how to uphold them. Although these matters of mahr and 
nafaqa are common to all shariʿa courts, the novelty in the Shiʿi case was the nonexistence of an 
institutional state sponsored body prior to the Jaʿfari courts where such definitions were 
documented and disseminated. Although al-ʿIrfān propagated the image of Shiʿi fathers as 
financial providers for Shiʿi women and children, the happenings of the Ja’fari shariʿa courts 
redefined and renegotiated such middle-class perceptions—that seemed to condemn excessive 
spending—in the everyday lives and realities of ordinary Shiʿi individuals. More importantly, it 
                                                           
489 See Chapter three on an extensive analysis of al-ʿIrfān. 
 
490 In the very few cases that I examined, the woman was denied alimony if she had remarried. 
 
491 Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt, Fatima vs. ʿAbd Ahmad, case 78, no. 107 (March 30, 1939). 
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was Shiʿi women who sanctioned the courts on these monetary grounds to define Shiʿi men’s 
roles as husbands and fathers. Through their usage of the courts, women constructed and 
redefined the meaning of husbandry and manhood, which in some ways antagonized the gender 
roles perpetuated in al-ʿIrfān.   
One case in particular interrogated the notion of Shiʿi men as financial providers and 
challenged these designated gender roles.492 Ibrahim brought about an appeal case to the Tyre 
Jaʿfari court which had ruled that he and his brother were obligated to pay a monthly nafaqa of 
75 Syrian piasters to their sister, ʿAfīfa.493 In this appeal, he asserted that she was no longer 
entitled to receive money from her brothers as she was now capable of providing for herself. 
Ibrahim claimed that ʿAfifa had agreed to be hired by Dr. Salim as a housemaid. Ibrahim 
requested from the court to terminate the expense obligation placed on him and his brother. In its 
ruling, the court upheld his request and released him from this financial obligation.494 In this 
case, the court recognized the financial capability of ʿAfifa as claimed by her brothers, making 
her financially independent and their equal in financial terms. Ibrahim in this case was able to 
redefine the terms of his fiscal duties and societal perceptions of what his role as a brother and a 
patriarchal figurehead. Although this can be read as a way for Ibrahim to release himself of the 
financial burden of supporting his sister, this can also be interpreted as an authorization and 
transfer of financial power and legitimacy to ʿAfifa, a woman rather than the prototypical male 
figure presumed to hold this responsibility. The court regarded her as a financially capable and 
independent woman, who no longer needed the assistance of her male siblings. This case in 
                                                           
492 Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Ṣūr, Ibrahim vs. ʿAfifa, case 60, no 52 (May 1, 1935). 
493 The history of this case is not provided, so that why nafaqa was granted to her in the first place can be 
determined.  
 
494 Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Ṣūr, Ibrahim vs. ʿAfifa, case 60, no. 52 (March 1, 1935). 
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particular put into question the notion of Shiʿi men and their masculinity as defined by monetary 
terms and their ability to financially support Shiʿi women like ʿAfifa. Even though shariʿa law 
assumes the financial provider role of men, this case revealed that the social realities were not 
always as such. Although this case was not typical, it was not treated with any aversion and was 
quickly ruled on. This arguably highlights the courts’ willingness and society’s acceptance of 
working women to financially support themselves and live independently.  
Both Shiʿi men and women came before the court because they held certain perceptions 
of their rights and duties in marriage. The court defined and maintained the marital duties of 
husbands and wives as it actively policed the everyday lives of Lebanese Shiʿas. The court ruled 
husbands must provide a certain standard of living and fulfill their perceived obligation as 
spouses and fathers while Shiʿi women utilized the authority of the court if their living 
arrangements were unsuitable to their perceived standards. The court regularly sent home 
inspectors and financial appraisers to determine the appropriateness and quality of living, as will 
be discussed in the following section. The court intervened both directly and indirectly in the 
lives of Lebanese Shiʿa in producing and demarcating appropriate roles and behaviors for Shiʿi 
men and women. In some cases as seen above, the court informed women and men of their rights 
and what they may be entitled to, thus producing knowledge about perceived social obligations 
and duties. In this way, while ordinary Shiʿi men and women participated in the fashioning of 
sectarian norms and everyday notions of masculinity and femininity, the courts informed and 
negotiated the practices of men and women in conjugal affairs. What can be seen in these cases 
is the negotiation process of these practices that came to regulate what was normative in society 
in the disciplinary apparatus of the courts and the confines of the home. The issue of financial 
obligation and spending entered most Shiʿi marital disputes, thereby facilitating the court’s 
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regulation of the appropriate kind of living arrangements and family structure for Lebanese 
Shiʿas.  
 
What’s an “Appropriate” Shiʿi Home? 
As previously discussed, most women disputed their financial situation and living 
accommodations before the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts in the hopes of altering or enhancing their daily 
lives. In many cases, the suitability of a particular living arrangement was questioned and 
disputed by Shiʿi women who did not feel theirs was an “appropriate” or “lawful” enough 
dwelling. The court came to determine what constituted a suitable home in accordance with the 
court’s standards and societal perceptions. Women who continuously came before the court to 
demand a suitable dwelling held certain perceptions of their husbands’ duties in marriage, which 
they believed the court would uphold.     
On January 17, 1938, Mariam came before the Beirut Jaʿfari shariʿa court proclaiming 
that her husband, ʿAbd al-Husayn, expelled her out of his house without providing her with any 
alimony. Her husband asserted that he was willing to provide her with a suitable house and all 
her living expenses, even though he believed she had left the house on her own accord. A court 
inspector was later ordered to visit the house to determine if it was a suitable and lawful living 
arrangement for Mariam. According to the inspector record, the court determined that the place 
was an acceptable dwelling, but was lacking in food. In order to confirm that ʿAbd al-Husayn 
would buy food for the proposed dwelling, the court inspector spoke to the local grocer to 
inquire if ʿAbd al-Husayn was a regular customer and purchased fruits and goods from him. 
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Once this was confirmed, the judge ruled that this was indeed a lawful home consisting of all 
necessary needs, and thus an appropriate form of alimony.495   
In the court records, the Arabic word often used was ṣāliḥ, meaning appropriate, lawful, 
or pious. I prefer to translate the word ṣāliḥ as appropriate or lawful, because its usage carried 
both social and “religiously” driven connotations when describing the examined dwellings.496 In 
many instances, a court inspector was sent to investigate whether the house was ṣāliḥ, and in 
these examinations the house would be considered as ṣāliḥ (proper) or ghair ṣāliḥ sharʿan (not 
religiously legitimate). The term sharʿan implied authoritative legitimacy, but one that entailed a 
legal vindication sanctioned by the Islamic authority of the shariʿa courts. The word sharʿan is 
derived from the word sh-r-ʿ, meaning to enact as it pertains to Islamic law. The word carried 
with it a heightened religious implication when utilized and authorized by the shariʿa courts, 
which became the authorizing body on Shiʿi law as it pertained to Lebanese citizens of that sect. 
However, there was another socioeconomic dimension to the term as used in the courts. The term 
sharʿan carried with it social acceptability; one enforced by the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts as an 
institution of religion, but more importantly governed by the issue of class. What was deemed 
appropriate or lawful enough for one woman was not also the case for another. The term was 
based on what was socially acceptable to an individual woman, what she was used to, and what 
her husband could afford. These elements governed what the term ṣāliḥ meant, making it specific 
                                                           
495 This case does not end here. It reappears with Mariam complaining about her living situation, again claiming it is 
not suitable, particularly since ʿAbd al-Husayn married another woman. After much debate, she is given a house to 
her liking and removed from the second wife. These types of cases appeared before the court quite frequently. For 
some of these types of cases see Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt, Mariam vs. ʿAbd al-Husayn, case 
197, no. 117 (January 17, 1938). The court regularly sent home inspectors to determine if the house was indeed 
“lawful.” Such cases include Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt, Muhammed vs. Sikina, case 153 
(May 1, 1939); and Hassan ʿAli vs. Ahmad Hassan, case 335 (June 28, 1939). 
 
496 My understanding of religion is guided by the work of Talal Asad, in that the understanding and notion of the 
religious cannot be disconnected from that of the secular. This understanding was reflected in Chapter two when 




to the particular situation at hand. Despite the variability of the term, the meaning of ṣāliḥ was 
negotiated in the boundaries of the shariʿa court and defined (and redefined) by the court 
officials and the individuals that came before the court who sought to debate this term. What was 
deemed a lawful adobe in the case of Mariam may not have been one for any other Shiʿi woman. 
In another case, similar in nature, a suit was brought about by Fahmīyya against her 
husband, Farīd, on February 15, 1938.497 In her argument, Fahmīyya claimed that they had been 
married for 10 years, but since she could not have children, he married another woman and 
brought her to reside in the same house. For this reason, she left the house and requested alimony 
and a suitable living arrangement “according to her standards.”498 Farīd confirmed Fahmīyya’s 
testimony and asserted that he would provide her with a proper dwelling in Baalbek, and meet 
the nafaqa she was accustomed to. Despite this promise, Fahmīyya demanded that the court 
examine the home first. Upon this request, a court inspector from the Baalbek court was sent to 
the proposed abode, and his report was relayed back to the Beirut court. Based on the inspector’s 
review, he deemed the house “very repulsive” and not livable in the condition it was in. He 
continued to note that the house did not even have any supplies or food.499 Fahmīyya’s legal 
representative expounded on this description by noting that this proposed residence was ghair 
ṣāliḥ sharʿan both on the grounds of its appearance and for health reasons. At the conclusion of 
                                                           
497 Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt, Fahmīyya vs. Farīd, case 79 (February 15, 1938).  
 
498 The Arabic word used here is amthalaha literally meaning to her liken.  
 
499 Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt, Fahmīyya vs. Farīd, case 79 (February 15, 1938). He was very 





the trial, Farīd offered to provide her with an appropriate home and 15 Syrian piasters daily, 
which Fahmīyya consented to.500  
The court regularly sent home inspectors to determine the appropriateness and quality of 
living circumstances, hereby policing the marital obligations of Shiʿi men to Shiʿi women. The 
court forced husbands to provide a certain standard of living and fulfill their perceived obligation 
as spouses and fathers while Shiʿi women ushered the authority of the court if their living 
arrangements were unsuitable to their perceived standards. The court came to determine what a 
lawful house was according to the court’s standards and societal perceptions. The term ṣāliḥ was 
both socially constructed and case-specific, as seen in the various usages of the term. As in the 
case of Fahmīyya, the terms of what constituted an “appropriate” home were debated both in 
regard to what she deemed acceptable as it related to her customary living arrangements and to 
her husband’s financial means. Women who came before the court demanding a suitable 
dwelling held certain perceptions of their husbands’ duties in marriage, which they believed the 
court would uphold—and they usually did. Although al-ʿIrfān portrayed the image of Shiʿi 
fathers as financial providers for Shiʿi women and children, nowhere in its depiction did it 
describe what this meant or entailed.501 Whereas al-ʿIrfān suggested the financially demanding 
women be chastised, the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts hardly ever reprimanded women for making 
increased requests for alimony or improvements in their living arrangement. On the contrary, the 
court supported and at times even informed women of their rights. The Jaʿfari shariʿa courts, in 
                                                           
500 Ibid. The agreement between Farīd and Fahmīyya is slightly more complicated. She agreed that she would live 
with him in the same home if he remained in the city of Ḥadāth in the area of Baalbek. However, if he decided to 
live in the neighborhood of Barj al-Barājina in the city of Beirut, she would want a separate house. Fahmīyya made 
specific requests about her living arrangement, which interestingly had to do more with the city and locale rather 
than type of accommodation she would be living in.  
 




many ways, became the arena where these elements of marital life were negotiated and 
redefined. 
  
An Appropriate Home Is a Nuclear Home 
As these cases show, women were brought to court for leaving their homes, and thus the 
authority of their husbands.502 The Jaʿfari shariʿa courts tried to maintain lawful Shiʿi homes and 
resolve familial unrest. During the Mandate period, there were new demands made by some 
women on their living arrangements. In many cases, Shiʿi women made requests for homes 
removed from extended family members. Although it is not clear when these demands became 
socially acceptable, their increasing presence and tolerance in the courts indicated a shift in the 
structure of modern family living.503 However, many changes came about with the Ottoman Law 
of Family Rights of 1917, which was inspired by the French Civil Codes, and continues to be the 
Muslim denominational law of Lebanon.504 According to Wael Hallaq, this brought about the 
“reduction of matrimonial relationships” from interactions within an extended family unit to 
“companionate marriage” that envisioned the woman as housewife and the husband as head of 
the family; something which was not present in fiqh.505 The notion of family, according to fiqh, 
entitled a “legal house” based on kinship where no legal head was designated, and each member 
                                                           
502 Many cases of this sort appeared before the court. In almost all cases, the woman left her home, because she was 
dissatisfied with the alimony or her living arrangements she was given.  
 
503 In my analysis of al-ʿIrfān, there appears to be no clear representation and shift in the depictions of normative 
family structure. 
 
504 In the case of Lebanon, this brought about the codification of a singular “Jaʿfari” shariʿa law “devoid of plurality 
and multiple juristic nuances and variations that the fiqh had afforded.” Hallaq Sharīʿa: Theory, Practice, 
Transformations, 454. 
 




had their delegated duties.506 The codification of family law coupled by new notions of 
individualism, and the impact of capitalism and its modes of production bolstered the nuclear 
family as the legal structure of choice. The family, as discussed in Chapter three, became 
important to the progress of the nation and national identity brought about by a burgeoning Shiʿi 
middle-class rooted that designated to women the role of nurturing future national citizens.507 As 
in eighteenth-century Europe, the issue of family structure, childrearing, and motherhood became 
pertinent to the modernizing project of the nation-state.508 In the context of colonialism, the Arab 
world, and postcolonial world as a whole, focused on women and their motherly role in the 
construction of national identity and formation of the nation-state.509 Omina Shakry has shown 
how the emphasis on women in the national project in Egypt was directed by both colonial and 
anti-colonial perceptions of the nation-state which affected the notion of mothers, both within 
                                                           
506 Ibid., 456. 
 
507 Hallaq Sharīʿa: Theory, Practice, Transformations, 452; and Lila Abu-Lughod, Remaking Women: Feminism 
and Modernity in the Middle East (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998). Refer to Chapter three for more 
on this. 
 
508 For more on what took place in Europe in this regard, see Anna Davin, “Imperialism and Motherhood,” History 
Workshop 5 (1978): 9–65; Ute Frevert, “The Civilizing Tendency of Hygiene: Working-Class Women under 
Medical Control in Imperial Germany,” in German Women in the Nineteenth Century: A Social History, ed. John 
Fout (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1984), 320–44; Anita Levy, Other Women: the Writing of Class, Race, and 
Gender, 1832–1898 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Class 
and Gender in the Colonial Contest (New York and London: Routledge, 1995); and Ann Stoler, Race and the 
Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things (Durham, N.C.: Duke 
University Press, 1995). 
509 In the eighteenth century, childrearing became important as the family emerged as a “localized pedagogical 
apparatus” in the modernizing process as Foucault has argued. By the nineteenth century, the focus in Europe was 
geared toward working class women and their proper motherly duties. Omina Shakry, “Schooled Mothers and 
Structured Play: Child Rearing in Turn-of-the-Century Egypt,” in Remaking Women: Feminism and Modernity in 
the Middle East, ed. Lila Abu-Lughod (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), 136–37; and Michel Foucault, 
“The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century,” Power/knowledge: Selected Interviews 1972–1977, trans. C. 
Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 166–82. 
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Egypt and Britain (as the other).510 Similarly, Lisa Pollard highlights how the Victorian family 
came to “symbolize modernity, economic solvency, and the rise and success of the nation-state,” 
among Egyptian nationalists in the nineteenth century.511 Beth Baron also explains how the end 
of harem slavery conincided with the emergence of Egyptian nationalism which brought changes 
to the structure of the national family.512 In the Arab world, not only did motherhood become 
important but so did the concept of family and what constituted a normative family structure. 
During this period, through the records of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts, we witness such shifts taking 
place in the structure of the family.513 For Shiʿas, this shift took a sectarian form in the 
nationalization process. Through the records of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts, we see a change taking 
place in the structure of families, and the demands made by women on what entailed an 
acceptable familial arrangement.    
The typical familial structure consisted not only of the husband, wife, and children, but 
the extended family residing under the same roof. During the 1920s and 1930s, this type of living 
setup continued to exist as a normative way of life; however, changes to this began to emerge 
during this period as reflected in the court records. Here, we see demands by women to live 
separate from their spouses’ family. As Asad argues, modernity brought with it a new kind of 
subjectivity in new institutional and discursive spaces in the realm of the family.514 The legal 
formation of the family as a category of law in the modern nation-state opened the space for the 
                                                           
510 Omina Shakry, “Schooled Mothers and Structured Play: Child Rearing in Turn-of-the-Century Egypt,” 135–38. 
 
511 Lisa Pollard reveals how the monogamous couple and reformed children were part of the modernizing process of 
the Egyptian bourgeoise. These reforms were informed and projected against a European ‘other’ just as Europeans 
imagined Egypt as backward and immoral, and in need of colonising. Lisa Pollard, Nurturing the Nation, 5. 
 
512 Beth Baron, Egypt as a Woman, 18.  
 
513 Refer to Chapter three. 
 




family as a unit in society where the individual emerged as a self-governing subject of the 
nation-state. The invocation of the nuclear family was a new modern formation and part of the 
“normalization of social conduct in a modern, secular state,” as Asad observed in the law 
reforms of Egypt.515   
In one of these cases, a woman by the name of Saʿda appeared before the court alleging 
that she did not want to live in the same house with her mother-in-law. Saʿda claimed that her 
husband, Muhammad, still owed her mahr and nafaqa but that she was willing to dispense of her 
right to her mahr as long as he provided her with nafaqa and a separate place of residence away 
from his family. Muhammad agreed to the court’s ruling of establishing a lawful home for Saʿda 
separate from his family.516 An extended family living under one roof was still a common 
practice, thus such a request represented a shift in the constitution and societal conception of 
family, one that was ordained by the court and presumed by Shiʿi individuals as acceptable. This 
can be seen in many cases that emerged during this time period whereby habitual arrangements 
were renegotiated. In most of the court cases retrieved, the husband rarely offered a living 
arrangement with the extended family indicating a shift to the marital couple as the basic unit of 
the family rather than the extended family.  
In a similar case, Ibrahim appeared before the Beirut Jaʿfari shariʿa court on January 16, 
1936, claiming that his wife, Suhaila, left his home 36 days earlier.517 According to his 
testimony, she refused his request to return so he was resorting to the court to resolve the matter. 
In her defense, Suhaila claimed that they were married a year before for a total mahr of 60 gold 
                                                           
515 Ibid., 227. 
 
516 Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt, Saʿda vs. Muhammad, case 17 (February 8, 1933). 
517 Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt. Suhaila vs. Ibrahim, case 14, no. 335 (January 16, 1936). 
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Ottoman liras; 40 of which would be muqaddam (advanced dowry) and 20 muʾakhkhar (deferred 
dowry) over 10 years. She continued to note that her al-mahr al-muʾakhkhar was used to buy a 
home for her in-laws where she resided as well. Suhaila argued that she was evicted from the 
house after getting into a fight with her husband and his parents. It was for this reason she 
maintained that she was entitled to nafaqa. Ibrahim insisted that the 36 liras Suhaila spent on 
household needs should be considered her mahr, yet the court denied his claim. Suhaila 
professed that she would return to him “on the condition that he opens a lawful home for her 
independent of his family,” in exchange for her agreed mahr.518 However, Suhaila maintained 
that she was still entitled to nafaqa of 12 Syrian liras a month since she had not voluntarily left 
his house. The Jaʿfari shariʿa court of Beirut ordered Ibrahim to “present her with a home away 
from his family” and the requested nafaqa amount.519 Ibrahim agreed to this and declared that he 
had a home to offer, which the court then inspected. Upon examination, the inspector argued that 
a lawful home must have a proper kitchen and bathroom, which Ibrahim’s home did not have. In 
the court’s final ruling it determined that Ibrahim must establish a suitable abode for Suhaila, 
which he promised to uphold.    
Although these cases may not have been typical, most living arrangements mentioned in 
the records leaned toward a nuclear family arrangement. Suhaila, like Saʿda, were able to 
negotiate a separate living arrangement removed from any extended family, which the Jaʿfari 
shariʿa courts supported and endorsed as an appropriate living situation. In regard to court 
appraisals, court inspectors were sent to examine the proposed abode to certify its suitability. In 
many ways, the nation came to replace the extended family where previously the extended 







family was state and society in one. The Jaʿfari shariʿa courts, established by the state and acting 
under its jurisdiction, effectively addressed and resolved familial disputes which were previously 
settled through the negotiations of extended families. Thus, perpetuating the nuclear family (in 
place of the extended family) also served to bolster the court’s authority by weakening this body, 
which could be seen to have taken (or been given) authority (at the behest of the state). In the 
modern nation-state, the extended family weakened and the state emerged as sovereign.520 Thus, 
the nuclear family becomes the unit of choice, which the state could more easily manage. This is 
not to claim that the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts acted as an agent of the state or that this was imbued 
from below by the masses. Rather, I am calling attention to a visible shift that took place at the 
time as a by-product of the modernizing project of the Lebanese nation-state.521 As new 
significance was given to the nuclear family, a shift was made toward this new modern 
formation.522 This can be derived from the aforementioned cases that document the Jaʿfari 
shariʿa court records of women making claims to live away from their spouses’ family and 
demanding separate places of residence. As an extension and creation of the Lebanese nation-
state, the Jaʿfari shariʿa court contributed to the making and remaking of modern Shiʿi 
families.523 The (nuclear) family became important in the integration of Shiʿas as a sectarian 
                                                           
520 It also came to breed sovereign citizens who belonged to the sovereign nation-state. Asad, Formations of the 
Secular, 200–217. 
 
521 I cannot determine or assert how this came about. This is not the objective of the dissertation, but rather to 
highlight how these conjugal arrangements came to be debated and established in the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts at the 
advent of its creation. 
 
522 Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular, 232. 
 
523 The Subaltern studies group has written extensively on the colonial impact on the inner or “private” sphere of the 
family. Such works include Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Dipesh Chakrabarty, “The Difference-Deferral of a Colonial 
Modernity,” in Subaltern Studies VIII, eds. David Arnold and David Hardiman, 50–88, (Delhi: Oxford University 
Press, 1994); and Nathan Brown, “Shariʿa and State in the Modern Middle East,” International Journal of Middle 
East Studies 29, no. 3 (1997): 359–76. 
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community in the modern nation-state at the same time that a shift toward producing appropriate 
roles for Shiʿi husbands and wives, mothers and fathers was emphasized during the Mandate 
period. 
The court came to play an essential part in establishing Shiʿi social norms as it 
demarcated appropriate roles and behaviors for Shiʿi men and women. Simultaneously, ordinary 
Shiʿi men and women participated in the fashioning of these sectarian norms and gender roles as 
they debated the affairs of their marriages in the newfound courts as subjects of the nation-state.  
 
Social Maladies: Corrupt Husbands, Idle Men, and Deadbeat Dads 
The Jaʿfari shariʿa courts became a space where moral behavior and appropriate conduct 
was constructed and consequently projected into Shiʿi civil society. At times, men appeared in 
court refusing to give their spouses or ex-wives alimony on the grounds that they were of 
immoral character. Shiʿi women, on the other hand, slandered the character and behavior of their 
husbands (or ex-husbands) when demanding their withheld nafaqa or mahr before the courts. 
Men came before the court proclaiming that their wives were “deprived of consciousness” and 
“lacked integrity” in hopes of taking their children away from their mothers during the ḥidāna 
(i.e., the Islamic prescribed period whereby a child remains with the mother until the age of 
maturity).524 Women, on the other hand, took their husbands to the courts for not financially 
                                                           
524 For more examples involving such ḥidāna cases see Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt, Fadila 
Omar vs. Hajj Husayn Omar, case 45 (March 8, 1933); Khadija vs. Said Daoud, case 313 (July 3, 1939); and Riḍā 
vs. Rafīqa (February 25, 1933). In these cases, Shiʿi men and women took their spouses to court on the grounds of 
immoral character or lack of integrity. For example, in the case of Fadila Omar, her husband claimed that she was 
deprived of consciousness, while in the case of Khadija her husband asserted that the living conditions for his 
daughter were unstable. 
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providing for them or for physically abusing them.525 The records of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts 
displayed a wide array of personal concerns and social maladies exhibited among Shiʿi Muslims 
of Lebanon during this period. 
Although the press blamed women, by and large, for marital problems, these court cases 
presented a more complex picture of spousal relationships and the problems therein. It was 
women more so than men who came before the court to complain about their spouses. Women 
frequently made complaints before the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts about their husbands’ behavior as 
reasons for divorce or change in nafaqa. Shiʿi women, for the most part, found a way to bring up 
domestic matters outside the Islamic legal jurisdiction of the personal status court into its guise. 
In a typical case involving nafaqa, Ṣāfa claimed that her husband, Husayn, had not provided her 
with living expenses for the last seven months. In his defense, Husayn argued that she left his 
authority and went to live with her parents while they were sick. Husayn requested her return and 
promised to provide her with a lawful home. Ṣāfa agreed to these terms as long as he pledged 
“he would not hit her and make her suffer.”526 Husayn consented to these conditions and the case 
was closed. Shiʿi women were able to mediate the behavior and treatment of their husbands by 
finding a way to interject these concerns into personal status matters even though the court was 
not obligated to address such issues.527 Unlike the articles in al-ʿIrfān that faulted women for the 
                                                           
525 Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt, Husayn vs. Fatima, case 14 (October 23, 1933). In this case, 
Hussein brought Fatima to court for leaving the house whereby she claimed that he was hitting her and had not paid 
her dowry. In the end, Husayn was required to pay her dowry along with promising not to hit her again. 
 
526Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt, Ṣāfa vs. Husayn, case 120, no. 133 (March 9, 1939). Ṣāfa had 
originally gone to the hospital to visit her ailing parents, and then returned to their home. The Arabic word used by 
Ṣāfa was ʿājiz, which literally means to weaken, make powerless, or incapable. After Husayn agreed to treat her 
properly, she continued with her suit for nafaqa. The issue of abuse found its way into the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts 
under the auspices of mahr or nafaqa.  
 
527 Many cases of abuse found their way in the Jaʿfari courtroom. See Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī 
Bayrūt, Khadija vs. ʿAbdallāh, January 23, 1939, case 19, no. 39 (January 23, 1939); and Fatima vs. ʿAbdallāh, case 
92, no. 136 (April 15, 1939). 
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crumbling state of the home (and nation), the records of the Jaʿfari courts reveal the detailed 
marital concerns of Shiʿi individuals which were largely brought about by women. In examining 
these court records, it becomes clear that women questioned the role of Shiʿi men as husband 
and fathers, and ultimately their masculinity as providers and heads of Shiʿi families. 
Shiʿi women also came to court complaining that their husbands were morally corrupt 
individuals who gambled and consumed alcohol instead of supporting their families. Lebanese 
Shiʿi men and women used various lines of argumentation to persuade the court to rule in their 
favor. On November 16, 1939, Muntāha appeared before the Jaʿfari shariʿa court proclaiming 
that her husband, Mohammad, left the house four months before without leaving her any 
alimony. In her testimony, she demanded that he establish a home for her, which would meet all 
her living needs, and that he reimburse her for the alimony he had not paid. In his rebuttal, 
Muhammad argued that he was away for business and could not provide her alimony, but also 
claimed that Muntāha had requested a divorce at one point. Muntāha defended herself by arguing 
that her request for divorce was based on the fact that Muhammad gambled and spent all his 
money that way rather than on supporting her. At the conclusion of the case, Muhammad swore 
that he would not gamble anymore and promised this on the condition that he did not have to pay 
her alimony for the months he did not support her. Muntāha agreed to these terms, and the court 
adjourned.528 Cases like these reveal many things about the nature of Shiʿi marriages, social 
maladies, and the understanding of Shiʿi masculinity and femininity. Additionally, such cases 
reveal how women were able to utilize the courts to legally condemn certain behaviors by their 
husbands, even when, and especially when, these were not the immediate grounds for the court 
cases. In a way, courts gave women legal leverage to make demands of their husbands. The 
                                                           
528 Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt, Muntāha vs. Muhammad, case 398 (November 16, 1939). 
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Jaʿfari shariʿa courts became a place where moral boundaries were established and perceived 
social maladies confronted. Muntāha, who apparently had a problem with her husband’s 
gambling, found a way to address this matter through the courts. She took him to court on the 
grounds of her alimony, and he was made to publically and legally commit to relinquish 
gambling. Muntāha questioned his manhood by challenging him in court for not fulfilling the 
role of a husband capable of supporting her financially.   
In a case dealing with similar accusations, Zayn brings his wife, Hayrīyya, to court on 
February 26, 1936, claiming she left his home and authority. In her defense, Hayrīyya claimed 
that she did not leave but was kicked out, and that he had not paid her mahr and nafaqa. She 
continued to assert that her allotted alimony was not sufficient for her and her son. In her 
defense, her sister testified that Zayn was “always spending on gambling and alcohol,” and that 
he was a man of “ill character.”529 She also confirmed Hayrīyya’s claim that her nafaqa did not 
meet her daily needs. Whether or not this testimony persuaded the court, in the end Hayrīyya 
received the mahr she was due with an additional amount for alimony for her child, although she 
agreed to suspend all demands for the alimony that was not given to her over the past few 
months. Once again, issues of gambling and alcohol surfaced in the court cases in conjunction 
with the discussion over spousal financial obligations. Women addressed these social concerns in 
the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts in hopes of remedying a situation, as in Muntāha’s case, while others 
utilized such concerns in order to defame the husband’s character in hopes of attaining more 
financial support. These issues appeared in court, but never surfaced in the newspaper as a 
societal issue or concern.   
                                                           
529 Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt, Zayn vs. Hayrīyya, case 19 (February 26, 1936). 
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In most cases, women questioned their husbands or ex-husbands’ capability as a man by 
his financial capability to support his family. Most women claimed that their husbands were not 
providing them with enough (or with anything at all) to support their living style. In one such 
case, Ameena came before the court complaining that she had been married to Mahmoud for five 
years and that they had children together.530 Yet, when she became ill two months before, which 
led to her hospitalization, he did not pay for her medical expenses. She continued to recount that 
even after her release from the hospital, she went to her father’s home, and Mahmoud did not 
request that she return home. For this reason, Ameena argued, she was entitled to nafaqa, as well 
as allotted money for a wet nurse for their two-month-old daughter. Ameena angrily noted that 
Mahmoud had not supplied her with anything since her illness even when she asked for her 
clothing. Through the mere opening of the case, Ameena deliberately depicted Mahmoud as an 
inconsiderate, uncaring, and irresponsible husband who provided no support at the time of her 
vulnerability and illness. He was not only a negligent husband but also an inattentive father to his 
newborn daughter. By portraying him in such a manner and targeting two socially significant 
roles of a Shiʿi man, she was able to reach a court-imposed compromise with her husband and 
attain the nafaqa she deserved.531 Whether or not her disparaging depiction of Mahmoud resulted 
in the favorable outcome for her is unclear. It is clear, however, that Ameena was able to 
convince the court to rule in her favor and require Mahmoud to pay her expenses. The court 
                                                           
530 Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt, Ameena vs. Mahmoud, case 194, no 98 (April 4, 1938). 
 
531 Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt, Ameena vs. Mahmoud, case 194, no 98 (April 4, 1938). 
Mahmoud admitted that Ameena became ill and he called on a doctor to examine her. Subsequently, she went to her 
father’s house, but was later admitted to the hospital. Mahmoud admitted that he did not pay for her hospital 
expenses, but he summoned her to come home after her release. However, she went to her father’s home instead. By 
the end of the trial, Mahmoud and Ameena had agreed to a nafaqa amount and her return to the house. 
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became an arena whereby social and moral norms were debated and reconstructed by individuals 
who invited the court to intervene in their personal matters.  
The role of a husband was more than financial, as Muntāha’s dispensing of her alimony 
in exchange for the oath by her husband to change his moral conduct showed. The court became 
a means by which women’s social grievances and notions of appropriate masculine conduct 
could be discussed and legally documented, even though at times it was outside the jurisdiction 
of the shariʿa courts. It became a way to publically make claims within the “private” sphere of 
shariʿa courts. In most instances, it was Shiʿi women who exercised their Islamic rights and 
questioned the character and manhood of Shiʿi husbands, which differed greatly from al-ʿIrfān’s 
claims of Shiʿi women in need of reform to bolster the state of the family and nation. Both Shiʿi 
men and women invited the court to intervene in their lives by using the authority of the court to 
dictate perceived notions of manhood and fatherhood while simultaneously having the court 
define societal norms and appropriate roles for Shiʿi husbands. Women were brought before the 
Jaʿfari shariʿa courts as previously examined for not obeying their husbands or leaving their 
authority and home.532 It was seen by men as a way to assert their authority and sustain their 
perceptions of the responsibilities of an obedient wife and mother, while women took this 
opportunity to express their grievances about their husbands’ conduct and character in hopes of 
amending their spousal situation and marriage contract. The issue over a woman’s disposition 
came into question in the context of child custody and disputes over parental control and 
responsibility.  
 
                                                           
532 In the majority of cases brought about by men, it was about the women’s disobedience and leaving their authority 





Chapter three examined the shift that took place in the 1920s in the literature of al-ʿIrfān 
whereby the Shiʿi woman, as wife and mother, became the locus of the family and the 
foundation of the Lebanese nation-state and symbol of the sect. Despite the proliferation of 
articles in al-ʿIrfān, addressing the role of Shiʿi mothers in childrearing and the upbringing of the 
future children of the sect and citizens of the nation-state, in almost all cases examined the father 
was given custodial control of the children after the ḥidāna period. From the records of the 
Jaʿfari shariʿa courts and their decisions on the legal age of ḥidāna, it meant that a child would 
remain with the mother until the age of nine, and then be surrendered to the father.533 However, 
this did not stop Shiʿi fathers from requesting their children before this defined age requirement. 
Shiʿi fathers used various lines of argumentation to dispense women of their ḥidāna rights, 
which would also suspend their fatherly obligation to pay nafaqa for the child. It was in these 
perimeters that the character of Shiʿi women was put into question and defamed in the 
courtroom.   
In one such case between Rose and ʿAli brought before the Beirut Jaʿfari shariʿa court in 
March 1938, Rose appeared claiming that ʿAli was not providing her with nafaqa for their 
children.534 During the court proceedings, ʿAli agreed to pay the designated nafaqa after which 
                                                           
533 The issue of ḥiḍāna continues to be debated among different sects, each advocating different age requirement, as 
well as different marjaʿ (religious leaders) at varying historical moments prescribing different ages for boys and 
girls. From the court cases, the age of nine was used as a reference point, although fathers came to request custody 
of children as young as seven. In Lebanon, debate over this has occurred as the grand marjaʿ Fadallah had set an age 
of 13 or until a girl has reached puberty, which may surpass that age.  
 
534 Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt, Rose vs. ʿAli, case 24 (March 13, 1938). The court proceedings 
continue until July of 1939. The couple has a total of four children, but the conflict over ḥidāna arose over the eldest 
daughter who was seven years old at the time. The other children were younger in age. Another case involving 
ḥidāna and dispute over age was Hassan vs. Baʾdura, case 40, no. 18 (January 23, 1939) in Al-maḥkama al-
sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt. 
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Rose demanded a separate abode in Beirut removed from her husband. After such a request was 
made, ʿAli then requested full custody of his children. When the case reappeared in court in July 
1939, ʿAli appealed for the custody of his eldest daughter, who was seven at the time, on the 
grounds that she had reached the age of ḥidāna. Rose retaliated arguing she was entitled, under 
the Islamic tenet of ḥidāna, to keep her daughter until the age of nine. The court affirmed Rose’s 
legal stipulation regarding ḥidāna, and thus negating ʿAli’s claim. Once this form of contention 
did not work, ʿAli argued that he was worried and “concerned” about the well-being of his 
children since Rose’s mother, who was living with her, was Christian, and for that reason the 
children were being “raised in a way that was not religiously appropriate.”535 Due to these 
concerns, ʿAli once again demanded the custody of his children. Rose’s legal representative 
reasserted the legal right of ḥidāna for any mother, and willingness to bring in witnesses to 
attack such defamatory claims. Before such action was taken, the couple reconciled and reunited 
on the last day of deliberation, which concluded the debate over custody.536 Based on this case 
and others of this sort, the courts and individuals who came before it strongly stood by the 
standards of ḥidāna, and the women’s Islamic legal right to child custody, although all rights 
were suspended passed the designated age.537 However, this did not stop men from attempting to 
obstruct this defined period as many such cases appeared with different contentions to ground 
their demands for child custody.   
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536 After nearly a year of court appearances, the couple decided to reconcile and live together. It was also revealed 
that Rose was pregnant again! 
 
537 In the court cases examined a woman was not given custody over her child past the ḥidāna period. Debates 




In a similar case, Khadija brought her husband of three years, Said, to court on the 
grounds that he expelled her out of her home and took her one-year-old daughter away from 
her.538 She requested the return of her daughter on the grounds of ḥidāna, along with nafaqa for 
the six-month period he had not supported her. In his testimony, Said claimed that he did not 
kick Khadija out but that she left of her own accord, so she was not entitled to nafaqa. Further, 
he objected to relinquishing his daughter to Khadija, whom he claimed “was not righteous.”539 
He continued to note that his daughter would be residing at the home of Khadija’s mother, which 
was “not a suitable home” but rather a “hateful” place for his daughter to be in.540 Khadija 
demanded her right to custody during the ḥidāna period, arguing that the only way to rid her of 
both her nafaqa and custody was if he could prove she was disabled or an insane individual.541 
With the conclusion of the case, Khadija was granted custody and nafaqa until her daughter 
reached the appropriate age. Cases pertaining parental rights of Shiʿi children appeared 
frequently in the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts.542 Although al-ʿIrfān strongly advocated the role of Shiʿi 
mothers in raising the future children of the nation-state, while paying little attention to the role 
of fathers in their upbringing, the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts almost always ruled in favor of men 
following the ḥidāna period. Shiʿi women were only entitled to custody of their children up to 
the age of nine at most. However, the middle-class perceptions portrayed in the press placed the 
burden of childrearing and upbringing (even passed the age of nine) on women. Although the 
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541 Ibid. 
 
542 Another case of this sort occurred between Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt, Mahmoud vs. 
Fatima, case 84, no. 380 (April 5, 1939). 
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new concepts of motherhood prescribed in al-ʿIrfān were “emancipatory” in relegating women a 
fundamental role and producing “children worthy of modernity,” as Afsaneh Najmabadi shows 
in her work on Iran, for Lebanese Shiʿi women this stopped short of giving them expanded legal 
rights to undertake this role.543 There was an apparent contradiction here, and a clear discrepancy 
of the portrayal of motherhood and fatherhood in the press when related to the concrete reality 
displayed in the shariʿa courts and the limitations placed by Islamic jurisprudence on such 
matters.  
 
 Medical Concerns: Physical Ailments and Diseases 
 As this chapter has shown, the Jaʿfari shariʿa records displayed the everyday concerns 
and struggles of Shiʿi marital relationships. As this chapter has revealed, women more so than 
men utilized the courts to manipulate and adjust their spousal relationships, living 
accommodations, and marriage contracts. Thus far, we have discussed gender roles and norms 
without addressing the issue of bodies, and how bodies were constituted in these debates over 
social norms and morality in the context of Shiʿi marriages. Foucault has shown how the modern 
nation-state through its institutions, such as schools, hospitals, courts, etc., were sites where 
everyday practices of normalization and discipline were produced and disseminated in society.544 
It was within these very institutions that knowledge was produced and disciplinary actions taken 
to ensure proper behavior and healthy bodies. Individuals considered weak, ill, undesirable, or 
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unstable in body or mind were separated from society.545 Since the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts dealt 
with the intimate details of marital life between Shiʿi men and women, matters pertaining to the 
body and what entailed a “healthy” body also appeared. In most of the cases of this nature, 
medical concerns regarding illness, damaged bodily parts, and sexual incompetence found their 
way into the courts, informing normative perceptions and morality. 
 On August 17, 1937, Khadija came before the Beirut shariʿa court for a second time 
claiming that her husband, Ibrahim, suffered from a severe abdominal disease that had prevented 
them from having any sexual interaction.546 Khadija claimed that this illness existed prior to their 
marriage, yet she was not made aware of his condition at the time. Due to the incurable nature of 
his disease, which had resulted in his sickness for over a year, Khadija insisted that their 
relationship must be automatically nulled with no legal divorce needed. Khadija referred to a 
Shiʿi Islamic tenet that declared a marriage was automatically voided if a sexual relationship did 
not exist for over a year due to a spouse’s illness.547 Since Ibrahim did not abide by the previous 
court rule to get examined by a physician as a way to confirm this condition, Khadija was 
requesting his presence in court again. During the court proceedings, Ibrahim attempted to 
discredit Khadija’s claim by noting that sex did take place once during their marriage. However, 
Khadija retaliated by noting that this failed sexual encounter only occurred while he was under 
medical treatment, and thus he could not perform the task. Khadija sanctioned the court to 
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546 Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt, Khadija vs. Ibrahim, case 222, no. 98 (August 17, 1937). 
 
547 Under Shiʿi Islamic law, a man and woman can annul (faskh) a marriage due to physical or mental deformity in 
one of the parties. In such instances witnesses are not needed to legitimize divorce, and the woman is not entitled to 
any portion of her mahr if annulment occurs before the consummation of the marriage and only half after 




dispense of her marriage on the grounds that Ibrahim was medically unfit and sexually 
incompetent to be an efficacious husband to her.548 After medical testimony from experts, the 
court ruled that Ibrahim had a severe illness which has prevented him from fulfilling his 
husbandry duties, and for this reason, the marriage was nulled. In this unique case, the court, on 
Khadija’s accord, deemed the marriage void based on Ibrahim’s ailing health and persistent 
detrimental illness. Under Shiʿi Islamic jurisprudence, lack of sexual interaction was legitimate 
grounds for divorce. What is interesting about this case was not the sexual grounds for divorce 
but rather the classification of Ibrahim as sick and unfit to fulfill his husbandry role. Matters of 
health and designations of “fit” or “unfit” bodies entered the courts through the avenue of 
marriage, whereby societal perceptions were formalized and normalized in the disciplinary 
institution of the courts. As a modern institution of the state, the Jaʿfari shariʿa court participated 
in separating the undesirable “other” from the ideal “health” members of society as it pertained 
to marital affairs.  
On April 15, 1939, Fatima appeared before the Beirut shariʿa court, claiming that her 
husband, ʿAbdallāh, of two years, hit her five months before and evicted her. However, due to 
this beating, she lost the baby she was carrying, and needed medical assistance, which amounted 
to 14 Syrian liras in physician expenses.549 She appeared before the court requesting nafaqa for 
the five-month period and compensation for the medical expenses concurred from the abuse. 
ʿAbdallāh denied claims of beating her up and throwing her out of the house. Fatima brought in 
medical experts to confirm that she had lost the baby, which corresponded to the time of her 
beating and departure from the house. After much deliberation and witness testimonies, the two 
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549 Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt, Fatima vs. ʿAbdallāh, case 92, no. 136 (April 15, 1939). 
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parties agreed that ʿAbdallāh would pay the medical expense and nafaqa, and provide her with 
an appropriate home. She also requested that ʿAbdallāh promise not to abuse her or cause her 
anymore physical harm, which he complied with. Unlike the previous case, the case between 
Fatima and ʿAbdallāh addressed the issue of bodily harm done and the medical repercussions of 
such actions imparted on her body, both due to her miscarriage and medical expenses 
accumulated. Fatima was able to prove before the court that Ibrahim was responsible for her 
medical expenditures while also securing, at least in front of the judge that such bodily harm 
would not be done again. Ibrahim was deemed guilty for impairing a “healthy” body, and thus 
reprimanded for such actions. Within the contours of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts, normative 
behavior and societal norms were informed and continuously defined when concerning Shiʿi 
bodies and the treatment of them. Since the courts dealt with intimacies of marital affairs, the 
issue of sex and sexual performance arose frequently. 
On January 21, 1938, Salām came before the court claiming she married Hassan from 
Ṭanẓūra near Haifa nearly eight months before. At one point, she lived in Beirut with him, and 
later moved to the city of Ṭanẓūra.550 She claimed that her husband was sexually “impotent and 
unable to penetrate women” and for that reason she became sick and was hospitalized for three 
months. She asserted that she only became ill after failed sexual attempts were made by Hassan. 
Although she was healthy at the time, she was asking for an end to their marriage and payment 
of all her medical expenses. Hassan claimed that he was not the reason for her sickness, and that 
when she became ill he admitted her to the hospital and paid for all her medical costs. In order 
for the court to arbitrate, a doctor was sent to physically examine Salām and make a judgment on 
her health and whether she could remain married to Hassan. The doctor recounted that Salām 
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was in overall good health to remain married, although he observed that Salām had an “enlarged 
heart and obstructed arteries,” which made her weak.551 The examining doctor repeatedly stated 
that according to his examination of her genitals she was still a virgin and that her genitals were 
in a healthy condition, inferring that Hassan was at no fault for her previous illness.552 When the 
court recommenced a few days later, an agreement between Hassan and Salām’s father was 
reached whereby Hassan would provide Salām with nafaqa, which consisted of a furnished home 
in Beirut comprising of all her essential needs. In accordance with Salām’s desires and 
confirmation of medical experts, it was made clear that Salām would not have to travel with 
Hassan to Palestine because of her medical condition. Both parties agreed to these terms and the 
court was adjourned in May 1938.   
Although the peculiar details of shariʿa cases are difficult to decipher due to the nature of 
the documentation processing of such courts, many things can be inferred by the account at hand. 
It was quite clear that Salām originally appeared before the court to terminate her marriage 
completely, yet this never came to fruition. Based on the available account, one could question 
whether this was the real reason and purpose behind her claim. She appeared before the court 
appealing for divorce on the grounds that Hassan’s sexually impotence resulted in her getting 
sick. Was this a way to place blame for her illness? Or a means to rearrange her living 
arrangement and avoid traveling to Palestine with her husband? Although this is not clear and 
cannot be affirmatively answered, it is clear that Salām was able to renegotiate her living 
arrangement while also questioning her husband’s sexuality. She questioned his sexual 
impotence and connected his inability as a man, both sexually and financially, to her illness and 
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medical woes. In a way, Salām dictated to the court norms of “masculinity,” and how Hassan 
was lacking in it. By proving her virginity, Salām was able to affirm that Hassan was sexually 
ineffective, since he was unable to penetrate her even after eight months of marriage, even 
though she was not able to prove her previous illness was his fault as she claimed. Yet, Hassan 
still consented to furnishing a home for Salām and meeting all her needs. Hassan complied with 
the demands made and remained married to Salām knowing that she was indeed sick according 
to the physicians account. In this case, it was confirmed that Salām was indeed sick and that 
Hassan had not yet performed sexually in their marriage. In the end, Salām did not have to move 
to Palestine, and was granted nafaqa and a residence in Beirut.  
Many things can be said about this case and other cases that brought up matters of health 
and diseases. First, Shiʿi women, more than Shiʿi men, introduced disputes over medical 
concerns and bodily matters before the court. For the most part, they brought up issues of 
transmitted illness or bodily harm attributed to their spouses after the consummation of 
marriage.553 Although shariʿa courts did not have the legal authority to evaluate medical 
conditions and how such diseases were contracted, these issues found their way into the courts at 
the invitation of litigants who related this to their marital situation, which was also intertwined 
with their financial and/or living arrangements. Salām who obviously did not want to 
permanently reside in Palestine was able to use the threat of divorce and the charge of incurred 
bodily illness to rearrange her situation. Medical concerns, particularly those related to abuse and 
sexual relationships, were made by Shiʿi women, highlighting their prevalence in society while 
also signifying the courts role, as a disciplinary institution of the state, in defining and 
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normalizing such behavior. For the most part, these cases questioned Shiʿi masculinity as one 
that was infected and contaminated, and one that tainted the bodies of Shiʿi women and the 
potential offspring of this union. Unlike the articles of al-ʿIrfān, it was largely men not women 
who were made accountable for the crumbling conditions in the household. The court records 
reveal how notions of gendered behavior, both masculine and feminine, entered the courtroom, 
and how the body became a site of discipline and normative construction.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter reveals how both Shiʿi men and women utilized the courts to define and 
redefine their living conditions and marital relationships, and consequently societal normative 
behavior and gender roles. By examining cases, dealing with issue of alimony, housing, morality, 
child custody, and social ills, this chapter illustrates the extensive array of concerns that the court 
addressed, and the effect it had on the daily lives of Lebanese Shiʿas. By examining this chapter 
alongside Chapter three, we see discrepancies between the portrayal in al-ʿIrfān, and realities 
that took place in court regarding familial and gender constructions. In examination of these two 
chapters, I offer a new angle through which to understand al-ʿIrfān’s efforts. Were one to read 
the journal, one might mistakenly perceive al-ʿIrfān as reflecting present lived realities regarding 
the concerns of family, motherhood, and childrearing. The courts not only elaborate upon 
realities on the ground, they also provide the background understanding against what, and on 
behalf of whom, al-ʿIrfān may be directing its edification efforts. Only examining al-ʿIrfān 
presents a portion of the context. One can speculate that al-ʿIrfān, at least in part, might be 
responding to the “facts on the ground” as portrayed in the court cases, whereby it attempted to 
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change gender expectations and norms—informed both by middle-class perceptions and the 
efforts of the nationalization project as has been previously shown—to reform society without 
these issues ever going to court. It could be argued that the activities in the court reflected gender 
behaviors and norms that al-ʿIrfān was attempting to modify through what it presented as ideal 
normative behavior toward which women, and men to a lesser extent, should strive toward. My 
analysis shows how social norms and gender practices were negotiated in these various 
institutions in society differently, ultimately shaping Shiʿi sectarian norms and behavior. 
Whereas al-ʿIrfān promoted the need to reform Shiʿi women as mothers of household and the 
nation, the Jaʿfari shariʿa court records revealed that Shiʿi women, more so than men, utilized 
the courts to enhance their living arrangements or modify the actions and behavior of Shiʿi men. 
The records of the courts not only disclosed the concerns and practices of Shiʿi women and men 
in their marital affairs but also illustrated that the demands and norms prescribed in al-ʿIrfān did 
not reflect the everyday realities of Shiʿi marriages and practices of masculinity and femininity.  
The Jaʿfari shariʿa courts, for the most part, allowed women to exercise greater freedom and 
rights even as they were formed (and limited to an extent) to the “organisational terrain” of the 
courts and the colonial state.554 Through the court records, different sets of power relationships 
emerged that determine the structure of Shiʿi marriages. In these practices, whether in the courts 
or press, we see the multiple and conflicting ways in which categories of gender, sectarianism, 
and nationality were informed and debated.  
In this chapter, I revealed how legal marriages appeared in the courts as a means through 
which women demanded rights and protected themselves financially, countering the 
stereotypical depictions of the Middle Eastern woman, especially the Muslim woman, as 
                                                           




oppressed by Islamic institutions (whereas, in many ways, the journal promoted such stereotypes 
even as it claimed to advocate education and modernization). Mounira Charrad’s text The State 
and Women’s Rights examines the differences in the development of Islamic family law in 
Tunisia, Morroco, and Algeria.555 In her research, Charrad reveals that the evolution of Islamic 
law and women’s rights depended on the pattern of integration between kin groupings and state 
formation.  The closer the alliance was with tribal kin groupings, the more conservative the 
tenets of Islamic law.556 For example, in Tunisia where state development emerged independent 
from tribal kin groupings, family law and womens rights were more liberal. Charrad noted “in all 
three Maghribi countries, family law policy came ‘from above’ as a strategic choice by the elites 
in power. Postindependence family law was formulated by the political leadership, which chose 
to maintain Islamic law, oscillated between alternatives or actively promulgated reforms.”557 
Unlike the Maghribi cases, in the Lebanese context there was no national code for family law 
adhered to by the political leadership; rather a system based on sectarian difference was imposed 
by the French colonial authority. Thus, family law was allocated to each sectarian entity 
independent and separate from the political state (yet recognized and protected by it) as enforced 
by the mandatory state. As discussed in Chapter two, each sect practiced personal status matters 
within their specific courts yet authorized and recognized by the state. In this case, the Jaʿfari 
shariʿa courts were established for the first time under the French colonial authority. Thus, the 
question of family law and women’s rights was not directly connected to or determined by the 
structure of the state and politics of integration. However, these rights were debated within the 
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institutional framework of the newly founded Jaʿfari shariʿa courts that came to standardize and 
normalize sectarian behavior and familial roles as it emerged as the sole authority on personal 
status matters. In the Jaʿfari shariʿa case, “both the process of codification and the concept of a 
unified legal system which has the state as an enforcing authority behind it are alien to the 
Shariʿa,” and practices of family law.558 This chapter reflected how the courts came to have an 
essential part in normalizing Shiʿi social and gender norms as a sectarian entity of the 
burgeoning Lebanese nation-state. As Ziba Mir-Hosseini noted Islamic family law reveals the 
interplay between three realities “a sacred level embodied in the Shariʿa; a legal level as 
reflected in modern legal codes and apparatus, which although derived from Shariʿa, is distinct 
from it; and the existing practices as revealed in the choices that people make.”559 The Jaʿfari 
shariʿa court penetrated the lives of Lebanese Shiʿa both by invitation and institutionalization as 
it came to normalize marital norms at a time when Shiʿi Muslims were integrated into the 
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The Future of the Sect: Educating Shiʿi Children into the Lebanese Nation-State 
 
These methods produce the organized power of armies, schools, and factories, and 
other distinctive institutions of modern nation-states. They also produce, within 
such institutions, the modern individual, constructed as an isolated, disciplined, 
receptive industrious political subject.560 
  
Introduction 
An appropriate home with “reformed” Shiʿi mothers and fathers was to produce upright 
Shiʿi children.561 As seen in Chapter three, al-ʿIrfān emphasized the importance of home 
education to be bestowed by Shiʿi mothers that superseded formal schooling. However, an 
appropriate upbringing in a proper Shiʿi home was to be integrated with an apposite educational 
upbringing in school. Just as reform for Shiʿi mothers and fathers was proliferated in the press, 
the call was also rendered to the future children of this sect. It was also during this period that 
formal education for Shiʿi children was propagated and called for in the popular Shiʿi monthly 
journal, al-ʿIrfān. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, various articles and op-ed pieces appeared, 
emphasizing the need to educate Shiʿi children and the importance of schooling for the 
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community.562 It was precisely during this period that education became an important issue 
among Shiʿi intellectuals and notables as aggressive debates about education inundated the pages 
of al-ʿIrfān.563 This exasperating petition for educational reform was linked to the need to 
combat the shortcomings of the educational system found among the Shiʿas of Lebanon. Articles 
were published focusing on the need to combat the pitfalls of the nation’s educational system, 
and how to remedy the lack of education among Shiʿi children. Education and the future of Shiʿi 
children became an imperative matter for the journal. In one such article published in 1922 and 
titled “Where is the ʿAmili?” the author argued “that the people are swimming in a sea of 
ignorance” and the only way to do away with the ignorance that has “poisoned their mind” was 
to awake them through education.564 Throughout the piece, the author lamented over the 
detrimental condition of education among Shiʿas.   
It was precisely during the French Mandate period that the first successful Shiʿi based 
educational institutions were established.565 In her extensive dissertation work on the education 
system in Beirut from the 1920s to the 1960s, Nadya Sbaiti illustrated the relationship between 
education and multiple nationalism in three different schools, and how education provided a 
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means of competing notions of “being” Lebanese.566 The significance placed on education, as 
she demonstrated, and the drastic rise in schools paralleled the formation of the nation-state. 
With the culmination of the French Mandate, there were more than 963 private schools with at 
least two-thirds run by Lebanese citizens.567 In her work, Sbaiti focused on an Islamic (Sunni) 
school, a non-sectarian school, and a Francophone run institution in Beirut without addressing 
Shiʿi educational centers established during this same time period.568 This chapter contributes to 
this analysis by examining the way in which the first Shiʿi schools crafted a notion of “being” 
Lebanese as they generated different modes of sectarian identity.569 Between the 1920s and 
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1930s, two prominent Shiʿi schools and cultural centers were established catering specifically to 
a burgeoning Shiʿi community. Al-Jamʿiyya al-Khayriyya al-Islāmiyya al-ʿAmiliyya (The 
Charitable Islamic ʿAmili College), referred to as theʿAmiliyya, and al-Jamʿiyya al-Khayriyya 
al-Jaʿfariyya (The Charitable Jaʿfari Society), better known as the Jaʿfariyya played a pivotal 
role in the amalgamation of Shiʿas into the Lebanese nation-state and education of Shiʿi 
children.570 This chapter examines the changes that took place during the French Mandate 
period, particularly in the 1920s and 1930s, and that propelled a fervent call for educational 
reform among Lebanese Shiʿas, ultimately setting the grounds for the establishment of the first 
successful Shiʿi private schools in Lebanon. The chapter first examines the literature produced in 
al-ʿIrfān that urged the call for education. What were they calling for? What were the reasons 
behind it? And what modifications did they deem necessary? This chapter seeks to examine why 
such an educational pull occurred during this particular time and the implications it had on the 
position of Shiʿas within Lebanese society. With the largest illiterate community and least 
number of schools, educational reform became a means of sectarian identification and 
advancement for the Shiʿas. The chapter then investigates these two educational establishments. 
The first educational institutions catering to the Shiʿi community, the ʿAmiliyya in Beirut and 
the Jaʿfariyya in Tyre, created a space in which sectarian modes of identification were 
institutionalized and defined, and thus contributed to the multiple nationalisms in Lebanon.571 
The main objective of this chapter is to show how the first Shiʿi schools contributed to and 
fostered both sectarian and nationalist sentiment—and at times contrasting notions—among the 
Shiʿi Muslims of Lebanon as they attempted to integrate Shiʿi children into the Lebanese nation-
                                                           
570 Although these schools may have included students of different sectarian orientations, by and large they served 
the Shiʿi community. 
 
571 The importance of institutionalization is emphasized by Max Weiss, In the Shadow of Sectarianism: Law, 
Shiʿism, and the Making of Modern Lebanon (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
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state by equipping them with the principles of modern education while continuing to bear a 
sectarian (and to some extent religious) undertone. The chapter looks at the specific curriculum 
of each school and the implications each had on Shiʿi society. Based on archival research at 
these two foundational schools, and a thorough examination of yearly records, publications, 
school attendance, and curricula, this chapter shows how these schools cultivated a distinct sense 
of Shiʿi awareness while creating an educational curriculum that promoted a sectarian and 
national agenda.   
Both the ʿAmiliyya and the Jaʿfariyya schools represented attempts made by Lebanese 
Shiʿas to become part of the nation by enhancing and “modernizing” their educational system as 
a sect. This push for educational reform was not particular to the Shiʿas of Lebanon, but rather 
occurred in most colonial and postcolonial nations. However, this chapter examines the specific 
reasons behind this educational impetus among this burgeoning community while also 
examining the history of these two schools. As Rashid Khalidi has argued “the power of the state 
[was propagated] through educational system, [as well as] the media and other avenues of access 
to cultural and political discourse.” 572 This chapter examines how the press perpetuated a 
cultural and nationalist discourse as it pertained to educational reform. However, in the case of 
Lebanon, due to the lack of a strong state establishment and sectarian nature of government, 
competing nationalist discourses were informed and rooted in sectarian modes of identitfication. 
Unlike other postcolonial contexts where a single unified education system reinforced nationalist 
ideology through the power of the state, in Lebanon multiple educational systems created 
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competing notions of nationalism, whereby the Shiʿi case was one among many.573 Unlike 
previous works on education in Lebanon, this chapter also investigates whether disparities 
occurred between the ideologies bestowed in the ʿAmiliyya school located in the Lebanese 
capital of Beirut, and the Jaʿfariyya school situated in the city of Tyre, a predominantly Shiʿi 
region in the South of Lebanon. How, if at all, did these Shiʿi educational institutions attempt to 
situate themselves in the Lebanese nation-state, and what types of sectarian and/or national 
modes of identitifation were being constructed during this Mandate period?   
As this dissertation has argued, the formation of the Lebanese nation propelled a sense of 
Shiʿi sectarian and national belonging that brought with it a need to reform. The reform most 
called for was that of the Shiʿi family and the individuals encompassing it—Shiʿi men, women, 
and children. As a component of this reform, the education of Shiʿi children, the future citizens 
of the sect, and thus the Lebanese nation-state, was deemed necessary. As a minority in the 
nationalist paradigm during a time of great national uncertainty, importance was placed on 
reforming the educational system within the Shiʿi community as it tried to negotiate its place in 
Lebanese society at the advent of the Mandate.   
 
The State of Education among the Shiʿi population: From Ottoman Empire to French Mandate 
The state of education among Shiʿi Muslims was extremely poor and lacking in 
comparison to other Lebanese sects. In 1914, the estimated number of Shiʿi children in school 
was five percent.574 This stark educational disadvantage exhibited in Shiʿi regions, such as Jabal 
                                                           
573 Sbaiti, “Lessons in History,” 10. 
 
574 Muhammad Bahjat and Muhammad Rafiq al-Tamimi, Wilayat Bayrūt (Beirut: Dār Lahd Khatir, 1987), 143. 
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ʿAmil, was linked to the group’s political and economic peripherality. The lack of modern 
agriculture and Western capitalist intervention in Shiʿi territories perpetuated a land labor society 
that did not demand educational prowess.575 The expansion of the port of Beirut and the creation 
of national borders between what became Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria alienated predominantly 
Shiʿi areas, such as Jabal ʿAmil and Baalbek, from the growing capitalist market.576 
Consequently, there was little economic incentive in those regions to pursue education. As a 
largely peasant society focused on agricultural cultivation, particularly tobacco, education was a 
privilege for a select few largely hailing from the emerging Shiʿi bourgeoisie and the traditional 
ʿulamaʾ (religious cleric or scholar) class.577   
Under the Ottoman Empire, educational efforts lagged behind, particularly in areas where 
Shiʿas resided, so much so that foreign missionary schools were established well before any 
organized state run schools were created. Foreign schools run by French, British, American, 
German, and Italian missionaries outnumbered Ottoman schools 2:1.578 For the most part, 
missionary schools filled the educational gap under the Ottoman Empire with different foreign 
and colonial interests vying for power in the region through education.579 It was also a way to 
ultimately undermine the power of the Ottoman Empire, which had been losing an authoritative 
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576 See Chapter one for further information on the economical impact the trade routes and border lines had on the 
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577 Chalabi, The Shiʿis of Jabal ʿAmil and the New Lebanon, 148. 
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and administrative grip across the Middle East. Even when the Ottoman Empire established the 
Ottoman Ministry of Education in 1847 to improve education, the number of Ottoman public 
schools went from 153 in 1886 to 359 on the eve of World War I. However, the schools 
established were largely in the Mutaṣarrifiyya region (Ottoman province of Mount Lebanon) 
where foreign schools flourished.580 Most of these missionary schools existed in Mount Lebanon 
and Beirut with very few existing in the rural and peripheral regions of Jabal ʿAmil and Baalbek 
where most Shiʿas resided. Thus, very few Shiʿas had access to these missionary and private 
schools as education remained a commodity enjoyed by the small ʿulamaʾ class.581 By 1920, 
Shiʿas had 11 schools while the Christian community had over 500.582 The number of schools 
present among Shiʿas remained significantly lower than among the other major sectarian groups 
in Lebanon.583 Government schools were also very limited in Shiʿi areas, which resulted in 
Shiʿas having the highest illiteracy rate among the various Lebanese sects as seen in table one 
below.   
Table One: Illiteracy Rate in 1932 
                                                           
580 This was also an attempt to counter the growing foreign presence in this region. See Traboulsi, A History of 
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the Druze literacy rate was much higher than that of Shiʿas as many Druze were educated in Maronite or missionary 
schools. This number drastically increased for the Sunnis of Lebanon as the Ottoman Empire’s power deteriorated 
and their political mobilization increased with the rise of Arab nationalism. See Martin Strohmeir “Muslim 
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This had a lasting impact on the nature of education in Lebanon as foreign schools 
became the model for future state schools, which emerged later. The education status among 
Shiʿi Muslims did not improve with the advent of the French Mandate. The French colonial 
authorities did not have a defined educational policy for the new Lebanese nation-state outside 
Christian communities, which were already well-equipped with schools.584 Although the French 
Administration undertook educational development by regulating and organizing existing 
schools, little was spent on expanding state run or national schools. Until 1951, there were no 
public secondary schools, and those available were run by foreign or local individuals.585 For the 
most part, the French continued the same system put in place under the Ottoman Empire. 
Consequently, privately run schools and missionary schools were the staple of Lebanese society. 
Privately run Shiʿi schools remained at a disadvantage as the mandatory government allocated 
2.3 percent of the state aid budget to Shiʿi schools while 92.5 percent of the budget went to their 
Christian counterparts in 1927.586 Rural areas, such as Jabal ʿAmil where most Shiʿas resided, 
became a periphery with the reconfiguration of the Middle East and the establishment of Beirut 
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over Sidon as the prime trade port.587 This reduced the importance of Jabal ʿAmil as financial 
investment, and institutional reform were placed on Beirut and Mount Lebanon.588 
Most of the schools present at the time were Christian missionary schools which housed a 
small number of Shiʿi students. During the Mandate, the majority of Shiʿi families could not 
afford these schools for their children due to high enrollment costs. Areas such as Nabatiyya in 
the south, which was predominantly Shiʿa, had no missionary schools leaving its children relying 
on the handful of state schools present. Although the exact number of state schools in Jabal 
ʿAmil is unknown, the number was scarce. For example, the southern town of Bint Jbeil had no 
elementary school while the city of Nabatiyya only had two.589 The two schools consisted of 
between only 90 to 120 students. The lack of educational establishments in these areas during the 
French Mandate limited the number of government held positions and political involvement in 
the state by Shiʿas. The situation only worsened under the presidency of Emile Eddé who passed 
a series of decrees in the 1930s intent on closing a sizable number of state schools as a way of 
reducing the state’s budget. Schools and teachers greatly affected were in Muslim areas as their 
needs remained secondary to that of the Maronites.590 According to Tamara Chalabi, there were a 
total of 177 schools in Jabal ʿAmil in 1938, however, the standards at these schools remained 
poor with few teachers and scarce resources.591 In contrast, al-ʿIrfān cited a smaller number of 
schools during this time period. In the “Question and Answer” segment of the journal, a reader 
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asked about the number of government schools in Jabal ʿAmil. In its response, the newspaper 
noted that Jabal ʿAmil had 52 schools connected to the government along with 54 private 
schools. The newspaper correspondent concluded that this was indeed a very scarce number.592 
In this same segment, another reader posed the question “Why doesn’t the government build 
schools according to the needs of the people instead of continuing to have the same number of 
schools as in old Lebanon?”593 The journal provided an elaborate answer that emphasized the 
weakness of the government in reforming and equalizing this discrepancy. Al-ʿIrfān and its 
readers were aware of the disparity in education among the various sects and regions, and the 
Shiʿas lagging position in this perspective.594 The frequent questions asked by its readers and the 
numerous articles written in al-ʿIrfān during the Mandate period highlighted the concern over 
education in the Lebanese nation-state, particularly as it related to the Shiʿi sect. It was in this 
climate that the call for educational reform, which was an indication of the growing sense by 
Shiʿas of sectarian consciousness and the awareness of importance of education to the 
empowerment of the community, perpetuated.595   
 
Education and the Nation: Al-ʿIrfān 
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593 Ibid. The question continued to ask was “who do we ask the government or parliament member for this?” 
 
594 “al-waṭaniyya wa ʾātharhā fī al-madrasa” [Nationalism and its Impact on Schools], al-ʿIrfān 15, no. 8–9 (1928): 
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The pages of al-‘Irfan became the stage for such debates and concerns with Shiʿi scholars 
blaming the lack of education on the community’s ongoing problems and their unheard political 
voices. Between the 1920s and 1940s, al-ʿIrfān was inundated with articles about education, its 
role in society, the types of schools that should be opened, and the curricula they should offer. As 
discussed in Chapter three, al-ʿIrfān spoke largely of the concerns of a growing Shiʿi middle-
class and society which emphasized education, another intricate component in the making of the 
Shiʿi family. Reform, as one article argued, was to begin in schools, and for this reason the issue 
of education had to be in the forefront.596 Schools were deemed the “foundation of knowledge 
and upbringing,” as one article noted, so the need to “remedy” them was imminent.597 Articles 
highlighted the “need for a structure and organization of learning” in Lebanon in order for 
change and development to occur.598 As noted above, there was awareness in al-ʿIrfān of the 
lack of schools in Shiʿi areas when compared to cities such as Beirut. The lack of political and 
economic prowess of Shiʿas in comparison to other sects was seen as the reason for disparity. In 
an article written by Fatāt al-Furāt titled “Education is for the Poor not the Rich,” the importance 
of education and how ignorance must be fought with education was emphasized.599 In order to 
lessen the gap “between the rich and poor,” and have our nation progress as other nations have, 
al-Furat argued the need to educate the poor and reform the current system, which had created 
such disparities.600 These disparities were not only delineated along socioeconomic lines, but 
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also along sectarian ones. As the most political disenfranchised and economical impoverished, 
the Shiʿas significantly lagged behind, and which impinged on their participation and 
amalgamation in the Lebanese nation-state. This paucity in many ways was seen to have a direct 
impact on the perpetuation of nationalism and the development of the sect in the nation-state as 
one article titled “Nationalism and its Impact on Schools” underscored.601 One commonality 
between articles published on education and schooling was their emphasis on the nation. From 
the nature of these articles, education was seen as a means of integration and knowledge 
production of the nation-state, and was thus a way of shaping the future citizens of Lebanon, and 
in particular the Shiʿi sect which lagged behind in education.  
 
Nation Building through Education 
Throughout the 1920s, a series dedicated to “Upbringing and Education” appeared, 
lamenting the state of education and the need for this issue to be addressed.602 In one such article, 
the author highlighted how “the first obligation of schools was to instill the “love of the nation” 
among the students.”603 The author expounded on this by demanding that education should be 
directed towar the advancement of the nation.604 However, in order for this to happen national or 
state run schools had to be constructed. Throughout the French Mandate period, al-ʿIrfān’s 
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writers demanded the establishment of national schools to combat the threat that foreign run 
schools would cause. This was not surprising considering that four-fifths of all students in 
Lebanon attended private schools while the rest went to the 129 public elementary schools 
opened by the French High Commission in 1920 and 1921.605 However, the majority of these 
schools (both public and private) were in Beirut and the Mount Lebanon region. As al-ʿIrfān’s 
writers purported, the call for nation-building through education had to be enforced by the 
establishment and enhancement of national schools. The January 1922 issue of al-ʿIrfān opened 
by addressing the lack of state sponsored schools in Lebanon and focusing specifically on Jabal 
ʿAmil.606 The article argued that “national” schools must be established to teach citizens to love 
their nation and defend it. A common concern of al-ʿIrfān was the prevalence of foreign schools. 
In one of the many articles addressing this issue, the author insisted on the growing threat of 
foreign schools that “teach the foreigners native tongue” and history rather than the “language 
and history of our land.”607 The author demanded more national schools to prevent the above 
from happening. In a similar article that commenced the June 1922 edition of al-ʿIrfān, it 
bemoaned the abundance of foreign schools over national schools “whose aim was political and 
religious and not the development” of the nation.608 Due to the failed state of nationalist 
education, the article argued, the nation has been weakened to the point of finding itself in “the 
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abyss of foreign progress,” resulting in “the disunity of the people.”609 Al-ʿIrfān continued by 
emphasizing the need to found national schools “dedicated to the people of the nation with 
educators from the nation,” in which foreigners would not be employed, and if they were they 
should have no say in the happenings of the schools.610 Only national schools according to one 
article titled “The Upbringing of School” could amend the nation and instill a nationalist element 
that foreign schools could not attain.611 In another article, the writer stressed the importance of 
national schools to teaching “the language of the nation” and what was pertinent to the (Syrian) 
nation and not to France.612 The author called on intellectuals to remedy the situation and help 
“raise the future soldiers of the nation that will defend it.”613 The author concluded by 
demanding national schools to “teach our language, geography, and history before it teaches the 
foreigners’ [sic] languages and their history.”614 Education was seen as part of the nationalist 
project and a way to amalgamate its constituents into the new Lebanese nation-state. The 
infringement of foreign and missionary schools throughout Greater Syria threatened the nation-
building process and its future children. The lack of state run schools in Shiʿi areas was a sign of 
their staggering position in the nation-building process and their integration into it. The 
education of Shiʿi children under nationalist state sponsored schools was seen as a way to 
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mobilize the nation-state, and the only way to do this was to bolster the status of the sect. In the 
case of Lebanon, nationalism appeared in a sectarian form as argued throughout this dissertation. 
Due to this sectarian makeup of the nation-state, the question over the role of religious education 
and type of curriculum to use in schools became one of concern and debate in al-ʿIrfān. 
 
The Desired Curriculum and the Question of Religion in Schools 
As debates over the status of education and how to remedy it ensued in articles published 
in al-ʿIrfān, the question of what schools should teach also became a matter of discussion. In one 
article, there was a strong call for a nationwide curriculum that utilized the same books in all 
state schools, while other writers stressed the importance of teaching the Arabic language, 
history, and geography of the nation-state.615 Almost all articles agreed on the nationalist 
component of the school curriculum that came through mastering the country’s language.616 This 
came during a period when the French authorities had declared French along with Arabic as the 
official languages of the nation-state. In Syria, on the contrary, the French applied a different 
policy in regard to language and established the Arab Academy to advance Arabic studies. This 
did not happen in Lebanon which was regarded as a Christian Phoenician country, and hence not 
Arab.617 Consequently, French was compulsory in schools, and culturally and politically 
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necessary for state or public employment. The insistence on Arabic as a form of instruction as 
propagated in al-ʿIrfān highlighted the importance of language in the struggle for national 
formation and anti-colonial expression. The imposition of French in all schools was enforced by 
the French Service de L’Instruction publique (Department of Public Education).618 For the 
French administrative authority, this was a form of knowledge domination that infiltrated all 
spheres of Lebanese society, while proclamation for the usage of Arabic was a form of resistance 
and national self-identification.619 Language was a contested site of national, cultural, and 
sectarian identity during the Mandate period, which would direct the means in which future 
citizens of the nation-state would communicate and reason in.620 In the case of Lebanon, the 
issue of language also represented an individual’s socioeconomic class and sectarian 
identification, and thus his or her access to power and resources. It was not until the Lebanese 
baccalaureate exam at the completion of secondary schooling in 1930 that Arabic became 
compulsory in schools. Prior to this, most secondary schools had taught little to no Arabic.621 
With the establishment of the new Republic of Lebanon in 1946, Arabic was declared the official 
language of the state and public schools—a step toward asserting national identity.   
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One aspect of education that received much attention was the place and role of religion in 
the school curriculum. As Nadya Sbaiti argued, the Arabic words tarbiya, referring to a moral 
component of upbringing and education, and taʿlim, meaning knowledge inducing education, 
were once perceived as one and the same.622 However, Sbaiti, among others, argued that the 
separation of tarbiya and taʿlīm coincided with the emergence of “secular” and “rational” forms 
of knowledge and disciplines, such as math and sciences.623 According to Sbaiti, there was a 
transfer of power from the family to school when schools became a place of taʿlīm but not of 
tarbiya.624 Taʿlīm was to occur as a function of schools to educate and raise children into the 
nation-state. In the case of Shiʿas, this debate over taʿlīm and tarbiya can be seen in al-ʿIrfān’s 
articles (which can also be read in the Al-Tarbiya wa Taʿlīm series published throughout the 
1920s and 1930s), and the subsequent creation of the first Shiʿi educational institutions. Al-
ʿIrfān’s contributors repeatedly highlighted the importance that religion had in formal schooling 
and the upbringing of the nation’s children. In Ahmed Riḍā’s article “Religious Education in 
Schools,” the prominent Shiʿi intellectual advocates religion as the most important aspect for the 
“development of proper character, and prevention of detainable actions.”625 Religious knowledge 
was seen as a necessary component of formal “secular” educational training in order to cultivate 
an appropriate temperament. In a more elaborate piece discussing this matter, Riḍā wrote that 
religion was no longer taught in schools but delegated to “the home and mosque,” which had 
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resulted in the ignorance found in society.626 He argued that the teaching of religion was 
important in society since the East was fundamentally different from the West whereby religion 
was “a component of the true nahda (awakening).”627 From this statement, it was quite clear that 
the author was aware of the growing split between taʿlīm and tarbiya, and thus attributed it to the 
West. By placing blame on the West, Riḍā made a clear distinction between the needs of the 
West and East in order to assert his demand for religious studies in formal educational training. 
According to this article, an awakening would only occur if religious education was incorporated 
in schools and society. In many of the articles discussing educational reform, religious studies 
was proposed and advocated for, and incorporated into curriculum modifications. Religious 
education was not seen as antithesis to secular studies, but rather contingent to it. According to 
another article written in June of 1922, the writer noted the importance of teaching religion but 
was quick to point out that it should not perpetuate “extremism.”628 This was one of the few 
articles that warned against excessive religiosity in formal schooling, and the negative impact it 
may have on the burgeoning fields of math and sciences.629 However, these articles did not 
question the sectarian component of schools and whether this would in any way threaten or come 
into conflict with the crafting of a unified nationalist sentiment. For the most part, al-ʿIrfān 
encouraged the study of religion in schools and the need to establish Shiʿi institutions of 
education. In one particular article, the author warned of the harm that sectarian schools may 
have on the nation, yet still advocated the teaching of religion in schools and employing teachers 
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who were competent enough to undertake this project.630 This debate between “secular” and 
“religious” education resulted in a discussion in the first educational centers as shown below.631 
However, with the lack of a single, unified educational system promoting a state-endorsed 
nationalist ideology, multiple educational systems were endorsed based on the needs of the 
sectarian community. In the case of the Shiʿas of Lebanon, a demand for educational reform was 
on the one hand nationalistic as it promoted an Arab Lebanese identity, and on the other hand 
sectarian as it spoke to the lack of educational development among Shiʿas.    
With the recognition of Shiʿas as a separate legal and political entity, a preoccupation 
with the educational status of the community became prevalent during this time.632 As Talal 
Asad has argued, the preoccupation of certain groups, such as Islamists, “with state power is the 
result not of its commitment to nationalist ideas but of the modern nation-state’s enforced claim 
to constitute legitimate social identities and arenas.”633 Consequently, the initiative of the Shiʿas 
to create schools was “a way of defining, ordering, and regulating social spaces and improving 
these social conditions” in a new nation-state that recognized them as a legitimate sectarian 
entity.634 In order to situate and integrate themselves within the new Lebanese nation, Shiʿas, 
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particularly those with middle-class perceptions, made efforts to remedy their continuing 
educational shortcomings vis-à-vis the other sects under the Mandate. Shiʿi sectarian and 
national self-awareness was reflected in the need to modernize and reform Shiʿi society in order 
to produce Lebanese national citizens. The demand to improve the educational status of Shiʿas, 
particularly the future Shiʿi children of the nation, became an imperative during the French 
Mandate period. Education was seen as part of the nationalist project and a way to amalgamate 
its constituents into the new Lebanese nation-state. Shiʿi children became the means by which 
this amalgamation could take place and the reason for this necessary change in societal 
advancement. Aware that education was a valued commodity and means to social mobility and 
power, Shiʿi leaders and notables campaigned for educational reform not only to strengthen the 
position of the community but also to enhance their own political prowess and recognition in the 
sect. Thus, the push for educational reform was driven by two forces: first by the rising Shiʿi 
bourgeoisie class who saw education as a means for personal social and political advancement 
and national integration, and second by the recognition of the Shiʿas as a legitimate sect within 
the Lebanese nation-state and inclusion in the government. For a group of people that lacked a 
pronounced political voice, the demands of the Shiʿas for educational reform became a means to 
political, social, and economic power, and recognition of a state that had long forgotten them. It 
was within this atmosphere that the making of the first successful Shiʿi schools appeared: the 
ʿAmiliyya school. Although many Shiʿi organizations were established at the beginning of the 
French Mandate to remedy the lack of educational centers within Shiʿi territories, most did not 
succeed due to inadequate funding and support.635 How did these schools address education and 
tackle the educational shortcomings present among Shiʿas at the time? How did the first 
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successful Shiʿi educational institution react to the commentaries regarding schooling and 
curriculum structure adhered to in al-ʿIrfān? 
 
The First Shiʿi Educational Centers Under the French Mandate 
 
The ʿAmiliyya 
The Charitable Islamic ʿAmili Society was established on June 12, 1923, in Beirut by 
Rashid Beydoun, a prominent Shiʿi notable who became the first Shiʿi parliament member in 
1937. Situated in the Beirut district of Barj al-Barājina, the organization catered to the needs of a 
burgeoning Shiʿi community where a significant number of Shiʿas had recently relocated to. 
During this time period, there was an increasing influx of Shiʿas from the South who came to 
Beirut generating a Shiʿi presence in the capital. Prior to the ʿAmiliyya, no institution catered to 
the specific Shiʿi needs and concerns in this area. The ʿAmiliyya came to provide an educational 
and cultural forum for the Shiʿi residents of Beirut, who were largely poor immigrants from the 
South. During its advent years, the society faced great social and economical hardship making it 
difficult for the organization to open its first school and center. It was not until 1928 that a proper 
building, consisting of three rooms, was purchased to house their first elementary school.636 In 
1929, the ʿAmiliyya school was established as a full-fledged modern elementary school with 300 
male students.637 By 1931, the school opened to female students and by 1936 the school had 446 
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students.638 In 1947, an all girls’ school, as well as a modern secondary school, opened.639 The 
funding for the establishment of the ʿAmiliyya schools largely came from Shiʿi immigrant 
communities in Africa, which ultimately propelled a deep connection with the Shiʿi diasporic 
community there.640 Although the ʿAmiliyya school was situated in Beirut, it spoke to the greater 
Shiʿi sect within the Lebanese context by representing Shiʿi educational reform and 
modernization. In an article published in al-ʿIrfān commemorating 10 years since the 
establishment of the ʿAmiliyya, its founder, Rashid Beydoun, spoke before a Shiʿi congregation, 
and hailed the school “. . . on raising the status of our people and nation” and “helped the poor 
get educated.”641 Beydoun continued by highlighting how “the nation is remedied through 
education, which was its ammunition.”642 The ʿAmiliyya school was promoted as a means of 
elevating the position of Shiʿas in the nation through education while also speaking to the needs 
of the sect as a whole. Beydoun propagated the ʿAmiliyya through his growing political position 
in the nation-state as the unifying symbol of the Shiʿi community. By 1937, the school expanded 
its educational operations by opening more schools outside the largely Shiʿi region of Jabal 
ʿAmil. Through its fundraising activity, the organization was able to open 48 schools in South 
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Lebanon.643 The expansion of the ʿAmiliyya from the capital of Beirut to the southern regions of 
Lebanon, in many ways, enhanced and reinforced the connectivity and sense of sectarian 
camaraderie within the boundaries of the newly crafted nation-state. 
According to the society’s first annual report in 1923, its main objective was “to raise the 
status of the children of the Shiʿi sect and to accentuate the quintessence of this sect.”644 The 
annual report declared its objectives as those meeting “the needs of the community.”645 The 
society made it clear that its mission was to combat the ignorance and illiteracy present among 
the Shiʿi population.646 In one of his infamous speeches, Rashid Beydoun justified the 
establishment of the ʿAmiliyya school by proclaiming that “the nation’s ammunition is education 
and thus it must properly equip itself.”647 From the outset of the ʿAmiliyya’s establishment, there 
was a clear sense of the society’s purpose and sectarian agenda, where it at once sought to 
enhance the sect while generating a Shiʿi voice and presence. The founders of the ʿAmiliyya 
were aware of the staggering educational statistics of Shiʿas, and thus sought to “create an 
educational institution that modeled itself according to the other Lebanese sects.”648 In order to 
accomplish this, the ʿAmiliyya school created a curriculum that sought to instill its students with 
the “appropriate education, character, and religious upbringing” to better situate and empower 
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Shiʿas within Lebanese society.649 The crafted curriculum emphasized the preservation and 
teaching of “the traditions of Islamic and Arab thought” along with study of worldly 
knowledge.650  
The curriculum of the ʿAmiliyya reflected these objectives as every private school in 
Lebanon was entitled to design its own teachings. According to the High Commission, private 
schools were allowed to adopt their own curricula and textbooks, which continues to be the case 
until today.651 This allowed each school to instill its own program of study as the French 
Mandate never standardized the private school curriculum. Even when it pertained to public 
schools, a national curricula was enforced in 1946, and has remained the same today, however, 
no set of standardized textbooks to be utilized uniformly in all schools was ever enforced.652 
Until this day, no official textbook or national historical narrative of Lebanon exists. The 
ʿAmiliyya school was entitled to create its own curriculum catering specifically to Shiʿas. 
According to the school’s 1923 annual report, the elementary curriculum focused primarily on 
religious (islāmī) and scientific (insānī) education. The school attempted to combine the 
principles of a modern education with the elements of a Shiʿi religious foundation and did not 
perceive enmity between the two fields of study as discussed earlier.653 The elementary 
education curriculum consisted of Arabic, French, math, history, and geography.654 The school 
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prided itself on teaching its students to master French as it attempted to acculturate its students 
into Lebanese society.655 The inclusion and emphasis of the French language in the standard 
school curriculum also indicated the school’s strategic effort to equip students with the necessary 
tools to continue into higher education and enter the Lebanese workforce.656 The school aimed to 
integrate Shiʿi children into the new nation-state while simultaneously accentuating their Shiʿi 
identity and sectarian unity.657 This was most evident with its course on geography.   
The geography course, according to the ʿAmiliyya’s annual report, introduced students to 
the diverse villages of the Lebanese nation, particularly Shiʿi ones, by organizing class trips to 
the Shiʿi stronghold of Jabal ʿAmil.658 There is much to be said about these trips and the 
significance they held. As the Department of Public Education was unable to institute a national 
curriculum in private schools or an official history or geography of Lebanon, schools such as the 
ʿAmiliyya were able to instill their own texts and narratives. According to Sbaiti, the history and 
geography books used in public schools in the early Mandate period were the same as those used 
in French private schools that recounted French and European history.659 Although the annual 
reports of the ʿAmiliyya school do not indicate the specific books utilized in each subject, the 
school incorporated the historical works of Muhammad al-Makki, a prominent Shiʿi writer and 
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intellectual and regular contributor to al-ʿIrfān.660 The school took an initiative to incorporate the 
emerging works of Shiʿi intellectuals focused on inscribing the history of Shiʿas in the Lebanese 
narrative. As discussed in Chapter one, the proliferation of Shiʿi historical and geographical 
narratives became prominent during the French Mandate years as Shiʿi intellectuals attempted to 
inscribe the community’s history into the national framework while situating that history 
between the competing narratives of Arabism and Phoenicianism prevalent at the time.661 With 
the lack of an official textbook, competing narratives were produced pertaining to the orientation 
of the private school. In the case of the ʿAmiliyya, the Shiʿi discourse was prevalent in its 
educational curriculum and school initiative. With the ʿAmiliyya paying special attention to the 
geographical areas significant to the Shiʿas of Lebanon, the school was at once interjecting 
Shiʿas into Lebanese history while also generating a particular national narrative akin to Shiʿas, 
and antagonistic to some extent to the more common Phoenician narrative that has largely 
excluded Shiʿas.662 By familiarizing students with the geography of Lebanon while emphasizing 
Shiʿi regions, the ʿAmiliyya transmitted a particular national narrative that idealized the past of 
the Shiʿas through their stronghold in Jabal ʿAmil.663 Along with the ʿAmiliyya school trips, in 
1933, the Rightly Guided, a group of boy scouts, was established and sent to Jabal ʿAmil to 
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spend the summer and explore the region.664 The school introduced students to this region and 
entrenched them with fondness and empathy toward Jabal ʿAmil based merely on their sectarian 
affinity. The production of knowledge about Shiʿi villages both enhanced and constructed a 
sectarian entity in Lebanon as “ancient” and entrenched in the lands past.665 Not only did the 
ʿAmiliyya teach its students this past but it initiated trips to Jabal ʿAmil, the geographical Shiʿi 
stronghold. The region of Jabal ʿAmil was not only a historical past, situating Shiʿas in the 
modern nation-state, but remained alive and present as students from Beirut were taken to the 
south to visit these historic villages. The significance of these trips from the capital, Beirut, to the 
rural remote region of Jabal ʿAmil heightened the students’ connectivity to this region as a 
sectarian legacy of the community’s past, present, and future was inculcated. Students who may 
have never known Jabal ʿAmil or have been aware of its historical importance were transported 
from the urban center to the rural periphery to experience it firsthand and become bequeathed 
with its presence. The ʿAmiliyya school’s curriculum strengthened sectarian affiliation as it was 
actively involved in reproducing the sect in the Lebanese nation-state. 
Although the ʿAmiliyya denied any claims of sectarian differentiation, the Shiʿi nature of 
the school was evident by the teaching staff in its early years. For the most part, the staff was 
composed of intellectuals and religious scholars hailing from prominent Shiʿi families, such as 
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Hassan ʿUsrayan, al-Sayyid Jaʿfari al-Amīn, Ahmad Ḍahīr, and Muhammad Mroure.666 This 
Shiʿi presence among the teaching staff transpired as the school continued to expand to areas 
throughout Lebanon.667 However, students continued to take part in the yearly ʿAshuraʾ 
commemorations to honor the death of the beloved Shiʿi Imam Husayn.668 As the pivotal 
historical moment defining and dividing Shiʿas from Sunnis, the commemorations remained a 
yearly event at the ʿAmiliyya schools. Schools took part in remembering the fallen Shiʿi Imam 
and his legacy as plays performed by students were reenacted, and the historical significance of 
the event were part of the curriculum.669 As Weiss and Mervin have argued, ʿAshuraʾ 
commemorations were minimal under the Ottoman Empire largely due to apprehension as Shiʿas 
practiced taqiyya whereby they concealed their religious identity for fear of persecution.670 
However, ʿAshuraʾ commemorations became more prevalent from the late 1920s onward 
whereby husayniyyas (centers designated for the remembrance of ʿAshuraʾ) began to emerge.671 
Fuad Khuri’s work on the Beirut suburbs of Ghobeiri and Shiyyah emphasized the public 
emergence of ʿAshuraʾ commemorations and mourning sessions among the migrants of this area 
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as a form of sectarian solidarity and unity.672 All these scholars highlighted the growing 
appearance of ʿAshuraʾ commemorations in the public space as a growing sense of sectarian 
awareness and accord proliferated. This can also be said about the stance the ʿAmiliyya school 
took in its ʿAshuraʾ commemorations in the Raʿs al-Nabaʿa district of Beirut, its public 
ceremonies, and active education of this distinctly Shiʿi historical moment.  According to Weiss 
“the public importance of ʿAshuraʾ became irreversibly institutionalized during the 1930’s” due 
to the wide presence of this religious practice and excess debates.673 The ʿAmiliyya school 
contributed to this institutionalization of sectarian identity in the nation-state through its 
educational underpinnings. 
The ʿAmiliyya also took a particular position by advocating a “modernized” form of 
ʿAshuraʾ celebrations in alliance with Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amīn who opposed the violent 
reenactment of the historic event.674 ʿAshuraʾ commemorations in many Shiʿi areas, including in 
southern Lebanon, were observed by reproducing the battle events that resulted in the death of 
Imam Husayn and his followers in the form of mourning ceremonies, passion plays, and self-
flagellation (laṭm).675 Sayyid al-Amīn advocated a more subtle way of commemoration that did 
away with the excessive mourning and violent bloodshed of this event, and called for a historical 
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and social understanding of ʿAshuraʾ to be adhered to.676 He called on Imam Husayn to be 
studied as a hero for his stance on justice and fairness, which the ʿAmiliyya school subsequently 
promoted in its curriculum.677 The incorporation of ʿAshuraʾ remembrance in its lesson planning 
and yearly events projected Shiʿas as part of the larger transnational history with a distinctly 
Lebanese sectarian orientation in the capital of Beirut. This strategic shift in the method of 
commemoration reflected the way the school hoped to present its sect publicly to others, and 
how it desired to position itself in Lebanese society as a part of the nation. The ʿAmiliyya’s 
focus was the children of the Shiʿi sect as it aimed to incorporate Shiʿas into the new Lebanese 
nation-state. According to the report, religion was included in the curriculum of the school not to 
create extremism, but rather to situate Shiʿas in the nation as a sect among the other sects.678 
However, religious study was a staple of the school and thought of as a “fundamental 
component” of schooling to be instilled in the “hearts of our youths” in order to shape them into 
“faithful, loyal citizens of this nation.”679 Although the school highlighted its sectarian sentiment 
by teaching religion as a subject, it prided itself on the comprehensive and modern education it 
provided its students.680 The school sought to generate a nationalist sentiment while establishing 
the sects’ proper place in society. In the case of Lebanon, nationalism was perpetuated by 
multiple competing notions of nationality rooted in sectarian underpinnings. 
                                                           
676 Sirāt al-Sayyid Muḥsin al-Amīn al-ʿAmili, eds. Haitham el-Amin and Sabrina Mervin (Beirut: Riyad el-Rayyes, 
2000). Muḥsin al-Amīn, Risālat al-tanzīh li-tanzīh li-aʿmāl al-shabīh. Sidon, Maṭbaʿat al-ʿIrfān, 1347). For further 
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Institutionalizing Sectarianism. 
 
677 Sāmī al-Ḥajj Mūsā, “Tarīkh al-jamʿiyya al-khayriyya al-Islāmiyya al-ʿamiliyya fī Bayrūt,” 73. 
 
678 Bayān al-ʿAmiliyya (1930), 2–4. Sāmī al-Ḥajj Mūsā, “Tarīkh al-jamʿiyya al-khayriyya al-Islāmiyya al-ʿamiliyya 
fī Bayrūt,” 72. 
 
679 Al-ʿAmiliyya Brochure (2002), 11. 
 
680 The school constructed a mosque, beside it, where daily student prayer was held. Al-qānūn al-dākhilīya, n.p., 20. 
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By 1947, the ʿAmiliyya expanded to include secondary education as teachers of different 
sectarian orientation made up its staff. This transformed the nature of the school as its orientation 
leaned to an Islamic and nationalist institution encompassing teachers of various sectarian 
orientations. In many ways, the ʿAmiliyya united Shiʿas of various areas under one education 
system as satellite schools opened throughout Lebanon. This project reified the desire to endow 
the sect with institutional assets that addressed the needs of its members on a par with other 
sects.  
The ʿAmiliyya school set the template for education among the Shiʿi community, and the 
schools which subsequently emerged. Rashid Beydoun’s ability to create a Shiʿi school at the 
heart of Beirut and expand this establishment throughout Lebanon reflected the Shiʿi 
community’s growing sectarian presence and their commitment to be incorporated into the 
nation-state. Education as an element of the nationalist project also became a way for Shiʿas to 
empower themselves and contribute to Lebanese society. Thus, the creation of the Jaʿfariyya 
school a few years later sought to follow the steps of the ʿAmiliyya.   
 
The Jaʿfariyya 
The Jaʿfariyya school was founded by prominent Shiʿi scholar Sayyid ʿAbd al-Husayn 
Sharaf al-Dīn with the financial assistance of the French administration.681 The Jaʿfariyya’s all 
boys’ elementary school officially opened in 1938 in the southern city of Tyre followed by the 
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girls division in 1941. By 1948, the Jaʿfariyya had expanded its school into secondary 
education.682 Throughout the years, the Jaʿfariyya school expanded and opened a number of 
branches in remote villages in the South to support areas with no educational resources.683 
According to the 1972 Jaʿfariyya annual report, 20 elementary schools had opened throughout 
Lebanon.684 However, until the late 1950s the Jaʿfariyya school continued to be the only 
secondary school in the predominantly Shiʿi city of Tyre.685 Since the school was established 
nearly 10 years after the ʿAmiliyya school, the Jaʿfariyya had slightly different objectives, 
particularly since the national circumstances in Lebanon had somewhat changed. With the Arab 
movement of Amir Faysal largely suppressed, and the long-standing presence of the French 
authorities in Lebanese society, the Jaʿfariyya had strong Lebanese nationalist overtones. As a 
reaction to the potent Western influences on Lebanese society, the Jaʿfariyya campaigned itself 
as the holders of Lebanese Arab history and culture.686 The Jaʿfariyya’s curriculum prided itself 
on teaching its students the Arabic language, literature, and history as a means to attaining 
this.687 The mission of the ʿJaʿfariyya school not only sought educational development as a 
means of advancement but also as a way to produce model Lebanese citizens, and “a wise 
generation for this nation.”688   
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This political change coupled with the geographical location of the Jaʿfariyya school in 
Tyre, the heart of Jabal ʿAmil, shaped its objectives and purpose. According to the Jaʿfariyya’s 
annual report, the fundamental reason behind the establishment of the school was to uphold the 
standards of the nation, particularly those of “the beloved children of Jabal ʿAmil” and “raising 
the status of our children in this nation” by instilling its students with a strong education and 
proper religious beliefs.689 The Jaʿfariyya school was a strong proponent of educating both the 
girls and boys of Jabal ʿAmil.690 It campaigned for the education of females and saw it necessary 
to the nation-building process and modernization of the sect.691 Its founder, Sayyid Sharif al-Dīn, 
advocated education as a component of the modernizing process and “knowledge [as] the path 
toward civilization” and “the measure of progress.”692 The school and its founder strongly 
believed in Western notions of modernization and advancement, particularly as it related to the 
role of education in society.693 Although the Jaʿfariyya school promoted a strong nationalist 
agenda, it was underscored by its sectarian tendencies, especially as it pertained to the Jabal 
ʿAmil and its place in the Lebanese nation-state. The school portrayed itself as “the palace of 
knowledge in the South” by glorifying Jabal ʿAmil, its history, legacy, and importance as 
proposed in the Jaʿfariyya newsletter.694 The Jaʿfariyya promoted nationalism and al-tarbiya al-
waṭanīya (nationalist education) by enhancing the stance of the sect and the recognition it was 
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given in the Lebanese nation-state, particularly as it related to the Shiʿi region.695 The school’s 
annual report specifically noted its objectives to “bestow the sons of Jabal ʿAmil a proper 
education and religious upbringing.”696 The institutional base of the Jaʿfariyya school pertained 
to the strong Shiʿi region, which shaped its objectives, educational goals, and curriculum. 
According to the annual report, education was the path toward “civilization” and the only way to 
measure society’s progress.697 However, a large component of the Jaʿfariyya school’s 
educational plan was sustaining a place for religion in its studies and within Shiʿi society. 
What was most significant about the school’s curriculum and agenda was the importance 
it placed on religion as a part of the modernization process. In an effort to promote education, the 
Jaʿfariyya maintained the need to teach the history of the Arab world while sustaining a place for 
religion in society. Like the ʿAmiliyya, the Jaʿfariyya’s elementary curriculum consisted of 
courses in Arabic, French, English, religion, history, geography, and math, with a separate 
Qurʾanic class.698 The Jaʿfariyya maintained a central place for religion in the school’s studies 
and teaching program. The school’s combined curriculum of academics and religion was deemed 
necessary to “awake the Shiʿas from their sleep” and create “a mature generation of Shiʿi 
intellectuals for this nation.”699 In order to obtain this, Sayyid Sharaf al-Dīn intended on creating 
an environment that combined the principles of Shiʿi Islam with the elements of a modern 
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educational program.700 The issue of the Jaʿfariyya’s strong religious sectarian stance spilled 
onto the pages of al-ʿIrfān. In its 1940 edition, an article written by Sayyid ʿAbd al-Husayn 
Sharif al-Dīn appeared defending the Jaʿfariyya school against apparent criticism over its 
sectarian tendencies. According to the article, the Jaʿfariyya had been criticized for not being 
nationalistic, but rather catering to “the needs of a particular people.”701 Sayyid Sharif al-Dīn 
argued that it was incorrect for individuals to think that the school was interested in teaching 
religion when the elementary school also specialized in “secular sciences.”702 He defended the 
school and its mission as one that promised to offer children a “comprehensive education” 
devoted to “promoting diversity.”703 In his defense, Sayyid Sharif al-Dīn asserted the diversity of 
his teaching staff as further evidence of the school’s nationalist sentiment. He contended that the 
Jaʿfariyya’s educators hailed from various sects, ranging from “Shiʿas, Sunnis, Alawites, and 
Christians,” insisting that one of the school’s leading directors was Sunni and French-
educated.704 Sayyid Sharif al-Dīn asserted this as further proof of the school’s diversity and non-
sectarian propensity.705 He upheld the school’s commitment to sustain a comprehensive 
education that encompassed both the secular sciences and religion appropriate for students of 
various sectarian denominations within the Lebanese nationalist framework. However, religious 
training was never denied in the article, but rather its place alongside secular knowledge was 
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asserted. The school defended the importance of religious education as a way to teach the 
appropriate morality and behavior necessary for any modern society.706 In many ways, the 
school’s position was a reaction to Western influences that saw no place for religion in society. 
The Jaʿfariyya school portrayed itself as a modern institution that continued to uphold religious 
undertones as it utilized the same interpretative discourse of modernization to measure 
progression and success. 
The Jaʿfariyya claimed to be non-sectarian even though its predominantly Shiʿi stance 
was evident in its mission and curriculum.707 The Jaʿfariyya sought to preserve the Shiʿis rich 
history in Lebanon as it made a point to indoctrinate its students with the rich “Matawila history 
of the past” as a source of pride and heritage as noted in the school’s annual report.708 The 
Jaʿfariyya school represented a Shiʿi institution that took a political and social stance to educate 
its student into the Lebanese nation and society as a modern sect among sects. The school 
acknowledged its sects’ staggering position in the nation and the need for “education to generate 
equality.”709 The school attempted to give its children the appropriate tools to integrate and 
advance in the nation as Lebanese Shiʿi citizens and national subjects.  
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Both the Jaʿfariyya and ʿAmiliyya schools represent the growing sense of the Shiʿas of 
sectarian consciousness within a newly defined nation-state. During a time of many political 
changes, the call for educational reform became a way to amalgamate the sect into the nation and 
to attain equal footing with the other dominant sects in society. Just as Shiʿi men and women 
were to be reformed so were Shiʿi children through the enhancement of education. More 
importantly, education became a means toward “modernization” and incorporation for the Shiʿas 
of Lebanon. Both the ʿAmiliyya and Jaʿfariyya schools, as well as al-ʿIrfān’s publications, 
emphasized the importance of teaching Shiʿi history and geography, and at times in 
contradictory ways as a means of transcribing and instilling the legacy of Shiʿas in the nation-
states’ past, present, and future. As seen in Chapter one, the writing of historical texts, 
particularly the history of the Shiʿas of Lebanon, became a prime concern of its intellectuals and 
religious notables. In the case of Lebanon whereby no official textbook or standardized historical 
narrative was adopted by the nation-state, competing narratives ensued as each community, 
including Shiʿas, came to document their own national history. Both Shiʿi educational 
institutions contributed to this historical process and sectarian formations at a time of great 
national ambiguity. More importantly, the ʿAmiliyya and Jaʿfariyya schools set the groundwork 
for other private Shiʿi institutions to emerge as they continue to play a strategic societal role for 









Sectarian Homes fills a gap in the social history of the Shiʿas of Lebanon while 
expanding on the practices of citizenship, sectarianism, marriage, and gender as they relate to 
Lebanese historiography and national formation. This historical study illustrates how Shiʿi 
Muslims came to practice citizenship and sectarianism, and the impact it had on the space of the 
family during the French Mandate and the creation of the new Lebanese nation-state. By 
focusing on the locus of the family, Sectarian Homes highlights how familial and gender roles 
became intertwined in sectarian and national categories of practices for the Shiʿi Muslims of 
Lebanon. 
 As they were most historically marginalized and underrepresented group in Lebanon, 
Sectarian Homes illustrates how the French Mandate brought about many changes in the way the 
Shiʿas of Lebanon came to conceptualize and integrate their place as a sect in the modern nation-
state. The system of political sectarianism was established as the only form of governance in the 
Lebanese nation-state, and thus citizenship became contingent on sectarian identification and 
national belonging. Due to the Lebanese state structure, citizens were tied to sectarian categories 
of identification that governed both personal and private practices of citizenship in the nation-
state. Consequently, families (and the individuals constituting them) were defined by their 
sectarian orientation, which were inadvertently linked to their political recognition in the 
Lebanese nation-state. Shiʿi individuals were confined to sectarian markers as the group was 
acknowledged by the nation-state as a legitimate sect. This impacted the familial space as 
personal status courts were established by the state to administer domestic matters. It is in this 
background that I explore how the familial home through the press, Jaʿfari shariʿa courts, and 
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education centers, served as a space where Lebanese Shiʿas negotiated, practiced, and 
normalized being modern sectarian citizens of the newly formed Lebanese nation-state. In 
particular, Sectarian Homes exposes the impact the recognition of the Shiʿas as a sect in the 
Lebanese nation-state had on the familial space, which was considered in need of reform and 
modernization by leading Shiʿi figures and members of society. This study argues it was 
precisely during this period of national formation and colonial presence that great emphasis was 
placed on remedying Shiʿi families, societal norms, and educating Shiʿi children as shown in its 
analysis of the Shiʿi press. This represented a shift, which moved toward the reassessment of 
Shiʿi families and the deployment of notions of femininity and masculinity as efforts were made 
to construct modern Shiʿi citizens of the nation-state. In extensively examining the pages of al-
ʿIrfān during the Mandate period, this dissertation illustrates the significance the journal placed 
on reforming the family particularly when it came to the issue of women, and its relation to the 
education of Shiʿi children and the development of the sect and nation. The fate of the sect was 
tied to that of the family. No other historical study captures this heightened anxiety regarding 
familial and gender roles as it related to Shiʿi practices of Lebanese citizenship and national 
formation.  
Sectarian Homes reveals that such productions of the Shiʿi family were a by-product of 
the colonial infrastructure that brought with it the recognition of the Shiʿas as a collective sect. 
With this recognition also came the legal establishmet of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts by the 
Mandate state to administer the familial matters of Lebanese Shiʿas. For the first time, Shiʿi 
familial matters and marital concerns were deliberated and documented in the institutional body 
of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts. From this point on, as this dissertation shows, families and 
marriages were intertwined with sectarian modes of identification. Sectarian Homes examines 
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the shariʿa records during the Mandate period, and exposes the impact this institution had on 
defining perimeters of Shiʿi marriages according to both sectarian and national lines. Chapter 
two exposes how issues of validating Shiʿi marriages and arbitrating sectarian and national lines 
of identification impacted marital disputes; while Chapter four reveals how gender roles and 
familial norms in the everyday lives of Shiʿas differed from those prescribed in al-ʿIrfān 
(analyzed in Chapter three). Through the court’s analysis, this study discloses how fluid sectarian 
boundaries and gendered practices were within this confined institutional space. The abundant 
records of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts expose the practices of average Shiʿi individuals in shaping 
and infoming familial, societal, sectarian, and gendered norms in their marital affairs. 
The recognition of the Shiʿas was a by-product of the new methods of disciplinary power 
established by the modern state whereby modern individuals and industrious political subjects 
were constructed in various institutions.710 By examining the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts, Shiʿi press, 
and Shiʿi educational centers in the Mandate period, Sectarian Homes unravels the different 
processes of informing Shiʿi familial norms and practices in these various institutions. In each 
space, importance was placed on the domain of the family and Shiʿi homes. By analyzing the 
shariʿa courts, press, and schools, this study traces the multiple constructions of familial and 
gender roles in the Mandate period. In reading al three sites, this dissertation shows how marital 
and gender roles were informed by growing sectarian and national identification among the 
Shiʿas. Whereas the press addressed appropriate gender roles in marital relationships and the 
upbringing of Shiʿi children, the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts came to regulate the everyday familial 
disputes for the Shiʿas for the first time. The family became a sectarianized space within the 
national landscape of Lebanon. As a sectarian space, the family was linked to the development of 
                                                           




the nation. During this colonial period, each institution came to inform and negotiate discursive 
norms for Shiʿi families. 
These new categories of collectivity ultimately fostered a sense of Shiʿi citizenship as a 
sectarian entity of the Lebanese nation-state. By placing, the press, the Jaʿfari sharʿa courts and 
educational instituions aIongside one another, Sectarian Homes illustrates how each informed 
notions of Shiʿi families in different ways. The family was organized as the house of discipline, 
which would produce “the proper mentality” of the Shiʿas as modern citizens of the Lebanese 
nation.711 Although these two spheres of the family may initially seem unrelated, it was during 
this transit period of the nation-state that familial concerns became important as both these 
institutions regulated and informed domestic practices. Sectarian Homes divulges the differences 
in the production of the family in the press and the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts. Whereas in al-ʿIrfān 
middle-class and Western constructions of the family were promulgated in its pages, the shariʿa 
courts represented more intricate understandings of gender roles and practices. Al-ʿIrfān linked 
the fate of the sect and success of the nation to the reform of Shiʿi families, and Shiʿi women in 
particular. The backwardness of the sect was linked to that of Shiʿi women, and thus they were 
described as needing reform. In many ways, the articulations of gendered roles blamed Shiʿi 
women for the failings of the sect (in comparsion to other sects) while also curtailing and 
limiting women’s role to the domestic home. On the other hand, the Jaʿfari court records 
illustrated a vivid picture of Shiʿi marital concerns, which seemed to give women greater rights 
in marital affairs. In most cases, Shiʿi women came before the court to amend their marital 
situation and faulting Shiʿi men for domestic troubles. Most interesting, it was during this period 
that the shariʿa courts were established and such marital issues were curtailed to the institutional 
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space of the courts under the auspices of the Lebanese nation-state. During this Mandate period, 
these two institutions regulated and prescribed discursive norms on the familial space. In both 
spaces, Shiʿi sectarianism defined their agenda and inclusion into the Lebanese nation-state. 
By examining the press and court records side by side, along with the establishment of 
the first Shiʿi educational institutions, this historical analysis also reveals how Shiʿas of various 
socioeconomic statuses utilized sectarian, as well as gendered, identification to suit their personal 
interests, thereby redefining societal norms and notions of “citizenship” into the Lebanese 
nation-state. I contend that not only did the colonial Mandate state play an intrinsic role in the 
formulations of the Shiʿas in Lebanon but that Shiʿas contributed to the production of the system 
of sectarianism in the Lebanese national space, particularly in the familial domain. While 
contributing to the system of sectarianism, Sectarian Homes illustrate how mutable such 
categories of identification were during this colonial period. Because these institutions have 
never been analyzed together, this study sheds light on this historical moment and provides a 
new understanding of how multiple, and at times contradictory, notions of citizenship were 
practiced. For instance, Sectarian Homes demonstrates how the establishment of the Jaʿfariyya 
and ʿAmiliyya schools reflected growing awareness and anxiety within Shiʿi society to reform 
and integrate Shiʿi children as the future citizens of the Lebanese nation-state. The agendas and 
curriculums of the first Shiʿi schools, albeit different in scope, were rooted in bolstering the Shiʿi 
sect by educating its future children and citizens of the Lebanese nation-state. By analyzing these 
schools, Sectarian Homes sheds light on different modes of identification that were proliferated 
in this space. When read alongside the analysis of al-ʿIrfān and cases from the Jaʿfari shariʿa 
courts, this study demonstrates the varying picture of sectarian and gender roles perceived and 
practiced in Shiʿi society and the daily lives of Shiʿi individuals. Sectarian Homes shows the 
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disparity between what was constructed as ideal Shiʿi gender roles and marital unity between 
women and men in al-ʿIrfān, and what actually took place before the shariʿa courts and 
educational centers in this regard. By taking such an approach, this study tracks how different 
spaces informed, negotiated, and constructed notions of Shiʿi citizenship and national 
identification. 
In examining the legal domain of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts and its first records, Sectarian 
Homes explores how familial matters and gender norms were negotiated in this new institutional 
body. The Jaʿfari shariʿa records merit future analysis and study. As one of only two individuals 
who has examined these records, my examination of the Jaʿfari shariʿa courts’ records reveal 
how its usage by individuals both complicated and reinforced legal and political categories of 
citizenship that were instituted by the Lebanese nation-state. More importantly, Sectarian Homes 
displays how gender formation and debates about the most intimate affairs of people’s lives 
became intertwined with categories of sectarian and national identifications. My analysis of these 
court records demonstrates how the legalization of personal status courts propelled a discursive 
space where notions of sectarian identity, religious norms, national belonging, and normative and 
familial roles were debated, performed, and constructed under the auspices of the new nation-
state. Within these contested boundaries, multiple and competing notions of gender and sectarian 
identifications were articulated as Sectarian Homes provides an intimate look at the everyday 
lives and practices of Shiʿi individuals. As this dissertation shows, the familial domain, and 
hence gender relationships, was linked and intertwined to the political and cultural progress of 
the Lebanese Shiʿas as a sectarian entity within this nation-state. 
By viewing these various institutions together, I argue that the collective identity of the 
Shiʿas was quite variable and contingent upon this historical moment. Because these institutions 
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have never been analyzed together in the context of the colonial Mandate period, new 
understandings of sectarianism in the space of the family are highlighted and unraveled. 
Sectarian Homes reveals how sectarian affiliations were not as bounded as they seemed during 
this formative period of the nation-state, contributing to a broader understanding of Lebanese 
citizenship and historiography. In undertaking this project, Sectarian Homes makes a major 
contribution to the social history of Lebanon, particularly that of Shiʿas, by adding to our 
understanding of how categories of sectarian formation and gender informed national 
identification during the French Mandate period. 
This dissertation contributes to the growing field that diagnoses the production of 
Lebanese sectarianism, citizenship, and national formation. Sectarian Homes contributes to a 
revisionist Lebanese historiography by taking an interdisciplinary approach that focuses on 
social, religious, gendered, and historical factors that imparted and shaped Shiʿi practices of 
citizenship and identification as they were incorporated into the Lebanese nation-state as a sect. 
This study introduces fresh material to the scholarship on modern Lebanese history in an effort 
to fill the existing lacuna on the construction of identity and civil society as it pertains to the 









Archival Material in Lebanon: 
Press 
Al-Bashīr, Beirut 
Jarīdat Jabal ʿAmil, Sidon 
Majallat al-ʿIrfān, Sidon 
Majallat al-Marj, Marjayoun 
An-Nahār, Beirut 
Al-Nisr al-Marjʿayūnī, Marjayoun 
Al-Qalam al-Sarīḥ, Marjayoun 
 
Courts 
Al-maḥkama al-sarʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Baʿalbek (Baalbek Jaʿfari shariʿa court) 
Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bayrūt (Beirut Jaʿfari shariʿa court) 
Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Bint Jbeil (Bint Jbeil Jaʿfari shariʿa court) 
Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Marjʿayūn (Marjayoun Jaʿfari shariʿa court) 
Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Ṣayda (Sidon Jaʿfari shariʿa court) 
Al-maḥkama al-sharʿiyya al-jaʿfariyya fī Ṣūr (Tyre Jaʿfari shariʿa court) 
 
Educational Centers 
Al-Jamʿiyya al-Khayriyya al-Islāmiyya al-ʿAmiliyya (The Charitable Islamic ʿAmili College), 
Beirut 
 
Al-Jamʿiyya al-Khayriyya al-Jaʿfariyya (The Charitable Jaʿfari Society), Tyre 
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